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ABSTRACT

Two papers by Polish scientists are provided that correlate lifelong education with man's creative activity and explore creativity as a practical philosophy. In "Permanent Education and Creativity," Bogdan Suchodolski supports the connection between permanent education and man's creative activity. He suggests that civilization is at a crossroads and wise control is needed to save it from dangers. The propositions of the most recent Club of Rome Report, "No Limits to Learning," are considered as are G. Picht's alternative, utopian proposals. Educational aims are explored that are based on preparations for a new, expected future and are not those of an adaptation to an existing reality. Discussion of creativity looks at the limits of a program for creativity. "Creativity as a Practical Philosophy," by Janus Kuczynski, is divided into three parts. The first part attempts a Marxist, positive interpretation of how sense comes to be created by man. The focus of part two is the concretization of socialism. The concepts of individuality, creativity, and community as a program are discussed as well as the formulation of an axiological attitude. Creativity is proposed as a means of a mutual development of the individual and the community. Part three gives an overview of social creativity under socialism in Poland. (YLB)

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PERMANENT EDUCATION AND CREATIVITY

Bogdan Suchodolski

CREATIVITY AS A PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Janusz Kuczynski

English language translation
edited by Colin Fletcher

Life-Long Education Unit, ED/SCM

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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between creativity and life-long education is often evoked but seldom studied. Two Polish scientists were asked to correlate life-long education to man's creative activity and to explore creativity as a practical philosophy. Creativity has been presented in this study in its historical and theoretical dimension, as well as in its daily practice.

That "motivation is the foundation and at the same time the consequence of life-long education" is one of the key points of the following pages. The rich life of Poland in recent years is reflected in this document where creativity is placed within the frame work of philosophical, political and pedagogical contemporary debate. The reader will find these pages full of very useful insights for educational policy makers and educators who have an interest in innovative educational process.

Bogdan SUCHODOLSKI is a Member of the Polish Academy of Sciences, a Founder Member of the Comparative Education Society in Europe, and the Association Internationale d'Histoire de l'Education, and author of several books on philosophy and education, the most recent being Anthropologie philosophique aux XVII et XVIIIème siècles, Ossolineum, Warsaw, 1981.

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PERMANENT EDUCATION AND CREATIVITY

Introduction

The term permanent education has gained considerable publicity in recent years. It has become obvious that in our changing civilization people learn throughout their lives to become capable of facing new professional demands and new social goals. Various actions have been undertaken to enable lifelong education. In many countries legislation has guaranteed time for the further education of employees. Educational policies have planned the establishment of many novel institutions and educational theoreticians are describing permanent education as much more than education after school. Permanent education is being expressed in terms of the aims and features of a general theory of education.

Today, after a period of great enthusiasm for the conception and realization of permanent education, we have come to a period of critical reflection. There have been difficulties in realization and there is an apprehension of some danger in the ways in which the concept has been interpreted. Permanent education, forced by economic needs, is most frequently organized within the field of recurrent education and manifesting difficulties in realization. It is neglected in the fields serving man's personal development and in the sphere of his social activity. Dangers in the interpretation of the permanent education principle are reflected in the attempts to identify this education with various kinds of indoctrination. In short, it is identified with the coercion of people and the violation of their minds. Further, a milder interpretation of this principle is being criticised.

It is said that adults do not want to be 'committed to whole life schooling'; nor do they want to be persistently taught the future forecasts - even the well intentioned - of a permanent education programme.

All the facts suggest that the problems of permanent education are not solely those of organization, administration and finance. There are important and difficult philosophical and moral problems, as well as anthropological and social problems, all deeply rooted in the complex development processes of modern civilization. This is understandable. Permanent education concerns teaching throughout a person's whole life; its aims and position express mankind's situation in the modern world.

Discussion on permanent education, from this point of view, considers the following problems. First of all we must remember that our civilization is at a cross-roads. It needs wise control to be saved from dangers and different kinds of catastrophies. Therefore the propositions of the most recent Club of Rome Report - 'No limits to learning' - will be considered as will the alternative and utopian proposals of G. Picht. Then attention will turn to educational aims, which are based on preparations for a new and expected future and are not those of an adaptation to existing reality. At each stage the problems of permanent education will be discussed. The problems raised are those of its social and philosophical genealogy and its handicaps in overcoming different types of alienation, the development of democratic participation in social and cultural life and progress towards self-government and self-realization. Finally, the problems of creativity will be taken up. Creativity is a specific guarantee of the authenticity of permanent education through its connection with individual and group needs and aspirations.

However, at the same time, attention will be paid to three limits of a programme for creativity. A principle of loyalty is just as important as the creativity principle; loyalty is understood to be an attachment to permanent values, which among others constitutes a collective and individual identity base. Secondly, a creative life model is not - within the range of man's activity - the only model. It is supplemented by a work model. Neither all work, nor the whole of work, can be transformed into creativity. Thirdly, creativity understood as the creation of social or material entities, should be supplemented by the principle of love. A principle of love should become the criterion for relations amongst people; the 'you and I' relationship replacing the indifferent 'they and I' and 'things and I' relationship.

1 Creativity

So far the consideration has stressed the various dependenciesof permanent education dependencies upon the conditions of social life and upon man's conceptualizations. Also stressed have been the great expectations connected with a general, lifelong educational programme being implemented and the simultaneous dangers increasingly arising from these attempts at implementation. Now the question is what possibilities exist of assurances against these dangers? What must be done to prevent permanent education from serving the purpose of man's exploitation within a labour force, whose better qualifications are important for bigger profits from production and not for better people's self-realization in work? How can it be ensured that permanent education does become an indoctrination programme - leading to a uniform society of obedient, passive, captive men - a programme strengthening dictatorships and fanaticisms? Finally, there is the question of how to save permanent education, rooted in the ground of good educational intentions,from administrative and bureaucratic shallowness; a shallowness which has influenced many school initiatives. We should guarantee that permanent education means to gain the values of authentic education, originating from real, individual and mass needs and aspirations.

Today, the search for such assurances, directs our attention to problems of creativity. Making the connection between permanent education and man's creative activity and making permanent education an ally of those creative forces which are present in societies and individuals - seems to be the expected beneficial programme of a dialectal unity between education and creativity. Permanent education connected with creativity would become authentic and lively. On the other hand, creativity, thanks to such an education, would become both more general and more intensive.

Are these expectations justified? This is the question I wish us to consider.

PART ONE

2 The Crossroads of Civilization

At the present time the development of civilization has reached a crossroads. Some think that this development will continue in the same way in the coming years and that our future will be the same as our present, only in every aspect 'larger'. Others think that many dangers, even catastrophies, await civilization on its present road of development and that we must build a future 'contrary' to our present by which to avoid them.

Let us begin with the characteristics of contemporary civilization. Francis Bacon formulated a thesis which was later developed by the Enlightenment doctrine of progress. According to this view, a spontaneous and uncontrolled development of science will bring a ceaseless blooming of civilization and give people the better condition of a comfortable and happy life. There is no doubt that today we are losing our belief in the genuineness of this thesis. The last decades have particularly deepened and spread the feeling of arising dangers.

Never before have people had such great military power. The scale of destruction which man could have caused is only a small fraction of the destruction he will be able to cause in the era which is proud to have, besides conventional arms, newly discovered offensive weapons - contrary to agreements and prohibitions - unknown to our ancestors. There is a bitter irony in the fact that the new weapons have been given abbreviations, which traditionally were, and still remain, the symbols of children's cultural beginnings. These are A, B, C, and refer to atomic, biological and chemical weapons. It is tragic that the world spends vast sums of money on armaments. This money could buy food and education, establish people's conditions of life and protect their health. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that even if this madness does not lead to an open armed conflict, it spoils the world's spiritual atmosphere, blocks the dialogue between continents and civilizations and destroys general human scientific values. The last of which are mobilized for destruction, instead of the protection and development of life. The danger of nuclear war is the most terrifying component of contemporary civilization. Only the apocalyptic vision of the end of the world can be compared with the terror caused by our visions of what could happen.

However, we can have the hope that the worst will not happen. Thus, there arise in different fields of civilization not strictly dangers, but harmful processes and situations which disintegrate the social community, disorientate human life and destroy the environment.

The great capitalist industrial civilization increases production beyond rational social and individual needs. It wastes; exhausting raw materials and the work of millions of people. Market absorbency is increased artificially by fashion and advertisements. People become obedient customers of unnecessary goods, even harmful prestige goods.

Research has shown the presence of over eight thousand drugs on the market. Only a little over two hundred are really necessary and useful. However, production has to increase. Why? The answer is - to produce more; although the official thesis is 'to make people happier from an excess of goods'. Thus, we come upon a vicious circle: produce more to consume more, consume more to produce more. This vicious circle turns faster and faster and is without breaks. At this point we do not ask about people's authentic and just needs, nor do we ask about the true purpose of production. We forget the waste of exhausting raw materials and the responsibility for future generations, who will inherit from us a destroyed and stolen world. We do not take into account the growing social conflicts which are due to polarization of richness and poverty; the race up the ladder of luxury; the tension of envy, competition; stresses; neuroses; frustrations and indifference. Furthermore, we forget that the increasing of production and consumption standards, calculated in money, indicate the decrease in standards such as the relations of man to man, man's relationship with himself: and the qualities of man's life.

At the same time, a wide range of side effects of modern scientific civilization are revealed. Man's natural environment is not only threatened, but very often irreparably destroyed. This is due to industrialization, which violates ecological laws, and due to the presence of chemicals in agriculture. Chemicals, according to our present knowledge, increase the output, but foul soil and water - simply all life and growth. Simultaneously, big cities, which until recently have been accepted examples of comfortable life, have become conglomerations of human masses. They exist in worsening conditions and suffer more from civilization's diseases than people did from plagues in the past.

Many countries have to overcome deep social conflicts. In many the traditionally exploited and suppressed social classes have won, in others the victory of either dictatorship or democracy has been undecided for years. There are also countries where the polarization between wealth and poverty has acquired dimensions which threaten the outbreak of hatred and total resignation from everything human.

A consumption model of life is formed in very rich countries. This model is attractive to many, but accessible only to some. The use level is raised higher and higher, making it harder to reach for newcomers. Different life conditions were always present, but they are harder to bear today as the idea of equality - at least the equality of chances - has influenced social consciousness. Evolutionary changes, leading to a just and acceptable society, seem slow - revolutionary advancement, too dangerous. Maintaining the present social order is defied by anarchists, who want to convulse its fundations. A wave of terrorism, whose roots vary within every country, continually disturbs the well arranged and wealthy world in different countries and on different continents. The painful and unsolved problems become more complicated when murders and kidnappings are the methods of activity. Innocent hostages pay, with their lives or captivity, for the faults of others and for their membership of a society which has to be punished. In many countries political struggle leads simply to the extermination of opponents, either through open or veiled murders, or through sentences of tribunals which cynically violate principles of law and justice. Whole tribes or even nations are being implacably exterminated in the name of great ideas.

New and difficult problems arise from the total civilization's formation processes. From the earliest times civilization developed in separate and isolated centres. Inter-continental relations were limited. Today all parts of the world are interdependent and most important problems regarding the world's future can only be overcome totally. The traditional political consciousness remains. According to this, every country wants to be sovereign and either tries to impose its will on others or isolate from others. Local interests conflict with international needs. Imperialistic and hegemonic tendencies strongly oppose the international need for understanding and cooperation.

A particularly drastic conflict between the developed and the developing countries, the rich 'north' and the poor 'south', can be seen. In countries which gain their freedom decolonization processes are unequal and often accompanied by numerous tensions. The interests of international cartels complicate the reconstruction and rebuilding processes (which are also sometimes blocked by the local feudal elite). The world's greatest powers interfere in these countries with their military and financial strength, to fulfil their own interests. Civil strife breaks out more and more often. The perspectives of third world development become unclear. Some countries see a solution in changing their feudal system by a socialist revolution. Others see their success in neocapitalism. A number of countries undertake the courageous and hopeful task of lifting themselves from archaic structures straight up to a just and desired 'new society'; uniting cultural traditions with the general human desire for freedom and equality.

The fate of total civilization, under these circumstances, becomes more and more dim in spite of various attempts to establish a new worldwide economic order. It is true that the world becomes standardized by the same techniques, industrial production and the same desires and consumption models. However, it becomes more and more disrupted in the political outlook, artistic and intellectual culture and moral attitudes. The rightly postulated dialogue between civilizations is at a standstill. Differences and contrasts can be seen more and more clearly. The just pursuit to protect national identity tends to turn quickly into militant nationalism, hostile to dialogue and toleration. The world population's potential for better contact through lines of communication and satellite techniques lacks authentic, spiritual understanding. Man is stranger to man, even hostile. Modern information media serve the understanding and coming together of the world's population to a small extent. They serve better the contacts through struggle, violence and domination.

The world's spiritual culture does not tell nations and individuals how to live happily and worthily. It does not direct their behaviour. This fact makes the situation worse. The great religious systems of Asia still have a strong tradition, but in practical social life they prove to be conservative or helpless. Weary and lost people of the West seek truth in these systems, but they only find a dubious psychotherapeutical method. The Pope's world trips excite the imagination of millions of Christians, who are hungry for faith and hope. The outcome of these trips is a rebirth of community feeling, which should relieve worries. But life quickly returns to its usual habits, where selfishness and injustice, poverty and hatred, regain their power over people. They only seemed to have lost such habits during the celebrated manifestations.

The awakening of a religion may establish a new kind of international solidarity. But when it is connected with fanaticism, it does not correlate with attempts to make conditions for basic understanding in the fundamental matters of human life. The great contests of youth - their rebellion against enclosing man within the borders of duty forced on him by needless or even harmful production, by horizons of luxurious and wasteful consumption blocking the roads to community, authenticity, creation, nature - did not remove from the social consciousness of developed countries, the stereotypes which inspire a senseless life of racing after wealth, power, and usage.

More features of modern civilization could be listed; but a general picture of its conflicts and problems has to suffice. This picture has been presented in the studies and memoirs of many national and international institutions and by many outstanding specialists. The picture allows it to be concluded that a combined and wise people's activity, on a total scale, is needed to overcome the growing difficulties and protect the future from the increasing danger. Such a control, rather than a spontaneous development of civilization, is needed to prevent a chain of disasters, even a total catastrophy - the destruction of all life on earth.

This is the crossroads that history reveals before us.

3 Limited Educational Propositions of the Club of Rome

Assuming that the many dangers threatening the world can be overcome only through a general education which allows the world to work out and implement a wise programme to control itself on a total scale - the Club of Rome Report is interested in teaching as the main property of that education. Teaching should be innovative, rather than conservative, to achieve this aim. The whole Report is devoted to the exposition of a concept of teaching through anticipation. This concept is contrasted with traditional teaching by means of the shock arising from catastrophies, which were not foreseen in time. Innovating teaching, also called anticipating, should - according to the Report's authors - have the nature of participation in all processes of learning in all aspects of life. The authors stress in many statements the general problems which are contemporary challenges for humanity. The challenges can be met only through an innovative and anticipating learning which creates people's solidarity in time and space through participation processes; enables an integrated understanding of contemporary civilization's general problems; stimulates individual and group autonomy, and inspires creative forces.

A description of this kind of learning, constitutes the best pages of the book. We are held fascinated by this vision, shown in various aspects and always as the only alternative we have to the disasters threatening our world civilization. 'Learn or perish' is a challenge and warning, which could easily be the Report's title; a title more adequate to its contents. The Report's authors, in actual fact, by calling for unlimited learning, have in mind only the type of learning which will diminish the gap between people and their civilization at the contemporary age's turning point.

Can we accept such narrowing of the educational problems of our age? Should we interpret their postulate of 'unlimited education' solely as the green light for learning, which is to serve - supposedly or truly - the recognition and solution of near-universal problems for civilization? Should we accept the contrasting of innovating learning with conservative learning? Do, really, all the most important educational tasks of our time fit into the mold of innovating learning presented in the Report? Is the antinomy of conservative and innovating learning the main - or the only - education antimony of our times, allowing fully for the establishment of educational directives?

The sole and steadfast support for innovating, anticipating learning, as propagated by the Report's authors, leads us away from contemporary problems (these problems are as important and difficult and decisive for world future as technology and science progress) and from humanistic problems of the value and sense of life - its spiritual and moral value. The Report's authors once or twice mention that the maintenance of mankind on earth should not be the only aim of learning. It should also aim at the assurance of man's dignity. However, this important humanistic problem remains neglected. The authors' interpretation of young people in protest and in contest, proves their great fascination and blindness as it leads to a defence of their own innovating learning concept and a rejection of conservative learning. They do not see other dimensions in the present day. Such youth movements have been treated as an example of temporal explosion of revolts against the domination of conservative learning. Their defeat is explained as a 'danger that the reaction to the questioning of conservative learning will lead to revenge directed against all innovating learning forms' (p 188). Such interpretation of a contest by youth, points to its marginal intentions - if at all manifested - and forgets its main aims. These movements are organized against productive and consumptive society, both as a conception of counter culture and in the practice of communal life. These existential problems - although mentioned by A.Peccei - were not included in the Report. There was space only for learning as the main factor in the development and control of a wise world-civilization. There was no space for learning as the source for those rich contents and qualities of people's lives.

The differences between the conservative and innovating learning should also have been stressed. Thus, there is doubt that modern civilization is a changing civilization and that people should be prepared to cope with new situations. Without wider existential and humanistic horizons, such change would not have been possible or necessary. The Report presents the conception of man as an entity creating its own environment and responsible for its shape and development. Man has a call for commitment and rational activity for mutual good. This conception sees man as the landlord of general civilization, concerned with its development and protecting it against dangers. Anticipating education is to serve this concern and prepare people to foresee rather than to wait for catastrophies (which teach through shock).

There is, also, another axis of human life; the individual and existential axis. Man desires to shape and live through his own life; the given 'here and now' is important, maybe the only reason for his existence. He wants to shape it and experience individually in the variety of culture richness, in the community of love and friendship; in direct emotional feelings; in contact with nature and art; in the construction of personal world vision and life wisdom. We need, of course, order for the world - the world we live in and we die in. The Report is full of serious admonitions and grim visions of total destruction. People, however, also need inner order, so necessary in turbulent and cruel times.

Nevertheless, the Report does not include all this. It stresses strongly man's role as citizen of the world and landlord of civilization generally. The Report does not discuss either man as individual, or culture, or man's personality and its development. Thus, these aspects are most important, not only because, finally, general control of civilization's development should become meaningful and lead to a better quality of the conditions of life and for a greater number of earth inhabitants, but also because dangerous world chaos is connected by feedback with inner chaos. Intolerant and aggressive confrontations between people of different tribes and nations, different religions and beliefs, different skin colour and different living regions, have their roots in individual views and attitudes. These are shaped by other individuals, who have power or social prestige. The anatomy of fanaticism, which threatens the modern world, clearly points to this subjective factor. The modern conflict between Hedonism and tradition (often discerned as a social service attitude, and including self-sacrifice for public causes, civil courage and heroism) is deeply rooted in individuals, but in new forms. Overcoming the consumerist life style is not only the matter of controlling the production of goods and a price setting policy. It is, in fact, the problem of choice made by individuals.

Without this fact it is an illusion that educational activity can do a lot for people and world improvement.

Education should be analyzed and supported from this point of view; as a social activity established to shape individuals. The elimination of this important and difficult problem is a great drawback to the Report. The fact that the shaping of individuals does not fit within the problems of general civilization development control and the innovating learning destined for these aims - should not cause its elimination. On the contrary, it should be the reason for its complementary introduction.

This existential analysis of education would open perspectives for the particularly important problems of those permanent and changeable values which organize people's lives. There is no doubt that modern civilization is a changing civilization; people have to be prepared to cope in new situations. But not everything is subject to change. Historically permanent values and perhaps general and universally human values remain. There are traditions, which are contemporary and a morality which is still valid. Besides new, changeable and fashionable art, there is eternal art; although some treat museums, which keep these works, as art cemeteries. There is an important man to man relation - direct and personal, outside organizations and institutions, the 'you and I' relation. Besides the variety of religions, customs, local practice, there are homogeneous, common, eternal, similarities. The great dialogue between civilizations - such an important proposition in our divided age - helps to discover them. Thus, education's important task is not only preparing people to cope with dangers. Its aim is also to teach them to accept common and permanent values, in changeable conditions. Man, himself, is changeable and varied from the historical and geographical point of view. Simultaneously, man is everywhere and always the same. Education should consider this extraordinary value of homosapiens; otherwise, it will not be able to fulfil its aims. Significant vagueness and uncertainty of directions (which should have resulted from diagnosing situations and from general principles) is the consequence of a narrowed outlook. Teachers have enough different means of action to initiate and advance the progress of an innovating learning population.

What should be done - on a local scale - to implant innovating learning principles? What to and how to change an educational programme at various school levels? How to reshape the school as an institution?

Another series of questions must be asked of the wider, social context if the proposition of a victory for the innovating learning concept is to be answered. Conservative tendencies are strong everywhere - it is a known fact. Edmund Burke's reflection deriving from an analysis of the French Revolution is still correct. According to this, people prefer to do stupid things which have been always done before, rather than wise things which have not been tried by anyone else. How can this psychological barrier be overcome? How will social barriers be overcome: institution resistance, class resistance and resistance of those who having power, are afraid to lose it? Can we believe that innovating learning will win in societies which become more and more bureaucratic; more and more strongly concentrated around conservative and dogmatic principles, more and more distrustful towards innovators, even in science (not to mention social aspects)? Will innovating learning find the way in the world of political violence; blind and fanatical hatred; different varieties of imperialism and colonialism extermination of tribes and nations, carried out under various slogans? Can we believe that innovating learning will overcome barriers put up by a the mechanization of man's work, routine encouraged by reluctance to change and people's submission to machines for increased production and profit?

We should search for strong allies to implement the innovating learning concept. We should look for them amongst social and political forces which lead to the future. Without these allies, the actions of neglected teachers will be weak and limited. At best they will be able to implement small reforms in the educational system; they will not participate in the important reforms.

I cannot conclude these reflections without stating some bitter, but sincere, afterthoughts of an historian. Looking from a distance at this work of good will, enthusiasm and feeling of responsibility, looking at it with kindness and without the active impatience which demands decisions, directives, and guarantees of success, we can place the Club of Rome Report in the long chain of human hopes and particularly within teachers' strong belief that they can do a lot of good in this 'upside down' world.

Let us remember the work and fate of J A Komeński. Thus, he who lived during the age of religious war and discrimination as an exile from his country - felt himself to be a 'citizen of the world'. Indeed, the world did not exist then and general problems were limited by the frontiers of Europe. Nevertheless, Komeński was working on a project for the improvement of all human things. This improvement was to be achieved through general education, through 'general care of human capability'. Thanks to the education renewal proposed by Komeński - i.e. his programmes and methods, thanks to his 'Great Didactics', there was to be 'less darkness, confusion and disagreement in a country and more order, peace and quiet'. In another work, 'Pampaedia', Komeński introduced a detailed programme of permanent education intended to include all people; they were to participate in everything human. Not only the chosen can become prophets - wrote Komeński - every man can and should prophesie.

Thus, we recognize in these thoughts the same attempt 'to fill the human gap' through general innovating learning. Are not the memoires and the addresses presented to convince the rich of his contemporary world not similar to what we do today? Is Komeński's memoire 'Via Lucis', presented in 1668 to the Royal Society in London (the great scientific institution of that time) not similar to our appeals to Unesco (with the belief that the road of light will be open to all)?

However, when he had been disappointed, time after time, and lost hope of convincing anyone, he turned to philosophical contemplation. He constructed his great concept of pansophy, thanks to which - he thought it may be possible in the distant future to establish a real people's republic. He continued his work and strengthened his conviction that making everyone 'human' is the highest aim of education. Education stopped being a tool of short-term activity for achieving desired political effects. It became an independent precious value ina 'labyrinth' world, an element of 'heart's paradise' existing only in the lives of some, most frequently among the discriminated.

Should we not - remembering this conception and Komeński's courage - propogate a slogan for unlimited education, because unlimited education is, as we believe, a global civilization improvement programme? Alternatively, should we not - being so often disappointed - protect this slogan because it possibly brings man his greatest good, even when the total world improvement campaign fails?

Although tragic, it would have been deeply human, if alongside a pragmatic slogan: 'Learn if you do not want to die' we were to propogate another: 'Learn even if you were to die'. Maybe history will agree with both, or maybe only with one of them? With which?

4 Utopia as the Strategy of Action

In a situation when civilization is at a crossroads, we ask how are we to control it and protect it from threatening catastrophies? This is the basic question. It means that we feel the future should not be the same as the present. It should be 'bigger' and in many aspects 'different'. More could be said: if civilization is not to perish, it must in the nearest future descend from the road leading it to total catastrophy. In what sense should it be different? In what spheres? These are the detailed questions, for which we seek answers in alternative thinking.

The alternative notion is the basic notion in contemporary thinking about future directions of civilization's development. It anxiously questions many accepted development tendencies, many habits and many institutions, pointing to their uselessness in new conditions and under new tasks, teaching that it can be 'otherwise'.

This is how the interest caused by (in spite of many animosities) alternativists' efforts to show the vision of the desired society, and the direction of present activity, is explained. This is why we carefully follow individual and group activity, such as that at the Centre in Nyon near Geneva or the Institute for World Order in New York.

In the atmosphere concerned to see the future - and thus the present - runs a process which is important and distinct for our times. We could describe it as 'utopia revaluization'. Utopia is an old notion, but the long centuries of its history have caused deep animosity in social consciousness. Society has always manifested its modernity by a contemptuous superiority to utopian visions. Today, however, we must and we want to look into the future. We must look in a variety of ways and critically. Linked with imagination and the will of action, utopian thinking regains its value. This revaluization is not a simple return and repetition. On the contrary, it is reaching to the source and essence of thinking. Whilst rejecting what is superficial, it protects the important. Utopia understood as a detailed future vision, vaguely appearing to people, is criticized. The categories 'sometime' and 'somewhere' and maybe 'never' and 'nowhere', are criticized, just as the traditional literary convention of the 'happy island', is.

Utopia is to be treated as a general vision of the desired direction of development inspiring specific present activity. This way of understanding utopia gains a philosophical interpretation, as in the works of Ernst Bloch. There, hope's principle meaning is revealed. As well, too, there is a social interpretation to be found in numerous publications by sociologists and economists. Johan Galtung[1], for example, differentiating between empirical and potential reality, states that all thinking about the future should consider this duality. It means that besides 'facts' there are 'forces'. Besides agreements and existing structures there are 'open' shapes of life; besides theory and empirical data, there are values. Utopia is present in the second dimension of reality. Galtung thus differentiates 'free' utopia from utopias which are organising activity.

The latter kind of utopian thinking function is brought out and is introduced into the present struggle for the desired future. Facts which were never before considered, by those creating utopian visions, under these circumstances become important. One of those facts is the strategy of action.

Recently, a conference was devoted to it. It was organised in the Thomas More Centre by Pierre Furter and Gerard Raulet.[2] The conference participants differentiated utopias into abstract and particular, closed and open. They also tried to answer the following question; what are the possibilities of action strategy? They pointed to the fact that authentic utopian thinking allows 'destructuralization' of conceptions of existing reality and gives possibilities of reading it differently. Some even thought that without categories of possibility, we cannot understand reality. Others said that utopian thinking, when treated synchronically, realizes the possible in the symbolic order.

On the other hand, when treated diachronically, utopian thinking causes a specific distance enabling a questioning of the present. Such 'literature of the present' is like a never-ending process opposing all forms of stability and dogmatism. When ideologies turn in the direction of firmness, through stressing with optimism the relation between reality and rationality, then utopian thinking asks if any exploitation of the present can strengthen future rationality. It also leads to a paradoxical conclusion, that 'the acceptance of utopia's irrealism is the best guarantee of its possible present'. This is why the basic assumption of utopian strategy is to 'outlive the distance', which allows a never ending questioning and hope process - an articulation of many negations. It also allows the discovery of their many sources and exceeds the boundaries of purely negative contests. Some conference participants suggested using a Hegelian 'negation of negation' concept to describe this characteristic. Others stressed the meaning of 'movement as opposition to the existing' and the meaning of 'experience as opposition to what has been learned and repeated.'

The understanding of utopia as an inspiration of present activity has found many believers. It has been especially expressed by Bernard Vincent in his publications. He refers to Ivan Illich's and Paul Goodman's ideas - particularly those discussed in the book, 'Paul Goodman et la reconquete du present'.[3] He points particularly to the meaning of the category 'here and now' as an essence of living utopia which can express man's personality - his creativity and self-realization and social nature - community with people and the world, mutual help and work within groups.

The range of such 'utopian life' is different within different conceptions. All, however, value the belief that an alternative to accepted schemes of understanding reality and principles of action is considered. This includes extrapolation; which in plans concerning the future, strengthens what exists in the present, even the direction leading to a catastrophy.

From this point of view, utopia should not be treated as an intellectual or artistic folly, although it sometimes has such character. It should be treated as people's important orientation within the present. Their duty and responsibility is building a future for the generations who will inhabit this world after us (in such natural and social conditions as we leave behind as the result of our present blindness and frivolity). This point of view has found a beautiful and wise explanation in Rene Dumont's book entitled 'Utopie ou la Mort'. This outstanding expert in the food problems of developing countries is convinced that without fundamental changes in moral attitude in the citizens of rich countries - the hope for such change can be treated as modern utopia - plans for feeding all the world's inhabitants will not be realized. The inevitable death of millions of people and their blind struggle with the rich world will be the consequence. 'Even in years of good harvests', said Dumont in one interview, 'more than half of the African population does not have enough food. Babies are born smaller and smaller. They already starve in their mother's womb. Soon, when they start dying, terrorism will become the only weapon of social protest left in the hands of developing countries. It will reach our own borders'.[4]

Set against these processes of future concern and the renaissance of utopian thinking, is the thesis put forward by Georg Picht. The wide range of his scientific and journalistic activity in philosophy, politics, education, as well as his activity as an educator, allows him to treat these problems integrally. His personal, moral attitude gives them a meaning of distinct general, existential responsibility.

Can we prevent the coming catastrophy? Picht's answer is simple: it is possible, but only if 'man's reason will be able to solve great problems of the world'. This condition is a utopian hypothesis which Picht defends from superficial and naive programmes constructed by politicians, technocrats, even scientists. 'We know for sure', writes Picht, 'that the technical world and everything which we call today society, will break up, if we are unable to verify through our own thinking and utopian activity, the hypothesis that world's greatest problems can be solved by reason. Utopia, which we treat as a basis, is the only source for theory planning future society. The aftermath of any other assumption is that future society will cease existing. This is the reason why we are forced to be utopian'.

However we must state clearly which utopia we have in mind. Picht differentiates three kinds of utopia. There are 'imaginary utopias' and their creators express 'unintentional desires, blind hopes, irrational wishes'. There are also 'critical utopias' in which we can recognize critical reflections on the states and possibilities of the present world. However, Picht supports 'enlightened utopia', which introduces states achieved through activity with a conscious aim. Contrary to the other two forms of utopia, this form of 'future anticipation limits itself to real possibilities'. This utopia considers practical studies based on methods of rational prognosis and does not introduce real political planning. Nevertheless, it crosses their horizons and this is the reason why it is necessary. Without a clear picture of the future, which will result from our thinking and activity, technology becomes dangerous and politics blind. Picht's intellectual struggle leads towards convincing us that we need more of such 'enlightened utopias', to liberate us from the shortsighted pragmatism and false hopes acquired from 'imaginary utopia'. Technocrats, politicians, even scientists are drawn towards both these dangers. The world's future depends on whether we can gain their access to 'enlightened utopia' and whether we can convince them that for the good of humanity, it is not essential that our minds produce technology and science, social ideologies and political institutions. It is essential, however, that our mind uses rationally its own products.

The description of Picht's attitude would not be full if we were not to discuss another two of its features. One is concerned with philosophical aspects of his conception, the other with existentially and personally rooted attitudes.

Picht's conception of philosophy leads him to characterise the acceptance of alienation as man's fate in time. Contrary to those for whom 'alienation leads towards the activation of combined feelings which destroy all rationality and deprive people of wisdom', Picht feels that 'man is always alienated because he is a being, who can only survive by trying to become something he is yet unable to become'. Such an understanding of alienation makes it the force of historical development. 'Because man is always alienated', writes Picht, 'he owns history'. He owns history, because alienation inscribed into the basic shape of his being, puts upon him the inability of stopping himself in any state. It also forces him, constantly, 'to go out of himself and as being transferred into the uncertainty of the anticipated future'.

This historical conception of man's fate acquires deep, humane and optimistic accents in Picht's interpretation. The aim is an understanding that our civilization's crisis is not a simple matter which we are unable to face. It is an element of our fate, our being in the world, our condition humaine. Truly human, feels Picht, is only he who can face it. It means that an 'historical crisis is the only form in which we can survive'. The following hope is possible: man's humanity, and future forms of wisdom, are released everywhere where man's poverty is shown and his misery clear; where false security fails and the lies hidden within social systems are revealed. Real hope for humanity arises where dangers threaten to win and where false hopes fail.

This kind of alienation constitutes the source of deep 'humanitas' and Picht stresses its importance. He is an enthusiast of antiquity by profession and a true Christian by vocation. Thus he warns against a search for man's humanity among the rich and well-fed; among 'Success people', among those who dutifully fulfil the life-model of consumer society. Already and in the past, says Picht, everything human occurs on the darker side of existence, in illness, suffering, poverty and in so-called deviations. He who is humane is also hungry, oppressed, pushed away, poor, ill ..... One has to learn the code of poverty to find true humanity.[5]

Such philosophy of hope, similar but different from M.Bloch's, was the basis of the concept of 'enlightened utopia'. It was to lead the great work of world improvement;

contrary to the false promises of technocrats and pragmatists, contrary to false pictures of an easy and happy future as described by irrational and blind utopias. Enlightened utopia - as we remember - is to be a severe criticism of the mistakes made by contemporary civilization in the field of aims, values and frivolity. The last is understood as the neglect of the activity of the whole of mankind's intelligent control, even science. People influence the future by their planning. Planning has two sources: prognosis and utopia. The first shows what exists and what happens. The second shows what we would like to happen due to our purposeful activity. In this sense utopia - enlightened utopia of course - is real and responsible thinking.

In this sense it is already present among us. It exists 'here and now', not 'somewhere and sometime'. In this form it becomes a challenge to our conscience, an appeal to our responsibility. Picht tried to take up this challenge and this calling in his own life. This constitutes the personal and existential feature of his activity, referred to previously. We cannot, of course, present his biography here. We shall recall, however, one important moment. In the winter of 1945, after the war, Picht left his University professorship and devoted his work to a boarding school in Birklehof.

This beautiful and rigorous decision by Picht, shows the existential roots of his attitudes. Who will be convinced that this school in Birklehof has a real and important meaning for the world's fate? Who will be able to forget that its spiritual patron, Socrates, could offer the world only his life and not rescue it from evil? Maybe it is not necessary to make these pragmatic calculations, but simply to live in this way.

5 Education for the Future

What is the purpose of education? Is it to adapt to modern civilization and therefore a preparation for participating in its present course of development? Or is it to call for competent and systematic improvement in all fields needing intelligent control?

The adaption programme, of course, is easier to achieve and is free of risk and dangers. The education authorities and parents usually support it. Parents are interested in their children easily finding a place in a well arranged society whose activities follow traditionally established directions. Those in authority over the national economy value the adaptive preparation as well.

Educating for a new future is difficult and risky. No one knows today what type of reorientation for the development of modern civilization should take place, to save it from catastrophies and make it a general good, serving all people. Not all agree to the programme which embodies the purpose of restoration. Therefore the teachers' goal of introducing the younger generation to the unsure ground of criticism, trial, hope and expectations, can be questioned. Sometimes teachers are even held back by moral arguments; that they have no right to complicate the young by making them an 'angry' generation, that they should be a generation of well behaved people seeking comfort and success.

The matter is not easy. Let us assume that we have to look for the means of successful control over civilization's development as otherwise humanity faces total extinction. Thus, a truth is that we teachers should prepare everyone for it, particularly the young. To answer the moral doubts as to whether the young should be exposed to fight and the risk of loss, we must state that although adaptive education is safer it can be questioned from the moral point of view. Adaptive education encourages a rejection of responsibility for the fate of the world. It also steers life to selfishness, using the argument that as long as a catastrophy has not reached the door of our home, then we can build there a peaceful and wealthy life.

Thus education is at a crossroads. The situation encourages the choice of a policy leading to a new future, rather than a conservative one. We must, however, outline the new role of education, its most important aims and values and hopes. It is clear that not having a specified and detailed picture of the future, we cannot see education as the realization of a ready model for future man. Under the influence of traditional education, which understands education as adaption, we try to fit this understanding into the future and adapt education to the picture of the future we have. This is false. Education should not be treated as adaption, even if adaption for the future. It should take part in all restoration processes, which today seek a wise path into the future. Education should not form and manipulate the young generation according to authoritarian models of the future. It should awaken the strength which will form the future. I understand how difficult these statements are for some teachers to accept. I know that they wish to be presented with a ready and detailed educational ideal. They could then teach it to their pupils and mark them according to its realization.

This, however, is not possible. We have to act in a different way. It might be more difficult, but more human and wiser. We must realize that through the centuries of European history, education served formation as well as inspiration. It implemented Plato's educational programme, but was also in agreement with Socrates. The ideals of the latter represented deeper dimensions of education. We are returning to them now.

Having rejected misunderstandings and harmful desires to realize a ready future model in education, we can point to some aims of inspired education for the new future civilization.

We must first point to its total orientating vision. As I have just said, it will not be a detailed picture of future civilization. Thus it must make us aware of basic postulates which a further development of civilization should fulfil. We must understand that civilization cannot be treated as a reality independent from us, which is able to award us with benefits or punish with catastrophies. It must become an effect of people's work.

Particularly today, when civilization is at a crossroads people's role in directing it becomes decisive. It must become a general good serving all.

Contemporary discussions concerning the desired, secure and general future civilization concentrate on the problems of its development and progress. It is important that education should also leave room for the systematic and deep revision of the present public opinions on progress and development. A general understanding of progress and development has been shaped and strengthened for two centuries - since the Enlightenment. Its fundamental assumptions concern scientific and economic successes i.e. growth. New inventions, wealth and better conditions of everyday life were to become the measure of civilization's development and social progress. Development and progress, understood as growth, were to be the basic aim of people's activity and the main reference for civilization's changes and values.

The contemporary crisis of industrial civilization is reflected in criticism of this conception. What really is development? What is the difference between true and fictitious development? Are progress and development evaluated correctly? Will they divert our attention from authentic life values? Are the countries that we call developed really developed? Are the countries that we call undeveloped really undeveloped? What is the range between the two kinds? According to which system do we evaluate their real or false undevelopment?

This is a list of questions doubting the general attitude that progress and development should be measured by technological and economic indices which are alienated from social and human context. We all know these indices. They force us to place higher those countries where the national income per capita is higher; where the production of steel and electrical energy is bigger; where the percentage of service workers is increasing; where education, particularly at university level, is more advanced; where there are more radio and TV sets; where there is bigger consumption of paper and soap. All these - and many like them - evaluate progress and development by a big, industrial, consumer, Euro-American model of life. Today we are losing faith in the rightness of these indices. We are no longer sure whether, for example, those Arab countries where oil ensures the highest national income per capita, are at the top of progress ladder. There are attempts to set a general index, which could be a reference point for achievements in different fields of civilization - from the effects of production to national health. The aspects that take over in those attempts are material rather than human, matter-of-fact rather than human; technological and economic rather than social and existential.

It is obvious that a certain level of material life is the basis of any progress and development. We are not trying to encourage poverty and primitiveness. We are not persuading teachers to lecture upon self-abnegation and asceticism. But it has been proved in many contemporary, economic and sociological, studies that a development of material-technical and capitalist-industrial civilization no longer serves people. It conditions them to demands, which are the source of alienation and do not deepen their humanity. This kind of development often unites with anti-democratic and reactive forces which have a policy of aggression and imperialism. At the same time it disorganises an individual's scale of values and creativity, subduing them to consumer civilization.

It is very important to show people the need for a fundamental revision of current conceptions of progress and development and to shape their new understanding. This should be the role of teachers. Although it is very difficult to work out indices suitable for the new understanding, research - particularly due to the initiative of J. Galtung - moves forward. The research includes indices which in evaluating progress and development take into account such values as: ecological balance, personal growth, equality, social justice, autonomy, participation, solidarity, diversity, fulfilment of basic needs and socio-economic growth - all included in social and individual development. The search for indices of progress and development will help to save us from submission to unworthy, technological development; to a technocratic myth, and a myth of material wealth. In particular, the wealth myth can negate all values in society and destroy equality, justice, participation and community. At the same time it can strengthen exploitation, violence and manipulation. The search for and establishment of indices will allow intelligent control over the further development of civilization, a wise development towards valuable and useful aims. Their implementation will assure the possibilities of a happy and good life for a greater number of people.

These perspectives should include the continuation of the development of science. The many international conferences and publications devoted to the role of science in development will be meaningful only if development comes to be understood in a new, humane and social way. Science, as Georg Picht said, should enrich our knowledge, but teach also on how it should be used for wise aims instead of destruction. It should also include everything that is needed and useful in technology. Science should not become fascinated by its own possibilities. The problems of planning, organization and management should also be discussed from the point of view of a new notion of socio-humanistic progress. Finally, it should not be analyzed according to the previously valid model of growth, gigantic and free from realistic socio-individual needs. Schumacher's thesis that 'small is beautiful', is appropriate.

An education which will serve the future should, above all, concentrate its efforts on shaping a critical consciousness. Through this consciousness it will be possible, from the point of view of civilization's goals and valued tasks, to verify everything in its spontaneous development. It will be also possible to show a way of proper control over the development of future civilization, freeing it from the many dangerous fascinations which those against the general good try to sustain.

We should teach alternative thinking to realize these plans; this is a second task of educating for a new future. As a result of alternative thinking we learn to understand our reality more deeply than by normal empirical observation. Deeper understanding results from an analysis influenced by the question: 'can it be otherwise?' Without the perspective of a possible distinctness, our understanding of reality becomes a slavish copying. In consequence reality seems static. The perspective of possibilities takes us deeper, into different forces, shaping a particular state of reality. It is changeable and never final. To understand the movement of reality we must consider various possibilities: those that will be realized and those that perish and those which depend on human intervention to survive.

This is the reason why alternative thinking is so important for dynamism and the orientation of human attitudes towards the future. If we consider that something can be 'different' or can exist in a 'different way' than it exists, our intellectual horizon widens. We take up a position from a distance and can evaluate the chances and purposefulness of cooperation in restoration processes; transformations and the realization of possible projects.

One can have an opinion that alternative thinking encourages criticism. This in return undermines the existence and sense of many dogmas and institutions, generally treated as unchanging and true. For this reason alternative thinking is dangerous and destructive; it is true. However, has not historical development always been a break away from the secure? Did it not negate what seemed a natural and stable foundation of social life, its structure and organization? This always took place in the past. Today, in the era of crossroads, it is particularly needed.

The fears which arise from alternative thinking being encouragedcan be diminished. We assume that alternative thinking should not be understood as mere free play with possibilities. We do not call possibilities anything that we can reckon ourselves; the discovery of possibilities is not imaginary. By possibilities we mean everything we can plan as more rational and effective; more valuable to the existing. A possibility is not real, but it can become real, or should become so thanks to our efforts. The notion of possibility comprises value and rationality greater than in present reality. It also comprises human activity. An activity bigger than the one depending upon an acceptance of reality.

Featuring alternative thinking in this way points to its deep connections with the thinking which has been called innovative learning; a form of learning which was introduced into the most recent Club of Rome Report, 'No limits to Learning'. It is contrasted there with maintenance learning. Innovative learning was to refer, particularly to foreseeing the consequences of events then occurring and the ability to integrate the anticipated consequences. Thus it is treated as self-anticipative learning.

Such an analysis of reality, showing all its internal connections and dependencies as well as development tendencies (particularly consequences to which they will lead) is the basis of alternative thinking. It draws its realistic strength from this basis. It can also differentiate between imaginary alternatives and those alternatives which are possible to realize, as the result of consequent activity. In this way alternative thinking becomes the apex of innovating and integrating thinking, as well as anticipating thinking. The last, when left on its own, would not lead anywhere and remain disorientated. It acquires orientation when serving as the base of alternative thinking.

Alternative thinking is an evaluating way of thinking, strictly connected with a humane and social vision of progress and development. This vision would have been an infertile utopia, if we were unable to work out a strategy for easing its realization. Alternative thinking enables us to construct utopias ready for implementation. The contemporary rebirth of the idea of utopia - I cannot go into details here - in philosophical and sociological writings, shows how connected is its meaning with the expectations and hopes of people in a world full of unrest, dangers and worries. The modern understanding of utopia rejects its traditional meaning as dreams of any kind, with the time and place of their fulfilment unknown. Utopia becomes an organization acting 'here and now' for the future, which should be 'different' than today. The new notion of utopia - and many publications present it this way - covers our recent considerations. That which is determined is a specific synthesis of a new vision of humanistic and social progress with an alternative analysis of the present times and the appropriate direction of activity; bringing the hope that possibilities will become realities through people.

A third aim of education, that of serving the new future, contains concern for the quality of life. It is deeply rooted in the objective factors of progress and development that I have just discussed. It is also rooted in alternative thinking which revises present reality and current beliefs. However, the quality of life's problem does not only arise from objective factors. It results also from subjective decisions made by individuals and from their personal choice of values according to which they want to shape their own lives. It is a specific style of individual existence. Although civilization's objective elements influence individual life style to some extent, strengthening them by a particular financial level; decisions of political authorities; socio-economic structure and current opinions, there exists - sometimes quite extended - a sphere of life susceptible to individual and group decisions, challenges to and reconstruction of life style, to acceptance of alternative visions, which present a new model of 'good and happy' life.

This field is particularly close to teachers' activities. Some think that they can do a lot for their pupils' life orientation - which is a rather conceited belief. Nevertheless, school education participates particularly successfully in this matter, only on a very small scale.

School education aims at studies which prepare professional people - and to a small extent - at a civil and cultural background. Whereas personal and existential problems are compounded in questions of how to live; how to control one's life to make it happy and worthy; how to run relations with other people regardless of profits and benefits; of which hierarchy of values to accept? All these questions are hardly covered by the education programme. The well known book 'Learning to be' introduces teachers - as the title shows - to these problems. It does not say, however, how to explain them in practice. It does not say what to change in education in order to 'teach to be'. Philosophical studies take up this problem, making a differentiation between 'to be' and 'to have'. They bring a lot of important reflection, important for education, in a range from G. Marcel to E. Fromm.

An education which will serve a new future should particularly care about the formation of life-qualities; through the conflicts and cooperation between the principles of 'to be' and 'to have'. There are no doubts that, today, the principle 'to have' dominates the general opinion. Its meaning is to have more money; more importance; more power over people; in short, more of everything. Human life orientated in this way becomes only a means to obtain all these successes. All its stages are important for rising higher up. Every experience is evaluated only from this point of view or from the point of view of the strength which will guarantee success in the future.

A style called 'horizontal' contrasts with the previously discussed style which is often described as 'vertical'. The horizontal style expresses a desire to be somebody and does not aim at having something. Experiences, which do not serve a purpose, are important here. They are important because they are valuable. The experiences of love and friendship, nature and art, do not have an instrumental feature. Their value is not seen in their function as means for success in other fields of life. Their value is absolute, self-sufficient. Man's life becomes fuller and in a sense happier, due to this kind of experience. He does not limit himself, nor destroy his valuable experience by a pursuit for financial successes and prestige gains. A defence of this kind of life in our utilitarian-pragmatic civilization, which encourages a one-sided implementation of the principle 'to have', is not easy. We support this defence, but not because we call for an ascetic resignation of all possessions. We would like to see aspirations enlarging possessions and acquiring new meaning when adjusted to who we are and who we become. Purely having - property, power, jobs - is not bad. Having for the sake of having, having without perspectives - is bad. It is wrong if human life becomes a means to enlarge private possessions, because it should be a means to enlarging human personality.

Life oriented according to the principle 'to be', instead of 'to have', has at least one value. It leaves man much more power over his own fate. In our aspiration to widen the range of our possessions, we always come across a resistance from material-social reality and the comparable aims of other people. These create various conflicts. In those situations a lot depends upon accidental circumstances and upon the strength of opponents and competitors. In contrast, aspirations 'to be someone' and 'become someone' do not create competitive situations and are not conditional upon the acquired successes of other people. In this sense the directive 'to do something with oneself' is better than the directive 'to do something for oneself'.

It seems that only the second directive is important. Very often man's energy and significance is estimated by what he can do 'for himself'. This is not, however, the road to a new civilization. On the contrary, on this road the future and its restoration will be darkened. The perspectives desired will be open when people do something 'with themselves' and not 'for themselves'.

I realize that sounds like traditional moralizing. I do not deny that it is present in my call. However, we must understand that it is a modern call, expressing concern for the future, on behalf of both societies and people. One economist has wisely said that an appeal to love thy neighbour had only had a moral meaning in the past. Today it is a condition of human survival on the planet. A similar change takes place in the sphere of the principle of 'to have'. A further strengthening of the principle of 'to have' will lead to - as it is clear today - everybody fighting everybody else. It will also lead a vast increase of different kinds of neuroses. Many people will finally find a peaceful and happy life within the walls and gardens of psychiatric institutions. This can already be seen today. Philosophers and artists ask anxiously, so often, whether people considered as healthy are not mad in this senseless world and - if those considered mad are not really the healthy, authentic people, who cannot find a place of their own in this crazy world. An old renaissance question is repeated in the concern for a true man: who is not real and for real man? Who is not true?

The quality of life, oriented around the principle 'to be' instead of 'to have', will help to overcome the dangers of modern consumer civilization, which are reflected in the disorganization of people's psyche. The American model of life which encourages and forces people to race higher and higher up and to compete with each other, makes the distance between aspirations and achieved successes grow.

People's lives become subjected to more stresses and frustrations which lead to neuroses, drug taking, crime and aggression. The horizontal model introduces calmness and balance. It silences competitive conflicts, rids people of the selfishness which forces them to see in everyone either an enemy or an ally. The horizontal model simply allows a person to see another human being.

This model of life is strongly connected with the new conception of progress and development which I have already discussed. The new indices of progress show the meaning of such a civilization's development, which could assure a good and happy life for greater numbers of people. The horizontal model guarantees the implementation of these aims on a larger scale than does the vertical model. It forms a certain balance between aspirations and achievements. Thus, we can conclude that a moral and cultural balance between needs and aspirations and achievements present in many traditional societies in the developing countries, guarantees a happier and more quiet life than that which is guaranteed by industrial civilization. Industrial civilization destroys the balance and creates greater tensions through dissatisfaction and requires more stimulation of effort. If we were to evaluate civilization's social values by the relation between needs, aspirations and their fulfilment, we would have to accept the superiority of civilizations existing in the jungles of Africa and America and not the one that exists in the 'American jungle'.

I do not make this comparison to encourage the return to nature and primitivism, but I would like to stress that a worthy quality of life is not an automatic result of a rich, consumer civilization. Dignity and happiness are neither conceived in wealth, splendour, fashion, denaturalization, nor in the atmosphere of competitive struggle for money, power, jobs, exploitation and control of other people.

It is clear from this chapter that the aims for education are vast and important. While working for a new future, education should organize the life of younger generations according to the principle of 'to be' and 'become someone'. Unfortunately, there is no time to discuss the details of this programme. However, I will point to at least three directions, by which it should be extended.

The first is that scientific education be understood as a disinterested world-view and not solely as a tool of practical activity. Science is valuable, not only because some of its applications bring us great profit. It is also valuable because it awakens and satisfies man's passion for thinking. It is not instrumental, but a value in itself. Contemporary education seems to forget this fact.

The second direction should be the encouragement of a bolder education through art. Great and wise mottoes have been phrased; let us mention at least those of Herbert Read. Art implements well the horizontal life-model and develops the construction of both community and personality. The implementation of these mottoes is being left far behind.

The third direction concerns philosophy in its widest possible meaning - the philosophy of nature, man and civilization. A very important field, totally neglected in education; treated with suspicion, disregarded. But man does not fit within utilitarian - pragmatic dimensions. Today, no socio-political problem can be tackled without taking into account the philosophy of man. Why does contemporary education try to avoid this problem? Youth protest movements were that generation's severe judgement on sterile, unwanted and timid education. The time has come to draw constructive conclusions from this judgement.

Now I would like to add some observations on the fourth education principle which plays a part in the construction of future, new, civilization. Man's whole life does not rest upon the principles of 'to be' and 'to have'. There is also the principle of action. This action does not serve either personality formation or the enlargement of his possessions. It is an action through which man 'makes something with the world'. A given, ready, unchanged environment for life does not satisfy man. This is a deep feature within man. He undertakes the continuous task of changing the natural environment. This task is that of creation and work. Work, of course, is treated as a source of income and creation as obedience to fashion and fame as organized by the culture industry. The essential meanings of work and creation are different. They express man who reshapes the world surrounding him and who develops through his own creative work. He then rebels against the restrictions which his creations put on him and undertakes a new task.

I shall not try to explain here the fluid line drawn between work and creation. I shall make the general statement that very important educational aims are in cooperation with social policy and with the working class ambition to restore human dignity and value to work and creation. A well-organized preparation for work at the school level, the awakening and strengthening of interests and talents, the systematic discipline of language and the development of creative dispositions - all these are within education's competences. They can serve the future. We would like to work for the acquisition of self-realization by a larger number of people in the future. An attitude of creativity should be popularized within a circle wider than that of artists and scientists.

The need and ability of action, shaped in this way, opens up wide horizons for those educational aims which we call 'participation' and 'involvement'. These terms become the basic aims of democracy in educated societies. General education, at its higher level, leads to the general desire for cooperation in collective life and decision making. The implementation of participation's premises requires an increase in the level of education. Both processes are mutually connected. They should also be connected with individual aspirations. Otherwise they will become superficial and dead. This connection can be realized only through individual aspirations and the development of needs and abilities of action. That is - through involvement.

There is dialectical connection between involvement and participation. It is not possible to involve people in common affairs without there being better possibilities for participation in the making and implementing of decisions. Neither is it possible to organize participation in a society of passive, unwilling people who cannot undertake involved action. The Club of Rome Report, which I have already quoted in this chapter, stresses the importance - social and educational - of participation. It does not, however, stress the importance of shaping the need and ability for action. Without establishing the needs of work and creation, and their associated abilities, their programme for participation cannot be implemented.

Activity, in which man creates something not 'for himself' or 'with himself' but 'for the world', is a very important aspect of existence. Its value in relation to the other two ways of existence, requires a deeper analysis.

We may be sure that the principle of 'to be' organizes a much more worthy life than the principle of 'to have'. It should be quite easy to convince people that action is more valuable than possessing, but the relation between 'to be' and 'to act for the world' is not unequivocal. Life organized according to the principle of 'to be' has more value than life totally engaged in 'activity for the world'. On the other hand, it is more valuable to do something for the world than with oneself. It often happens that directing man's activity into his inner life blocks his important and valuable contribution to the world. Man's existence becomes selfish. He gets rid of the duties which are a burden to him. He is then smaller than he should be because he does not exceed the boundaries of himself. This breaching of man's own boundaries expresses his values. Humanity is manifested through various acts of service, sacrifice, even the sacrifice of life.

'Doing something with oneself' cannot always be treated as an immoral alibi which protects man from the more difficult activity of 'for the world'. Sometimes it is more valuable than this activity, which is often superficial, useless and only deserves indifference. Escape into the world away from inner life is just as wrong as escape into inner life from activity in the world. There are many false actions in contemporary social life which manifest a strong tendency for an excessive and overgrown development. Many people are mobilized for these actions and they are deceitfully convinced about their importance. An overgrown bureaucracy is the best example; this kind of activity in the world cannot be highly valued.

It must be stated that the value of any activity in the world depends on the aims it serves and the extent to which they are attained. This might seem a trivial conclusion. It has, however, extensive consequences because it means that teaching the ability to act should be connected with the total vision of the new and future civilization. This should be the origin of the right involvement and valuable participation. Only this vision shows where to become involved and where to participate.

This vision - as I have said - does not constitute a picture of some far away reality which could one day win the whole globe. The principle is that of actions in different time perspectives - some close and others further away - and organized in different spatial scopes. There are actions brought about for general and far-away aims;

there are also actions for close and local aims. The vision of new civilization is an inspiration for everything that takes place and will take place 'here and now'.

The different ranges are not always harmonious. There is particular tension between the local mentality created through centuries - being a member of a tribe, nation, country - and the new consciousness of world citizenship. It is difficult to disregard traditional ties. We appreciate their value in the development of civilization and people's lives. We accept the right of every group to keep their cultural identity. We are anxious that the new industrial civilization (and connected with it, the consumer) covering the whole world, destroys communities, their cultures, customs and values. As teachers, particularly, we are moved by the 'sadness of the tropics' as described by Levi-Strauss and by the misfortune of people 'torn out' from the mother-land of their own culture.

At the same time we cannot forget that the world citizenship principle is the basic condition of everybody's preparation for a sensitive and intelligent attitude to the new mutual problems and their solutions. This is only possible on a total scale. Teachers face very important tasks. Through their work they should prevent the younger generation from betraying their own nations, but at the same time, teach them the ability to undertake the new human duties that contemporary history sets for them; the duties of civilization's total control. Taking up the great 'dialogue between civilization's' would be an important step in this matter; this is what Roger Garaudy calls for.

The preparation of the young for involvement and participation needs the solution of a very difficult problem - it requires the reconciliation of tolerance and eagerness. A big, important action can never arise without enthusiasm and a kind of blindness. An action which deserves dignity and generalization should not be influenced by fanaticism and non-tolerance. The English philosopher, Alexander Pope, pointed long ago to a connection between enthusiasm and fanaticism. We should not think, nevertheless, that they are inevitable. We believe that toleration can accompany eagerness and not scepticism or nihilism.

The implementation of this hope is combined with courageous efforts to deal with violent actions. A vast wave of terror and violence spreads throughout the world. Those who lose power use terror as a weapon to manifest their hopeless situation. For dictators, who have gained power, it has become a method of governing. For fanatics, it has become a strategy for destroying enemies. Simultaneously with the wave of direct terror, there is an increase of violence used by ruling classes and countries to strengthen their power over the exploited classes and conquered nations and tribes. Human life has lost value, it is no longer protected. On the contrary, the easiest method of victory over enemies and rivals is their extermination.

Are we going to be laughed at for trying to defend the principle of action without violence, in a world of cruelty and turmoil? Are we going to be laughed at for recalling the political and social action strategies of Ghandi and Danilo Dolci? Will the defence of their ideas become the source of hope that respect for man and immunity of his body and person can be guaranteed in this world? An outstanding Polish writer once said: 'Man is sacred and no one has the right to harm him'. These words form a boundary which cannot be crossed in any action.

I am going to finish by recalling one of the thoughts of H.G.Wells. In his book 'The Outline of History' he described the modern era as a dramatic race between catastrophy and education. We want to win this race. This is the reason why we feel that educational orientation is important and urgent. It must serve the forces - unfortunately, not yet strong - which want to control the future civilization's development for benefit of all people in the world.

Education understood in this way has four main axes. These are:

1 A total vision of the future world as a sought after and 'real' people's world;

2 Alternative thinking, freeing the mind from a submission to the existing and opening it towards new possibilities;

3 A strategy of life regulated by the principle 'to be' rather than 'to have';

4 The activity of involvement and participation, but free from violence and fanaticism.

These are the four bricks of the big house of new education, which should be built with the effort of all teachers in the world. Is it not utopia to propose the construction of the house of education as a world house of education, when everywhere where it is organized, is far away from this purpose and responsibility? Maybe. But is there another way out? A food expert, R Dumont, analysing the approaching hunger catastrophy, presented the only effective means which could prevent this catastrophy in a book entitled: 'Death or Utopia'. And this is the real modern crossroads of civilization. Can we teachers think twice, for a moment, which to choose?

6 The Problem of Overcoming Alienation by Means of Lifelong Education

The realization of the whole programme of lifelong education depends to an even larger extent on the factors determining the basic conditions and the principles of human existence; although the connection between these aspects and education is more indirect. Lifelong education is only to a certain extent a matter of organization as implemented by teachers and educators. It is deeply rooted in the social circumstances which determine the motives of human action and thereby influence the evaluation of different principles and different objectives in human life. If we accept the ideas of lifelong education, we should also accept one particular mode of life. We have to accept the principle that education, interpreted in a broad sense as the intensification of human development, should be regarded as the most essential value in life. According to this principle, the influence of education will dominate the organization of everyday life, and we can only accept this principle if we believe that the social circumstances in which we find ourselves provide the possibility of a full realization and development of all human faculties. If man finds himself in surroundings that are hostile or alien to him, education cannot be the dominant factor in life. In philosophical terms, one might say that the indispensable condition for the realization of the programme of lifelong education is to overcome alienation. Lifelong education can only become a reality in surroundings that are neither hostile nor indifferent. Are we really at the beginning of this epoch?

It is difficult to give a very optimistic answer to this question. An analysis of the social and economic situation shows that there are many conditions favourable to lifelong education. The material foundations of our contemporary life offer people the freedom to choose their form of everyday life. Thus, people's occupation becomes a field for the realization of their personal abilities, and the possibilities of taking part in the developments of social life encourage reflection and initiative. The most important task consists in the social promotion and personal development of everybody, at every level. However, our contemporary civilization tends to destroy the demand for education. Only outstanding, creative people feel the need for lifelong education; it is not needed as an element within a mechanism. As the environment seems more and more hostile and alien to us, and makes us feel like slaves, the aspirations which lifelong education would help to fulfil wither away.

In this connection there are three important aspects of social circumstances which have to be organized in a particular way if the motivation for lifelong education is to be permanent and general. It is not its institutional organization which makes lifelong education difficult to realize; the main problem is to generate and sustain motivation among all people. Motivation is the foundation and at the same time the consequence of lifelong education.

The first aspect of reality is social life. Reality gives people particular and limited possibilities. If man feels the social situation to be hostile and alien to him - if he feels its slave - then the motivation for lifelong education will be atrophied; even if it may live on for some time in the form of protest or in an effort to escape from reality. This would mean - in Marxist terminology - that in 'hostile' or 'alien' surroundings man cannot exist as a true representative of his species. Only the overcoming of alienation shows us the way to a 'human' form of life and, consequently, arouses our interest in the world and in education. Of course, contemporary civilization in its organizational and institutional form is felt to be a huge mechanism which can destroy man. But it is also evident that the modern centres of production can eliminate one important source of alienation. The democratic achievements of socialist countries and the democratic development in the system of planning and administration have laid the foundation of a way of life which makes everyone understand its individual relevance, so that people do not feel like a tiny cog within a wheel. Under these circumstances the chances of the motivation leading to lifelong education are steadily increasing. The possibility of participating in social life and acquiring responsibility helps to create this motivation.

A second aspect of contemporary reality relates to the material surroundings created by modern civilization that are represented by the concrete things which appeal to us in different ways.

This aspect of contemporary civilization has recently attracted the attention of sociologists and psychologists. Nowadays our surroundings are not formed or influenced by opinions and spiritual values. More and more we are surrounded by material things which are either desirable or indifferent, useful or amassed without any purpose, corresponding to our needs or 'hostile' to them. These things may be genuine or have artificial value. They are connected with several aspects of civilization: with fashion, prestige or rivalry, temptation, desires and boredom. In surroundings dominated by these factors our way of life represents a modern form of alienation. We have to put an end to two great myths existing in consumption-centred societies: the myth of a 'civilization where everything is obtainable by pressing buttons', and the myth of 'consumer goods as indicators of human-qualities'.

If our modern, technical and scientific progress developed into a civilization where any benefits considered worthwhile could be secured by mechanical, useful and efficient manipulation, there would be no further need for any education - not even lifelong education. If people's only desire were for consumer goods that can - indeed must - be bought in order to show them off in public to gain prestige, education would become superfluous; it would be sufficient to possess things. Material value would be the connecting link between consumption and production; it would beset man on all sides. It would be the instrument as well as the central point of human existence - and would give free scope to ambition and covetousness. Education may be a means to develop the right attitude towards material goods.

Quite often the quantity of goods possessed by a person is taken as a criterion for the evaluation of his personal qualities; it also manifests social rank and prestige. Human life is ruined by the excessive value attached to material goods at the expense of the value attached to the human spirit. A principle of life based not on material values, but on education - which implies acceptance of spiritual values - will find no support unless we free ourselves from the fetishism of material values.

Human life must become a field of creativity and human contacts which enrich the human mind. This is also the implication of Hegel's statement that man can 'double' his existence. Lifelong education closely corresponds to this process of multiplying the dimensions of human existence. A 'one-dimensional' man needs hardly any education, since the guiding principles of his life are governed solely by the criteria of efficiency, and his future prospects are limited by utility and power.

It will not be easy to overcome these difficulties. It requires not only a socio-economic system where the possession of things is no longer an indication of the 'position' a person has reached; it also requires a different kind of education in order that people understand how 'things' are made. The world of science and technology is a hostile and alien world so long as we do not understand its structure. Once we have accepted science and technology as achievements of the human mind, they become an objective reality it has created and not a means of mental enslavement. So one can take the view, even if it may sound paradoxical, that one indispensable condition for the realization of a continuous and generally available education is education itself. Changes in the motivations and needs for education can be compared to an avalanche. An avalanche carrying with it all the snow in its path grows bigger and more powerful and can carry more snow, ice, stones, and trees in proportion to its increasing weight. In the same way the needs for education, once aroused and satisfied, produce more and deeper needs of the same type.

The third aspect of reality relevant to lifelong education is culture. At first sight there seem to be no difficulties. But there is a phenomenon which might be defined as 'cultural alienation' - a notion which in the European philosophical tradition was used chiefly in Humboldt's reflections on cultural alienation and methods which could help to overcome it and developed in Hegel's philosophy as a concept of 'negativity'. In other words: culture can be a serious obstacle as well as a valuable aid to an intensification of the process of lifelong education. The first difficulty is connected with the postulate that on the one hand culture should be within everybody's grasp, while on the other hand it should be 'difficult' in order to arouse our curiosity and a desire to master the difficulties. This complex interrelationship between 'near' and 'far' is a central aspect of an education based on cultural values. They must be placed within the boundaries of human faculties, they must correspond to an individual's needs and not exceed his horizon of understanding, but at the same time, they must be on a level high enough to present a challenge. However, if science is too difficult to grasp, it becomes an indifferent, hostile reality. And if, on the other hand, it can be understood without any effort, it will be too weak to cause any profound change. Art must directly express the inner experience of the artist. If it was merely a static reproduction instead of a dynamic creation, it would not be powerful enough to arouse an inner need for development. Man can fulfil himself not by copying and reproducing himself, but by changing and developing. In modern civilization this dialectical tension has become weak. On one side, there are works of art that seem utterly incomprehensible even to fairly well-educated people; they are snobbish, pretentious and esoteric, and can be appreciated only by a specialized elite, which - in isolation from society - uses a language of its own. On the other side, there is a 'cultural consumption' that has far-reaching effects as it is organized by the profit-seeking 'amusement-industry': which entertains the masses with comic strips or thrilling, but primitive, trivial books and mechanical means of distraction.

Of course, neither extreme can be a positive factor in a culture-oriented programme of lifelong education; neither can be the centre of an 'educative society'. Culture which is too 'difficult' or too 'alien' will produce only trivial emotions, vulgar diversions of an antisocial, aggressive character and sexual titillations.

Any cultural policy attempting to end the dialectical contradiction between man and works of art, which is an obstacle to the development of lifelong education, must face this difficulty. It may be easier to work against the destructive nature of the 'cultural industry' than to reorientate creative, artistic work. In socialist systems cultural activity is not directed towards the dangerous ends which are exploited in capitalist countries. But even in a socialist system it is difficult to effect these changes.

However, great emphasis must be placed on creative artistic work. It should be intelligible to all social classes; it should express ideas and feelings in a form that corresponds to the language and experience of all social classes. Legal restrictions, pressure, or censorship cannot further this development. What we need are valuable, comprehensive, and at the same time, directly intelligible creations in all fields of cultural life, from the sciences to the fine arts. Actually, nobody knows which conditions, which motives and which kinds of appeal are necessary to arouse and encourage cultural interest among the masses. Demands for cultural values from small groups are, therefore, helpful and important. These demands express a basic need for change in the whole sphere of social movements that cause man to orientate his life according to the ideas of lifelong education, and thus enrich it. This is a fundamental pre-condition of happiness.

These reflections show that the problems connected with the realization of lifelong education considerably exceed the range of thought of education-oriented politicians, who treat education as a matter of producing qualified workers and specialists. It also exceeds the horizon of educationalists in general. In a certain sense, lifelong education represents the entirety of learning and teaching. Though part of its role is to update vocational qualifications and promote vocational advancement and success, lifelong education can and must obviously be organized as a whole.

The first task will be to design lifelong education as a continuum for the various stages of life and increasing maturity. The second task will be to define the procedures, methods and media of the educational process. But lifelong education has another dimension which is much more profound than the requirements of vocational updating, advancement and success. This dimension can be defined as the 'human' one, because it concerns the question of whether one considers certain values and principles of life as absolute and therefore as providing the criteria for the selection of the motives of human action which shape everyday life. For these very reasons lifelong education depends on all factors characterizing 'the human condition'. And though these factors may lie outside the educationalist's sphere of action, they are of great importance, for the structure of social reality and the processes taking place in the social surroundings can either encourage the demand for lifelong education or hinder and even destroy it.

The world of material things produced by man can become a labyrinth which completely entangles him, but it can also be instrumental in making him free and enriching his mind. Culture can help to develop the personality, to make it dynamic and flexible, but it can also cause cynicism and indifference. Only by overcoming all these alienations can we pave the way for lifelong education, which in a deeper sense represents an entire philosophical system centred upon man and his creative development.

One might ask whether our discussion of the social foundations and the prospects of the concept of lifelong education and its requirements does not under-estimate the organizational efforts already made in this field, whether it does not underrate the educational strategy used to inspire teachers. We have intended nothing of the kind. Our aim is to show that lifelong education is deeply rooted in human life, and that the need for lifelong education increases in some circumstances, whereas others destroy it. That is why we have to deal with factors beyond the sphere of pedagogic influence, so that the educationalist's point of view may be heard in the discussion about the reforms of cultural and social life. This discussion is of vital importance to contemporary civilization, since it opens the way for its further development and lays the foundations for a happy and dignified life for every individual.

The foregoing reflections show to what extent the realization of the programme of lifelong education depends on overcoming three basic types of alienation found in modern life. They also make it obvious that the realization of lifelong education finally depends on the outcome of the great social struggle over a reform of our contemporary civilization, and on the resulting changes in its basic social requirements and in its future. This explains why some social classes are more interested than others in the outcome of this struggle. These are the classes which take part in it because they feel its immediate urgency and are able to understand its objectives. Obviously, this will apply to different classes in different countries, and, consequently, the action programmes are different in different countries.

In some countries our statement applies to the intellectuals whose visions of future society contrast with the shortsighted calculations of the planners who merely reproduce the unsatisfactory contemporary situation. It is beyond any doubt that in many countries there are social classes distinguished by their courage and their power of constructive thinking, whose visions create completely new prospects of the education-centred society of the future. Gramsci, among others, expressed the same point of view.

In other countries, our statement applies to the working classes. The traditional needs of these classes - so characteristic of the labour movement of the 19th century - have culminated in the demand for a social system which will treat human work as a form and expression of social interaction and see it as representing the cultural values of human existence. Sometimes these initiatives come from the young who criticize impersonal and rigid organizational structures and the gradual destruction of humanistic values. Their protests, now more vigorous than ever before, point to the need for a way of life which allows for increased individual experience and social interaction.

It is difficult to find common ground between the demands of these social groups. However, all these phenomena lead us to conclude that the future of our civilization depends on rational and responsible actions, and that the problems cannot be solved mechanically. This outlook necessitates not only a rational control of development; it also requires a type of education which enables people to exercise this control and to acquire the complex personal experience which will enrich their lives.

For these very reasons the initiatives of certain groups are of great importance for the realization of lifelong education. These groups try, in their own limited surroundings, to create a new model of life; within the boundaries of their limited possibilities they attempt to find new models for human existence. The initiatives of these courageous and pioneering groups create cases in the desert of our civilization which has damaged our environment and reduced the significance of meaningful human relationships. These initiatives form the first steps towards more far-reaching actions. If the experience of these groups is synthesized and disseminated, it will be possible to show the real essence and value of lifelong education.

7 Lifelong Education at the Crossroads

Lifelong education, a notion which has triumphantly resounded throughout Europe and the entire world, has for several years been the subject of research and theoretical studies which have had as their goal specification what has been achieved so far and elucidation of the prospects for the future, as well as the identification of obstacles and discussion of failures experienced. But it is precisely in this area that disagreements have been unusually pronounced. Some people, full of enthusiasm, draw attention to official action in the domain of lifelong education, stressing the laws passed by parliaments; the directives issued; the institutional forms of public education and the methods employed. Others, rather more negative, have criticized the strictly pragmatic nature of these actions, their dependence on constantly changing interests and on the forces at play in the labour market. They maintain that these actions are merely facades lacking real educative substance, and that they are isolated from the real, though often unarticulated, life needs and aspirations of certain social groups and strata. Some of the protagonists, even those who are aware of the difficulties and failures encountered, believe in a future where the educative society will make it possible to overcome all obstacles by creating the conditions which will permit both full development of all individuals, their peaceful coexistence, and the continuous general development of society. However, others are rather sceptical about these visions. They foresee, for the rest of the 20th and the 21st century, a society not very different from the contemporary one. That is to say, a society concerned above all with material success, consumption, politics, the mass media and enjoyment of leisure, and not at all concerned about the idea of an education which is lifelong and comprehensive, dignified and noble, but demanding. And still others question the very value of this ideal. They claim that it is being used as a justification for different forms of manipulation of people, for enticing them to adopt doubtful values; and for shaping individuals according to arbitrarily established criteria which have already become part of a dead tradition, or only a mask for the interests of dominant groups or, in some cases, of totalitarian states.

The divergence of these diagnoses and prognoses concerning lifelong education gives food for thought. It shows that, underlying these differences, there are fundamental issues which may not always be publicly stated, but are always present in the controversy and add to its heat. In fact it must be made perfectly clear that if lifelong education is to encompass people's entire lives, it must be closely linked with a social and metaphysical conception of life. All education, including the education of children and adolescents, has, of course, elements and directions which derive from a definite conception of life; but the importance of these elements is much greater in the education of adults. In the earlier stages educational activities bear, so heavily, a responsibility in the domain of bare skills and basic instruction - learning to read and write; beginning to understand how to make use of modern means of learning and expression; grasping the fundamental elements of knowledge - that responsibilities of other kinds receive little attention. Besides, the intellectual level and the limited life experience of children make it possible to provide this education in a simple and straightforward manner. The major, difficult problems of life will make their appearance later. By contrast, in lifelong education they are already present. And it is precisely these problems that cause all the disagreements in evaluating the forms and tasks of this kind of education. If it is true that our civilization stands at the crossroads - and it undoubtedly does - then lifelong education necessarily stands at the same crossroads. For the only one of its sectors that can retain its form, and with which everybody is more or less in agreement is further education and vocational training linked with progress in science and technology. We still do not know very well how to organize this, nor do we take full account of the fact that preparation for an occupation may have to be repeated several times in a working life. But, in principle, we do see clearly what the issues are in this age of rapid change in the economy; in an age which we have ourselves labelled the age of the scientific-technological revolution. But there are other aspects of lifelong education: the need to encourage participation in social and cultural life; the need to foster the development of each individual's personality; to improve interpersonal relations; to win acceptance of the way of life we are trying to promote; the need to improve the quality of life, and perhaps even the happiness of all individuals. And these are the very aspects that are most closely bound up with the whole set of problems of contemporary civilization; with the situation of human beings in this civilization; with the human condition and with man's need to understand the world and to have hope for the future. If we are developing the programme of lifelong education for everybody, if we proclaim our desire to serve mankind and insistently call for cooperation, it is because we are convinced that, in this chaotic world, we can change things for the better and help people through an education which is in harmony with their day-to-day lives. What else would give us the right to impose upon people an education going on throughout life?

But in our times, the fight against education as a power has intensified. It has become a varied and violent struggle. From Paolo Freire's books denouncing education by oppressors, to Ivan Illich's writings unmasking the school system as a system of violence; there is an educational literature full of these kind of critical remarks. From the American student movements protesting against education in the service of the establishment to the May revolt in France, when youth sought its own way towards an unknown future, a series of events have indicated the Great Alternative to our present civilization. Education should not serve to reinforce the existing order, but to create a new alternative order.

The cultural and educational practice of trying to put into effect a defined concept of lifelong education then became a starting point for a discussion of principles. At the same time that André Malraux created the 'maisons de là culture' as lay churches of great art, worthy of being experienced by all, Chombart de Lauwe's studies were showing that every culture is a set of chosen values and a specific 'power' that dominates the people. More radical writers compared the power of culture over men to that of police power and demanded: 'Chase the cop out of your head!'.

Thus the roots of the traditional concept of lifelong education were cut. Unmasked as a power aiming to dominate the spirit, it had to give way to entirely different notions of education; notions that emphasize the right to oppose established values and authorities; the right to revolt against the civilization of things and the consumer society; the right to spontaneous creation. Can there still be a place for lifelong education in this movement, frequently called this 'counter-culture'? Can a concept of lifelong education, not only the traditional one, which recognized lasting human values and recommends their transmission from generation to generation, but any possible concept, make sense in the perspective of a future that should be free from an 'asphyxiating culture', as J.Dubuffet put it? And just as Freud, in his critique of culture, equates education with liberation, so do these different conceptions of counterculture reject education in favour of inspiration and creation.

The sharpness of the conflict between the programme of education as a power destroying man and the notion of counterculture liquidating education altogether, has obscured the fact that this dispute involves the highly important set of problems concerning the human condition. They are the problems of what is personal and what is superpersonal in man. These two elements have always played a role in education, expressed in a concern for the individual human being here and now, and in a concern for his humanity to be understood as a lasting and general value. That is why education should support individual needs, tastes and creative tendencies as well as lead and direct the individual in accordance with human values. When these two objectives did not exceed certain limits, education did its duty; when they did exceed these limits, education ceased to exist or became oppressive.

If education maintains a certain moderation it will avoid these two dangers, but will find itself confronted with serious difficulties. The first of these relates to the question of how to support the individual, the second to the substance of key values. The school education of children and young people has an easier task inasmuch as the teacher knows his pupils; whereas lifelong education encompasses vast social multitudes and addresses itself to unknown people. How can it individualize its activities in order to succeed? Furthermore, children and young people generally accept, at least in some measure, the school situation in which they are to be educated. Adults do not. They do not want to be pupils, nor do they desire that somebody educate them. How can education be organized while respecting this aversion? A huge, anonymous, hostile audience - that is the public which the organizers of lifelong education have to cope with. If they behave aggressively, if they use any sort of compulsion, they will lose all influence. Hence they must try to win over this public.

There could be very different strategies for achieving this. But their principal characteristic must always be to make this public active, to make it state what interests it, to make it an authentic subject of education. That is the most difficult strategy, but the only effective one.

R.Planchon, the excellent organizer of the Théatre Populaire Français, once said: 'I do not believe in cultural needs. How to arouse them is the real problem'. And that is what must be done in all domains of life. For that reason it is of the highest importance to reach the authentic social forces guiding individuals and groups. The organizers of lifelong education will rarely be able to reach individuals directly or to contact them personally. But they can contact social groups, trade unions and associations. If they succeed in overcoming the intertia of these bodies and their tendency to put up an impressive appearance, if they discover the social trend of mass inclinations and aspirations, then they can base their action upon this trend. Fundamentally, lifelong education is a process of social trends, of the social development of forces and aspirations.

It is easier to formulate this observation and advice than to put it into practice. Pessimists will ask - perhaps not unreasonably: are there still authentic social trends, authentically-active social groups in industrial societies or is there only an 'ant heap' of individuals, organized and administered for definite utilitarian ends? In developing countries, where social conditions may be more favourable to lifelong education, the situation is perhaps more promising.

The second difficulty concerns the key values. Since in lifelong education we must not simply arouse and inspire, but arouse and inspire towards something, the question is how to define the right direction. The immediate answer will generally be: it is the whole body of supreme values of our European culture. But this answer is only partly satisfactory. For decades, these values have been the subject of violent controversy. And even if the radical criticism put forward by the proponents of 'Proletkult' is disregarded, enough problems remain under dispute, even such elementary ones as the notion of humanism and the notion of lasting moral values. Do the organizers of lifelong education have the right to draw final conclusions from such discussions and to determine on that basis the body of key values which, according to them, have successfully passed the test of modernity? Or should they rather wait until someone else in the society does so, and then conform to his verdict? But who would be capable of doing the job? Should a single set of recognized values govern the whole of society, or should not rather a pluralism be envisaged? If so, lifelong education would also have to be pluralistic. But with a wide variety of value systems to choose from, would not the twofold concern - for values that are simply human and for common values - be lost? And in that case, would it not be necessary to provide, in addition to numerous lifelong education systems organized by social groups with different ideological orientations, a lifelong education that is not committed to any block,with an ideological character similar to that of UNESCO, for example?

Matters become still more complicated for another reason. The values of European culture, irrespective of our approach, are not the only values in our epoch, in which the world is becoming the common property of mankind. To what extent should the values of other civilizations be integrated in European lifelong education, and to what extent should lifelong education in non-European countries include our values? The difficulty of finding an answer to this question lies not only in the richness of all these values, which is not easy to evaluate, but chiefly in the fact that the functions of values with which one lives are different from those of values one merely knows about. Even if a world programme of lifelong education were created

- perhaps it is preferable not to wish that this will happen - the values it contained would have a different force in the various regions of the world. In some they would be accepted existentially, in others only for cognitive reasons. Consequently, another question arises: would it be necessary for this cognitive sphere to be transformed into an existential sphere, and how could this be done? For the essential goal is not that people know of one another, but that they know how to live together. And a solution whereby the scientific and technological values dominate, in the same manner everywhere in the world, is inadmissible.

Let us finally look again at those crossroads at which the theory and practice of lifelong education stand today. It is searching for its way through the conflicts between the hopeful vision of attaining the educative society and the realistic programme of what is feasible; through the contradictions between a programme of 'education at the top' and one of education for ordinary people; between the temptation of domination by education and submission to the opponents of culture; through the difficulties of interpersonal influence and those of laying down key values.

The safest and most effective strategy would be to concentrate on vocational improvement and further education, on recurrent education geared to the necessities devolving from the progress of science and technology and the demands of production. However, within these horizons there is no room for the ambitions and goals that are characteristic of lifelong education. If we want to save it in its entirety, we can only do so by means of a new conception of human life in which it would occupy an important place. It should also be recognized that the directive 'Learning to be' is not the only one that matters. The conviction that 'It is worth living in order to learn' is just as important. A life of unceasing curiosity about the world is in a sense a life worthy of man, and a happy one.

But not altogether. For, an educative direction of life is in fact a self-centred orientation, even an egoistic orientation. True, it is a sublimated egoism bringing certain advantages to society, but it encloses the individual within himself, isolating him from other people and from living for them. In the context of European culture, a life so organized follows the path of knowledge and not the path of love.

These are different paths. In his 'Faust', Goethe tried to unite them. His success - or perhaps his failure - is a challenge for our age to seek that union. And lifelong education must be placed within this fuller vision of the life of man in the world and among other people.

PART TWO

8 Creativity as a Style of Life

The attitude towards creativity has changed fundamentally in our age. According to tradition, creativity was an activity of outstanding and talented individuals. Important, permanent works of art were its fruit. It seemed obvious that creativity was a category within art and an attribute - maybe an advantage - of geniuses. The first break away from this conception was the acceptance of scientific work into the kingdom of creativity.

Now, we talk more and often about technological creativity, in spite of the fact that until recently technology was treated as a set of rules. Rules did not leave any space for freedom, so necessary for the act of creation. Today, we no longer hesitate to talk about technological invention; nor do we hesitate to compare this kind of invention to artistic and scientific creativity.

In addition to this we discuss creativity in the exercise of professional work, particularly in some professions, as well as a 'creative' management of institutions. This is a distinctive departure from the traditional understanding of creativity. It is related to 'average' people - not to geniuses - and to an activity which has an organizational and productive character. It is not related to those unique works of art which have permanent value.

The usage of the word 'creativity' leads towards the description of an active, not passive, attitude to social life and culture. A creative attitude to reality expresses a specific type of commitment and innovative activity. Today, in our policy towards culture, we aim to erase the boundaries - rather than to stress them - between the 'creators' and the 'receivers'. We also aim at the activation of audience and listeners. We want to awaken their creative needs and abilities and to replace 'passive' reception by a reception with creative and interpretative features, which keeps its value even whilst remaining a private, personal experience. The mass media are criticized from this point of view. They universalize the attitude of passive reception, which has been standardized by accepted cliches.

Similarly, the social policy which is struggling with the centralization of management and bureaucratization of administration, points to the 'creative' initiatives of individuals and social groups. To further generalize this attitude,we initiate those conditions which favour a social participation unlimited by the boundaries imposed by the obedient exercise of orders. Social participation should have a 'creative' character. The fruits of such activity do resemble - as the traditional understanding of creativity required - particularly valuable forms of spiritual and cultural work. They turn into a process which shapes relations between people; adapts institutions to tasks and needs; influences people's motivations and makes a valuable social atmosphere.

The universal custom of using the word in connection with children's activity, particularly with reference to their art, is a specifically spectacular departure from the traditional understanding of creativity. The notion of 'children's creativity', formed a long time ago by teachers and psychologists, long remained a word specific to their vocabulary. Today, it has been accepted into colloquial usage. It refers to a mass phenomenon, almost general in our age, which subjectively is important as a mode of personal maturity through expression. Creativity is no longer held to be an objective production of a work of art.

All these changes in the understanding of creativity are convergent. They confirm the rejection of the traditional notion, which was connected with outstanding scientific or artistic talent. We are now trying to generalize what in the past has been treated as a privilege of the elite. We want to discover the 'real' life of 'average' people as it is connected with the production of things which are 'spiritual'. In our visions of the future we point to the generalization of varied forms of creativity as being a particularly important element of the lives of the masses.

The introduction of the creative element into man's life changes it distinctly. It loosens its recent form, takes it away from accepted traditions, directs it into novelty. Creativity invalidates our present biography, giving a new interpretation to our past - often completely different from the one which we have accepted. It teaches us to begin our lives 'from the start', again and again. Creativity breaks the repetitive ties of both standardized routine ways and the set of habits which are related to life-possibilities and the ways of experiencing them. This is wonderful, as well as disturbing. Man seeks for change which saves him from boredom, but at the same time he values repetition. Repetition gives him the feeling of security in a familiar world. Creativity destroys the familiarity of life which endures through repetition, through what is well-known, through everything functioning according to accepted principles.

At the same time, creativity constructs new forms for man's reconciliation with the world; the discovery of his own place in the world through the assumption of a resistant reality. The world becomes ours, through our creativity written in it. It is true that man develops by his redoubling through activity, which also reshapes the world. Thus, creation is the best method of multiplication. In this sense, the world keeps its familiarity which is so important for stabilizing life, but which then also gains special meaning under the influence of creativity. Familiarity can be gained through the risk of disaster and the price of effort.

The concentration of creativity forms an isolation from people. Creativity is, in actual fact, an individual activity. Even when it is deeply established in a particular community, it does not become collective activity. Because of this, creativity is often 'treated with hostility' in big institutions, even those established to further creative activity. The fate of true creators in those scientific or artistic institutions which simply function, proves this theory. The fate of creators in production firms is even worse. There, they violate the stabilized course of production and introduce the risk of innovation. We do not gain friends through creative activity, as we are the different ones. Sometimes we can gain a protector or a patron; most often we arouse envy and silent wishes for our failure.

The intensity of our creative efforts leads to a reorientation in the choice of values in life. Our creation becomes most important; man is ready to pay any price for the possibility of devotion to such creativity. He is ready to reject things generally valued and accepted as important. Success in wealth, jobs, and power loses its meaning in comparison with the only true value, the possibility of pursuing creative activity. In extreme cases the fascination of creativity becomes the cause of neglecting elementary duties to oneself, to close family and friends, and to society.

Creative life is concentrated in the present. Even when creativity is spread through time and results are obtained after a period; it is an activity which gives satisfaction in immediate moments. It is a different style of life from the one shaped by rational aims and consequent planning. The basis of the latter style is the division of what we do and experience, into spheres, means and aims. This difference disappears in the creative life-style. Everything is equally important and nothing is levelled to actions which become the means of achieving distant aims. These actions demand effort, discipline and self-denial. Play organizes existence as life for the instant. It does not recall the past, nor worry for the future. Creativity, similarly, although on a higher level, organizes human existence as self-important and absorbing acts. The value of life is realized through creative activity as always in the here and now. It is not distant in time; it does not await us in the future which always escapes away before us.

Due to this fact, creativity gives the most direct existential answer to the question of the value of life. All other answers have the nature of a logical argument. Specific assumptions have to be considered. In order to give force to these arguments, creativity justifies itself without the need of reference to anything else. There is no need for a different explanation, nor searching anywhere else. Because of creative activity life gains a direct value in our experience. There is no need to explain it differently, nor to seek anywhere else. It is right here, in that creative activity which involves us and gives us pleasure.

Creativity gives us the feeling of the fullness of life through the connection of a rich internal experience with the possibility of richness in the world created by human activity. Work has, of course, a similar kind of subjective and objective connection. Creative activity is, however, a higher form of work. It mobilizes man more fully and opens up greater possibilities for world transformation. We do not engage our internal world fully in professional work. In creative activity we use the means by which imagination becomes materialized. Feelings fulfil a created work which from then on is a part of objective reality. Reason becomes the source of wisdom, which has been gained in the course of self-realization in the world's difficult processes.

We can now ask, what is the role played by creative life in contemporary civilization and development when creativity is understood in this way? We are particularly concerned about anthropological aspects. We want to answer the question: in what do people see the value of life, in what do they seek their happiness; to what extent are they ready to accept it at the cost of hedonism and place creative needs higher than routine, habits, and consumption?

We should consequently seek a detailed answer to the question of which model of life - of everyday life - can and should be put forward to contemporary people?

This proposition can have an authoritative nature. People's freedom depends on the fact that man cannot be made happy by force. The choice of values should not lead to fanaticism, but link with - in spite of difficulties - tolerance.

It means that moderation and friendliness should be found between a resignation and indifference to the world's value (and empirical research which classifies people as 'such and such' desiring 'this and that') and, at the other extreme, a rigorous, moralistic appeal demanding that people live in a particular way.

This is the only way to settle people's true desires, which they do not express and sometimes they do not even know. The authentic need should be described in comparison - even when it is hidden - with the falsely imposed and loudly manifested. Through practical experience and testing, it will be possible to state the range and means of people's dependence on change; the stimuli and appeals that they are sensitive to; the motives they are subjected to. It will also be possible to state which model of their own existence they are ready to reject, which to accept and which they will protect, so treating any attempt to change it as a destruction of the freedom and personal right to run one's own life.

The detailed axiological research is rarely undertaken today. After all, its results are important for the setting of aims, those towards which we should systematically and purposively direct civilization's development. We should try to discuss the conception of creative life in the light of such axiological reflection.

The proposition of creativity's values should be compared with those of different models which have had different social acceptances under different conditions. One of the most characteristic models in contemporary

Europe was shaped simultaneously with the development of capitalist economy. It arose as a contradiction to the conceptions of traditional life - convent, chivalry, court, and the renaissance conventions - and stressed the meaning of wealth achieved through trade and financial speculations and - sometime later - through production activity. A new concept of life was formulated that was closely connected with puritan and Calvinistic ethics. Life was to be fully devoted to the material activity which brought profit. The profit was then to be reinvested in the business and not used for personal pleasure. The severity of this model - once known as lay ascetism - was important for a long time to the creators of big industrial properties. They lived modestly and carefully, devoting all their time and effort to the extension of productive activity according to capitalist principles.

This life-model was presented at the same time to wider social circles which did not have the same financial background. Everybody was to grow rich through thrift and work. Only laziness and waste were barriers to improving one's fate and gaining great fortunes.

This conception of life - more differentiated than this short description is able to show - has been outrun in our age by the consumerist ideology. An increase of wealth in all social classes so characteristic of industrialized countries; more services of convenience and more life pleasures, the increase of free time and amusements, the ease of travelling around the world and tourism - all these have changed world views from the traditional 'service of production' to the more modern research strategy of seeking 'the fullness of life', using combined or potential possibilities for a varied, pleasant life.

This conception, so much attacked by moral philosophers, has had many protectors. They point out that it is the most 'natural' and least false conception of life. They are convinced that people desire, above all, a comfortable and pleasant life. It could be contemptuously called 'small happiness', but this happiness is real and truly desired. It takes people away from the important affairs of this world. However, as Voltaire already bitterly noted, it is best to cultivate one's own garden. This selfish orientation - as the protectors of this conception say - is most human and tolerant at the same time. When all strive for a pleasant life, everybody understands everybody else and no one tries to destroy anyone else. In history great ideologies have always been the source of fanaticism and intolerance. They destroyed enemies and established inquisitional tribunals; divided people into believers and non-believers, obedient and resistant.

The consumerist life-conception, however, encouraged - particularly in rich, capitalist countries - a crossover between the boundaries of moderate wealth and reasonable pleasures. The market mechanism and aspirations for social prestige, competition between groups and individuals; fashion and advertisement; stopped consumption from being the fulfilment of people's real needs and turned it into a manifestation of their position and possibilities. Consumption, having been taken away from people's true needs, was turned into a 'market' for the various pleasures offered by show business. Drugs became an additional factor for intensified pleasures, which under natural conditions would have been passed over.

Thus, two kinds of consumption were formed. One serving people and the other served by people. At both ends a consumerist model of life showed the same restrictions, shared the restrictions which made it weak. The following question must be answered: does wealth only have to serve increased consumption - or is there something else besides this?

The sharpness of the question concerning the purpose of wealth is very often weakened and even eliminated by the introduction into the notion of consumption, of the concept of participation in culture. The consumerist model of life is not only a model of comfort and wealth. It is also a 'cultural consumerist' model. However, the connection with this sphere of reality is not easily made. Practice shows that wealth and amenities create the need for bigger wealth and better amenities, rather than culture. Defining participation with consumption is misleading. Participation requires a different basis to that of the consumerist life-model.

Youth protest movements have questioned both life-models, showing that man and his community die out when we condition people's production needs, as well as when we turn them into a market for goods and consumer services. The hope that the consumerist life-model would help to free man from the ties of serving production mechanisms has proved illusory. This model did not return man to himself, but deepened his alienation. The freedom and authenticity of the individual dies away in the cause of organization and institution form, which serves both politics and economy. It also disappears within entertainment and mass culture. This is the reason why the whole of contemporary society and its moral code are being questioned. The same life-model was to be applied to its educational system, and shape people's obedience to the requirements of a false life.

The life-model development within protest movements demanded the minimalization of material needs and the maximum deepening of internal experience acquired through man's different efforts at development, regardless whether the development was to serve a purpose or not. Such development was also to be acquired through the feeling of love and friendship. The latter constructed a reality of small, specific, everyday communities. In this respect, life was not to be - as Marx said - a means to live. It was to be pure life.

The implementation of this plan was to be done through the rejection of society, sometimes by an escape to nature and seclusion, in a self-sufficient existence contrary to the stabilized conditions of general wealth.

The community principle was realized through the most difficult conditions. Sometime ago 'heretic groups' protesting against the church, as well as communes of utopian socialists protesting against capitalist order and some fractions of the cooperative movement preaching the brotherhood ideology and trying to establish 'friendship unions' within the hostile world, tried to do it.

The opposition to this contestation way of life was, after manifestations of protest, sometimes very loud. The opposition gave hope for a 'mild revolution'; implemented by individual decisions and a personal, moral responsibility for the choice of values. The model established in the nineteenth century, and based on historical traditions, was the revolutionary life-model. It was a sacrificial answer to historical examples, showing the possibilities of revolution. It would bring an end to social inequality and man's exploitation by man. Selfish, individual interests have lost their meaning in this commitment. Proletarians joined the solidarity ties of class and party, and were to become the most efficient tools of revolutionary activity - beginning with general opposition to the exploitation system and ending with an heroic attempt at social revolution and gaining political power in a country. Disasters, such as prison and death became elements of tradition, a great legend of heroism and a challenge for younger generations.

This life-model has acted particularly strongly, and in a wide social spectrum during the present century. There have been the October Revolution and socialist revolutions in other countries and national liberation movements throughout the world. Tested in difficult conditions, on barricades and on battle fields, it remained an example of the post-revolutionary life which needed effort and devotion. Man remained a tool and creator of historical changes. His personal life was not important. What he did with himself - even when he acquired a better education - was to serve 'the cause'. Relations between people should also be shaped according to revolutionary alertness and interests. A severity towards oneself and others became a basic element of this life-model. Its history spread across the universe and was described in a work entitled symbolically 'how was steel tempered?'.

When translated into colloquial language, this life-model stressed a sacrificial effort for the establishment of better living conditions for future generations according to development plans. Their implementation was an honourary matter for all workers. They had to - in resigning from everything - assure a happier fate for their children and grandchildren. Work was to be the basic value of man's life. It was to be systematic; intensive; efficient beyond norms: exemplary work. Alongside war and revolutionary heroes, stood work-heroes. They were beautiful examples of life for all, particularly for the young. In their organizations the examples of the century, and changing needs and tasks of the country, were to come alive.

In the course of further development, the strength of this heroic life-model began to decrease. Living conditions normalized, technical and economic progress allowed for a general increase in wealth. The working generation demanded its rights and did not want to use their lives solely for the good of future generations.

This is the crossroads of our age. The heroic life-model is losing its glamour, and consumerist tendencies are increasing. We do not, however, take the road to where consumerist ideology destroys all other charms and values of life. We do not want to lose what is valuable in a sacrificial, even heroic, life-model. We want to keep, in reasonable dimensions, the right, general aspiration for wealth. At the same time - simultaneously, not later - we want to convince everybody that wealth is the basis of valuable life and not its only aim. How can we do it?

The conception of life as creativity gives some hope. Creativity allows a crossing of boundaries drawn between people on the basis of consumption. In consumption man constantly repeats himself, in creativity he heads for novelty. A consumerist attitude teaches people to organize their whole existence according to expected and desired fulfilments. The creative basis allows them to go beyond that level and undertake activity which has a value in itself and does not just serve as a means for different aims. This activity leads simultaneously to objective results and subjective interests.

In this way, life which is creativity, keeps some of its heroism; which points to aspects that are more important than the individual and his pleasures. The truth returns to us free of the severity in style, which was so previously. It becomes a truth accepted directly, sometimes enthusiastically, without effort and the feeling of sacrifice.

When a distinct contradiction arises between the heroic attitude and the consumerist attitude, the creative attitude accommodates these differences. It shows the possibilities of a life in which man gives away his strength to objective tasks and values, and at the same time, realizes himself without sacrificing his ownself. This solution can be accepted more easily by modern people who reject the consumerist model's exclusiveness, than can the heroism which appeals for sacrifice and which demands self-annihilation.

In creativity as a life-conception, individual rights are respected more than they are in any other conception. They are respected to the boundaries of selfishness; maybe even beyond these boundaries. Modern man, who experienced a long and varied individualism at school and who found the charms of life 'according to himself', finds in creativity important propositions and an attractive directness.

Here, however, the creativity life-conception shows its worrying defects. One of them is the problem of deeply rooted creativity in the present social world; the problem of the dialectical controversy between authenticity and fidelity. Creativity can derive from the past, either as its fulfilment or as a new interpretation. It can also become an attempt to reject everything, often through the illumination of a new truth and order; often by individual pride and contradiction. At one end creativity is threatened by routine academism, at the other by fanciful strange expressions. The development of culture runs along two paths - a creative, reinterpretation tradition and a new creativity which rejected it (sometimes described as barbarity, sometimes as primitivism and 'wildness'). Contestational creativity led to new values, and similarly to erudition. The new continuation of traditional achievements showed their inexhaustible possibilities. The conflict between the two paths is particularly sharp now. In controversies between 'culture' protectors and preachers of an 'anti-culture' programme, important and dangerous creativity antinomies are revealed. Can we believe that creativity will become our real voice, when it is based on an acceptable and assimilation of all such traditional wealth? Can we trust that creativity will become important and valuable for us (truly human), when we have rejected all of history's achievements; that creativity will be only a manifest expression of our present impulses?

We can widen this antimony to other aspects of creativity and ask for proposals by which creative activity respects two principles simultaneously - the principle of novelty and the principle of fidelity?

An in-balance causes either dogmatic and reactive activity or activity directed towards non-responsibility. The path of valuable, creative, innovation leads between dangerous diversions and we are not sure how to save it from these dangers. We have come to the boundaries of a strategy outlined by the conception of life as creativity.

Creativity, indeed, is free and independent, but it must be rooted in the world in a certain way. It must be responsible and lead to the implementation of certain values. It cannot be a fancy or a contradiction of novelty at any price. Nor can it be an egotism, manifesting private distinction. It cannot be, of course, restricted by administration. Its force to destroy the old, in order and to show new visions, must be respected. Creativity is the highest form of activity among people and for people. How, and for what reason, will this consciousness be always present within acts of creativity?

9 Creativity - reality, hopes, doubts

I wish to present to you some reflections on the contradictions existing in the theory and practice of creativity. Creativity is the most honourable activity of mankind; but at the same time it is the most tragic and controversial one. Creativity is an expression of the freedom of man, but also an expression of his volitude. As a 'model of being' it is unpopular, but highly respected . It is the source of happiness, but also of despair.

Let us see these contradictions in detail.

The unprecedented growth of the ideology of creativity induces reflection. There are two main subjects upon which to reflect. The first is the question concerning the sources of this growth and especially whether the ideology of creativity is an expression of actual transformations in the social reality of our times or whether it rather reflects a hope regarding one day in the unknown future? Creativity will win through as a principle of universal life; although today it is steadily being reduced and destroyed.

The other subject is the question to be answered about the anthropological status of creativity, i.e.about the value of the sociology of creativity, and particularly whether creativity can really be treated as the supreme value of human life and the main force in the processes of shaping man's social existence and his individual happiness?

These two problems are the subject of my reflections.

As regards the first question, it is difficult to give an unequivocal answer. The development of modern civilization both stimulates and limits the growth of man's creative abilities. This dual and inconsistent property can be perceived in many areas: in work, in social organisation, and in culture.

Although today we cherish more hope than we did before that technological progress will permit an increase in the creative elements of human labour, it is difficult to imagine that such an increase could affect the mass of society. The organisation of production and service industry demands, and will demand, good workmanship rather than individual creativity.

A similar duality exists in the organisation of social life. There have been acute tensions between the centralization of planning and management and those tendencies stressing the value of a regional and local autonomy which permits an unrestrained development of creative initiatives by small groups. Attempts are being made in various countries to harmonize and counterpoise these two tendencies, but this choice of path can hardly be expected to prevail in the future. There are many indications that in an epoch of mass societies and global organizations, large organizations and institutions will grow in significance, and for them the creative initiative of individuals and small groups will be troublesome rather than desirable.

The same is true about the way of life. It has been repeatedly emphasized that modern civilization is a civilization of things being more dominant than its people.

This preponderance is very conspicuous in both the systems of production and consumption. In such conditions, human creative abilities are being curtailed rather than developed. Real life situations consolidate passive attitudes and adaption; as a producer and as a consumer, man loses those profound dimensions in which creativity has its roots. The defence of creative attitudes must also be a criticism of man's submission to a civilization of things. Such a criticism is no easy task, and its prospects are rather unclear.

The weakness and instability of creativity's position in modern civilization is best illustrated by education; in which all socially held dogmas and hopes are reflected and consolidated. It is characteristic that there is so little concern for eliminating in advance from the younger generation's education, those impediments and obstacles to the propagation of creative attitudes. The visions of the future held by the adult generation which embody the tasks of education fail to take account of creativity. It is generally believed that education should be adaptation. A characteristic example is the failure of the so-called New Education, in the 20th century.

This brief survey indicates that the ideology of creativity is not an expression of actual social processes shaping man's way of life and does not reflect a practice in which creative attitudes would be propagated and developed.

It rather expresses the hope that in the future it will be possible to widen those narrow areas of reality in which creativity is contained today; in the hope that more people will have the opportunity to develop and utilise their creative abilities at work; in social life; in leisure time, and in cultural pursuits.

The above review also indicates that the programme of furthering creativity encounters such difficulties in social life that the hope for future successes does not seem to be well-grounded. The awareness of these difficulties, and the disappointment they cause, leads to a rapid radicalization of the ideology of creativity, which becomes one of total contest, giving rise to alternative social visions.

This wide-ranging criticism of modern civilization, from the viewpoint of creativity, rejects the optimistic hope that a vision of creative life is contained in the form of civilization which is being developed in the modern era and in which we are taking part. It calls for an almost apocalyptical judgement of the present direction of civilization's development; for rebellion against this line; for a contest which then gives rise to a faith in alternative possibilities for further development, possibilities which are totally unpredictable today.

From this point of view the ideology of creativity requires anthropological reflection. If man really is a creative being - homo creator - then why does the propagation of the principle of creative life encounter such great and hardly surmountable obstacles? The obstacles to the propagation of creative life are perhaps rooted in human nature? What do the people desire most? Novelty or repeatability? Risk or certainty? Unrest or peace? They certainly desire both things. One can believe, however, that they generally adopt an attitude wherein that which is important is familiar, lasting, and gives a sense of security. Novelty may be interesting but it is also dangerous since it breaks with a world which the people know and in which their lives are settled. Creators are living outside the zone of security; often on the border of frenzy. Their works are frequently rejected, but even when they are admired they do not provide a model of life for all people.

Inadequate attention has been paid so far to the relationship between the ideology of creativity and those dramatic tensions and conflicts in life which sometimes have tragic consequences. Creativity is a form of struggle with life, it often fades away in conditions intended to make it easier.

The other anthropological question is connected with the problematic focused upon the sense of life and its justification. Creativity offers an answer to this question. But what kind of answer? This naturally depends on the understanding of creativity. Let us therefore recall two characterising concepts; those of Spinoza and Bergson. Spinoza wrote that 'creation is an action in which no other causes aside from the affective cause play a part'. Creativity was similarly thought of by Bergson. He meant by creativity that which is not determined either by causes or by aims. In this sense, creativity is free, since it is not the effect of circumstances or conditions, or the execution of a plan.

Such a concept of creativity eliminates questions about the sense of life, about the justification of its form, about the aims which it ought to serve. Such questions are particularly perplexing in our times. Creative life is self-sufficient, it has its own causes and its own goals, it is by its very nature, an acceptance of life, it is the value of life.

But is such a vision of creativity evidence of man's greatness and happiness, or is it a consequence of despair, as Kierkegaard would say? Of nihilism, as Nietzsche would put it? Of man's absolute solitude in his being and amongst the people, as contemporary existentialists argue?

The third anthropological question is: does creativity build up human community? It is evident that it does in some way. In the artistic domain, the products of creation are the meeting place of people from various epochs and nations. These meetings, however, have a specific character since they involve only a fragment of personal life, they are sometimes very intensive, but do not embrace concrete human relationships. The community of those who love Bach's or Chopin's music does not become a community of people in the real conditions of their life. One could say that this 'aesthetic' community is not a real one. Let us recall here a question raised in the distinction made by Kierkegaard: 'What is meant by living aesthetically and what is meant by living ethically?'.

Kierkegaard's considerations encourage thoughts about what is an unpopular subject today; the hierarchy of values. This value - hierarchy is particularly concerned with the interrelationship between creativity as an action encompassing the individual and love as an experience requiring community and cooperation and, if necessary, also requiring sacrifice. Placing creativity at the top of the list of human values involves those dangers often emphasized by artists, who have showed what may become of a poet and the people surrounding him when he serves 'creative frenzy'. A different hierarchy, one subordinating creativity to love, seems safer. Although the idea of 'creativity for the people' may encourage a certain measure of didacticism and moralism and provokes the defence of 'independent' creativity; in fact creativity, aside from the domain of technical experiment, is really and profoundly man's activity for man. Such creativity has been shown by the greatest artists and greatest scholars. Let us recall the story of Albert Schweitzer's life, a life creative for other people.

Perhaps such a creativity constitutes the most profound feature of the human being.

10 Teachers' attitudes towards the present culture and the forming culture

The difference between reality which is already created and the creative force has been described by philosophy for centuries now as the basic law of nature, both at rest and alive. It has also been treated as the law of individual development. The contents of this law have been formulated from different points of view and in different ages. The indicative intuition has been general and common. Reality is dual. It consists of reality which is produced in more or less solid shapes and of reality which is a collection of forces creating these and other shapes. Thus, there is a 'clear' and 'permanent' shape to forms which it acquired. It is distinct in works and ideas, stabilized in institutional and organizational forms; in social structure and power systems, in laws and moral norms. There is, also, the 'dynamic' and 'dark' reality of forces which fall down, grow and explode in struggle with the existing order and the achievements of protesting forces which create new principles and new forms, new works. The differentiation between creating reality and the already created one, has a particular meaning for educational analysis.

The created reality is treated as the subject and instance of education. Thanks to this, a process of internalization within the young generation should take place. Different aspects of educational activity correspond to different fields of culture, being described as objective and being obliged to form subjective culture. The essence of the education process must depend on this fact. It became a mutual belief of different types of education. Most important, therefore, became the problems of optimizing educational activity, its efficiency with the process of internalization in binding the younger generation to culture. All teachers' efforts tend towards the deepening and widening of these processes. The main theories, notions and principles of educational policy are constructed to enable the implementation of these aims on a wide social scale.

The situation changes when we consider culture as creating reality, rather than as created reality. New horizons and new tasks for educational activity are shown. They no longer depend upon the internalization of previous achievements, obligatory principles, models of collective life, established institutions, scientific notions and aesthetic tastes. They depend on binding the younger generation with the forces creating culture even, or rather particularly, when they are creating new culture, that which is contrary to the present.

It is an anxiously difficult and responsible task. What guarantee do we have that we are able to reach these forces and define them correctly? They are, after all, hidden under a layer of present reality which has a strong background, chaotic and unclear - as always when new life is being created. When everything is clear in stabilized shapes on the surface of social life, deep down everything is dark and worrying. New aspirations increase. Animosities and protests, as well as the search leading to disaster being at the same time the source of hope, arise.

Settled solutions are opposed to alternative propositions, those of submission to visions of the desirable. Pragmatic sobriety is opposed to romantic utopia, for which encouragement to the impossible seems the most realistic strategy. There, deep down under the surface of already shaped artistic and scientific life, new intuitions and hypotheses are born. Different ways of expression and feeling, criticism of routine and cliche, direct and formal criticisms are all established. The desire for authentic experience is strongly increasing. Deep down, new tastes, life-models and new ways of evaluating people and things are formed. Moral doubts arise with reference to responsibility for everything we do.

Who can say, however, when, why and how these increasing forces rise above the surface of life to reshape forms and institutions in order to present the fruit of new creativity in art and science and to show new ways of life and models of relationships, a new style of people's existence? Who can differentiate, with certainty, between dull forms of protest and correct contests and between artistic programmes heading nowhere from excellent institutions or great new creative headlines? Who can, also, differentiate between false projects for an alternative technology from well-promising solutions (so necessary in the raw material and energy crises)? Finally, who can differentiate between valuable programmes for struggling against consumerist civilization, from the false and cynical criticism of the ideals of social service? Who can draw a correct boundary between opportunism and a responsible acceptance of reality and between an egoistic escape from life and a utopian vision for organizing activity in the future?

All this points to the importance of education's orientation towards the future; education introducing its pupils to the problems of culture which humanity should create for itself and education organizing an alliance with those forces searching for new solutions and for new tasks. Education oriented in such a way, opposes an education which introduces us into created culture and at the same time fulfils its many important aspects. When education, which introduces us into created culture, concentrates its efforts upon personality through its connection with values and examples, with acquired knowledge and applied practice, then education connected with creating culture stresses everything important for undertaking new tasks. It leads towards shaping imaginary and intellectual forces. It aims at abilities in planning and engagement with innovations. When an education of being introduced into present culture considers particularly the internalization of objective reality, then that of the education to serve creating culture stresses the shaping of a varied personality; its externalization in action and in verbal, musical, and practical expressions. It heads for an awakening and development of creative needs and abilities. When educating for present culture uses models and examples presented for imitation, forms indications and in a way controls obedience towards them -

education connected with creating culture uses methods of inspiration and encouraging initiative which enrich the emotional sphere of personality and its imagination.

This is how the two kinds of education differ from each other and at the same time complement each other. They express people's two-fold situation engaged as they are in the wealth of the world. It has been established by the mutual efforts of nations and continents and over centuries of history. People are faced with the coming future and its need for new abilities. The lives of societies run divided into categories of creativity and fidelity, assimilation and innovation, risk and repetition. The lives of individuals run similarly. They welcome repetition, because it gives them the feeling of intimacy and durability. However, novely is also appealing, because it enriches present experience.

11 Necessity and freedom

This brings us to what is possibly one of the most thorny problems of education. Modern man, enmeshed in a whole network of relationships and ties of material and social interdependence, operating within a fixed system of objects and structures, has grown used to fashioning his life so that it becomes an efficient instrument for achieving his aspirations and carrying out the tasks before him. These pragmatic and utilitarian categories make life a tool that can be used to attain specific goals.

But let us be mindful of Marx's warning against the danger of allowing life to become no more than a means of existing. Marx's warning suggested another way of life than that based on purely practical and utilitarian considerations. Contact with art diverts man from this kind of existence; it incites him to undergo experiences in which he gains first-hand impressions that are valuable in themselves and have no reference to ulterior gain. The cathartic nature of art is to be seen precisely in the fact that it recalls man to a reality in which the present is valuable in itself, not in terms of the future to which it leads; a reality in which experiences have their own intrinsic value. Art shows us life as a complex of values which are independent, not a means to an end.

Attendance at a concert or a theatrical performance will not help us in what we shall be doing at work or in our social contacts next day. But it is a factor making for the concentration of our inner forces, which are in this way purified and submitted to something which can be surmounted or transcended. It is a source of inner wealth, the importance of which for human activity may not become clear until much later.

The ability to lead a life in which the present time is used with a view to the deliberate achievement of aspirations and accomplishment of tasks - a life in which the present becomes from time to time a period of meditation filled with fruitful impressions - this ability is of great importance for man today. It is very closely bound up with aspirations to a life of human worth, in which men can find a reason for their existence in the happiness conferred on them by their emotions and actions. In this ability we find the solution to the most important questions of our time, the alienation of man, weariness and indifference, contestation and the oversimplified conventions of the consumer society, with its futile distractions, and the monotony of the mass-produced models of the culture industry.

This, then, will be our diagnosis: humanist culture is becoming a specific and primordial need of human beings now that their capacity for action and conduct is being subjected to the severest of trials. In such a hard, austere world, the question is not only what men are capable of doing, but also what they are.

Let us take this prospective analysis a step further. By having recourse to the idea of 'humanist culture' as a specific category of existence and freeing it from any kind of direct praxeological interference, not only do we avoid creating a realm apart, but on the contrary we do justice to all that men have lived by for centuries, taking the huge risk of organizing their own environment within nature. To revert to the Greek saying quoted above, it is not necessary for man to live, but to be able to navigate. It was precisely his courageous 'navigation' which for centuries was the driving force behind the development of man. It was, and continues to be, the inexhaustible well-spring of humanist culture. Karl Marx expressed the same idea in his 'Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', when he explained that the true meaning of economy is saving, that is the organization of material production which affords the forces of man the greatest opportunities for development. Spare time, wrote Marx - and this is just as applicable to leisure as to time devoted to more lofty activities - transforms a person into an entirely different being; thus metamorphosed, he resumes his place in the production process, where his personality develops tremendously.

When 'saving' becomes a rule of social and material strategy, man has the maximum amount of freedom; humanist culture endows this freedom with a content which preserves it from the vanity and sterility of existence.

Thus, the life of man is on two levels. At the first there is a decisive struggle to secure material welfare. Everything relating to social and political organization, that is to say labour and the economy, legislation and the State, is at this level. Here tasks are organized, with a strict attention to detail which guarantees their proper execution; they are kept under continuing inspection and their results checked. The State and the law have been set up above individuals and communities, to direct and supervise their activities. Work, which is performed as a social duty and which calls on men to go to the limits of their staying power, becomes the very substance of existence.

At the second level the situation is quite different. Here we have the realm of freedom and imagination; spontaneity prevails everywhere; here creative work can be performed which transcends earlier achievements and causes an upheaval in existing forms of life, hitherto regarded as unshakable.

Moral and legal injunctions are modified by the desire to act in concert with others, constraints are transformed into commitments. Truth discovered through science then becomes a value in itself, appreciated because it is truth and not because it brings with it technical advantages. Beauty enables us to make our lives richer, and it is of inestimable value, not because it is a kind of embellishment, which has social prestige, but because it helps to produce human beings worthy of the name. The world of things and money yields place to true human wealth, the wealth of a many-sided existence which transcends its own limits through creation.

We referred above to two 'levels' of human existence. This may be a misleading way to put it, for neither level is above the other. They are interlinked in innumerable ways and closely interpenetrate each other.

One might use another expression - though, unfortunately, it too is unsatisfactory - and say that life is a continuing correlation between prose and poetry. By 'prose' is meant any important group of human activities - professional, social or political. By 'poetry' is meant human activity which is free from any constraint, uninfluenced by considerations of profit or loss, and which fearlessly runs the risks of innovation. Whether man became man because he was a poet, or because he knew how to live very prosaically, is not important. What matters is that man is still a two-dimensional being who lives in the prose of his existence and, in it, creates poetry. Neither the man who lives by prose alone, nor the man who lives by poetry alone, is a complete being.

The idea of practical action implies a rational and utilitarian organization of life and postulates a discipline based on plans prepared in advance and geared to the future. It requires a critical analysis based on information which has been assembled and processed. It calls upon people to submit to the rigours of the organization and distribution of labour as higher principles governing the social system; it calls for the constant checking of the results achieved in order to be able to turn acquired experience to account with increasing efficiency; and it holds out the promise of an ever-closer association between private interests and those of society, thanks to satisfactory social institutions, a just social policy and rational information as to needs and motivations.

Poetry organizes life in an entirely different way. It makes greater use of the irrational resources of man's personality, his sensitivity, his imagination and his will for direct action. It is not by accumulating and processing information that one is to discover the potentialities to be exploited. The future is revealed in visions, not in the form of projects: plans and forecasts are only the consequences of such visions, otherwise they would be no more than a confirmation of limits already reached. Organization is less important than the ability to act, since sacrifice and the community spirit increase the forces of each individual ten-fold. The value of life is not measured by successes accumulated over the years. Life has emotional value; it is the experience, shared with others, of 'life here and now, on this earth'.

While we defend the importance of poetry against the narrowminded interpretation that practical people would put on it, and whilst we insist upon the importance of correlation between the practical and the poetic, we cannot evade the fundamental question of which of these two patterns comes higher in the scale of importance.

Who can deny that practical action is of vital importance? It is practical action that builds up our material and social world which is best suited to our tastes and intentions. But is this process governed solely by the search for the best results in the struggle for existence waged by mankind, weak and powerless yet victorious thanks to its manual dexterity, the variety of tools, its intelligence and its speech? Who can maintain that the human species aspires only to live, and not to live in a specific way?

Naturally, everything that a man does has a certain importance. But it is also important to define what he is. It is important to know what his position is in his profession and in the community, but it is equally important to know how he lives, and the ordeals which he must overcome if he is to attain happiness and create bonds of community with other people. It is important that the sum total of human welfare should increase, and that it should be wisely distributed. But what is the use of welfare?

Now is the time to advance, with firm conviction, an argument which many, in this age of scientific and technological revolution, will consider unorthodox, namely that practical action should be put to the service of poetry. In this 'common-sense' age it is poetry which leads us on, which teaches us to go beyond the limits we have already reached. It is poetry which overthrows the petrified world of things and institutions, and which brings into play the genuineness of feelings, the community spirit, emotion, imagination and personal experience.

Transposing this idea to the level of education, we shall note that a twofold strategy becomes necessary: on the one hand, a strategy for organizing material and social reality and directing it towards established objectives, and on the other, a strategy which guides man's inner life and gives it its richness, a strategy which we shall describe as humanist.

For the former, what is important is what a man does and how he does it. The latter is concerned with what he is. What counts in the first case is ability and efficiency; in the second, it is the value of life and the style of life.

12 Art - imagination, expression, community, creation

'How should we live?' - becomes a more and more important question in our times. Educators translate it into another question: how should we influence young people in order to help them to find such a way of life which would bring a man happiness and secure the social value of his life? The answer to this question should organize the total educational activity. This activity, planned in various institutions and that arising during individual contacts; school-education and its counterpart realized in everyday life - the so-called parallel and permanent education; directly influencing young people's minds in the course of teaching and animating discussions, as well as indirectly influencing them by means of organizing and initiating contacts with culture.

Thus, art, being a great and important factor of our life in shaping our attitudes and experiences - though it is by no means a moral instruction only - is of special significance in this domain. Educating by means of art has a profound and durable influence; its dimensions are different from those of a catechizm or instruction.

Aesthetic education becomes more and more significant because of the increasing importance of art in contemporary life. Hitherto, only artists and aesthetes used to proclaim so; the majority of masses did not accept this point of view. The universal and everyday importance of art seemed to be a utopia; it could be at its best the entertainment of the broad masses rendered accessible to them by technological means. Today art has begun to be considered as actually an important and necessary element of human life; one of its basic factors.

Why do people need art?

First of all, because art enables people to create their own world of shapes and colours, sounds and words, events and problems, experiences and affections, personal and social feelings. The traditional, current opinion opposing the world of art to the real world and treating art as a mere delusion is wrong. This 'delusion' also is a kind of reality in which people live. In the human world the sound of music is no less real than the bluster of wind; both a picture and a landscape beyond a window are similar elements of human reality. Events taking place on stage, on screen, or in a novel, are as real as those occurring in so-called life; the fact that in the former case only documentation can help us to identify the active persons is no argument for supporting the point which claims that what happens in life is more real than that occurring in a play. The realm of art is the man-made world in which people also actually live. And those who think that the life of a man listening to a concert is less real than the life of this same man doing his various everyday tasks considered commonly as'real' are mistaken.

There are specific features which emerge when the artistic world is seen as being the real human environment. It is a great man-made construction in which human, creative power transforms the existing reality differently from that transformed by planned social activity such as science or technology. The resistance of matter mastered in scientific research and technological constructions and the resistance of social reality are different types of resistance than that mastered by an artist giving an intentional form to the chosen material. In the creative activity of an artist, as in the experiencing of the work of art by a listener or a reader, a special kind of human freedom appears. This freedom is important: though it differs from the type of freedom which is achieved by a man when he subjugates the elemental forces of nature with the help of science and technology, or when his experience of social activity enables him to subdue the unrestrained forces of social development.

Being the result of human triumph over the resistance of matter and acting in agreement with the vision leading human activity, this freedom is very intimate; it ensures profound understanding between man and works which are created by him. Machines create the world of human power which guarantees the independence of the pressure of things; they are our tools and our arms. The world of art is a human world in another meaning. It is not opposite to people as a material and external instrument of their power; it can be identified with people as a projection of their mental and emotional life when subjugating raw materials: wood and marble, concrete and steel, canvas and paint, sound and words; even fate-creating situations, events, and experiences.

In social activity, the opinion which is confirmed that man oversteps his limits and forms his environment, discovers completely new dimensions and possibilities of our existence. Man seems to be all the more able to transcend social and individual boundaries due to the possibilities of multiplying the forms of his own activity and thanks to his ability to enrich the dimensions of his existence. Today it can be explained that the number of various types of human 'ways of living' is infinite, and that the possibilities of experiencing life multiply. Moreover, it can be assumed that man's mental and emotional needs develop his demand for expression and make him look for contacts with other people in an active and genuine life. These problems force us to get more interested in the qualitative aspects of man.

In the light of these facts concerning the problem of a creative and rich life, the world of art must appear more concrete and actual; the artistic experience appears more human. Thus the opinion that 'man creates on the basis of the law of beauty' becomes comprehensible. Looking for forms and meanings of artistic creativity which would emphasize reality as a 'human thing' turns out to be more and more significant. Thus, in a way, there is the revival of the ancient concept of art as catharsis, art as purification, art as a means of riding oneself of the pressure of things.

This new relation between man and the world overwhelms the traditional point of view which considers art as the source of compensation or illusion. The role of art is not only that of moralizing, it is not limited to the confirmation of reality. From this point of view, art is neither an 'oblivion' nor entertainment. It expresses man's potential power and abilities. Art identified with the process of creation and the experience of human existence must always keep reality at a distance, in order to be able to create a new and richer world. Such a way of understanding art implies its association with a new type of thinking about reality and human duties, with the new way of experiencing our existence.

There are various elements of this new attitude towards art and of these new experiences. Imagination, expression, community, and creativity, are the most important ones. So, let us discuss them for a while.

We used to think that we owe the content of our dreams and beautiful visions to imagination. Though completing our dull reality they never make it easier, they did not even model it in the agreement with our needs and expectations. Imagination used to be considered the domain of artists, the source of art opposite to life, the element of people's leisure demanding rationality and organization.

But understanding imagination in this way is out of date and leads to harmful educational and social results. Both the development of our knowledge about ourselves and the changes of social life conditions force us to re-examine these opinions. Why?

First of all, imagination turns out to be a very important factor in the development of mental life, especially that of the scientific thinking. It helps to overcome grooves and stereotypes; it never interrupts thinking - instead, it makes it easier and flexible because it enables us to overstep our limits and to see those aspects of reality which were unnoticed before. The advantages of imagination made some institutions organize additional training for university staff and introduce classes in literature, drama, music, and craft work. Though not directly related to any scientific specialization, they did good service as the 'refreshment' of minds, as a loosening up of stagnant forms of activity. In this way the experience of scientists can help to activate their force in their major field of study.

The very nature of creative thinking is innovative and exploratory; it goes beyond its own achievements and breaks habits arising from previous activities; it always enters unknown areas. The process of such thinking is not identical to the manipulation of well-known elements in a familiar way; it does not mean drawing conclusions on the basis of previous knowledge, even if such conclusions have not been known before. The process of creative thinking is the process of actual discovery, and imagination is the factor pointing to all those possibilities which should be taken into consideration. If rational thinking is the systematic verification of hypotheses, imagination often becomes the source of hypotheses, the source of scientific inventiveness.

The role of imagination in scientific thinking is especially important in modern life, particularly in understanding the development of science. Participation in this development demands many new intellectual abilities in the creation of which imagination takes a part. Scientific civilization is - despite current opinion - the civilization of imagination. It is so because imagination teaches us that reality described as 'possible' is as important for human activity as that actually existing.

In our circumstances the role of imagination is not only limited to scientific and technological progress; it also manifests itself in social activity and in social institutions. There is no doubt that modern life becomes very complicated in the field of organization and administration, and because of this, becomes 'unclear' to people. Human relations lose their previous directness and become very institutionalized. In such circumstances people's responsibility for their activity changes: it results not only in direct contacts, but in remotely influencing people, too. Institutional life enables human activities to effect more and more people. What we do 'here and now' becomes very important over very large territories and for an increasing number of people, both at present and in the future.

Social imagination becomes a very important factor of social activity in such circumstances because it helps to 'see' the results of various activities in overcoming the limits of people's direct experience, as well as the relations between those who are the subjects of the activities.

The role of imagination in modern life is related to another element, namely, to planning. It is this kind of activity which, though taking into account the present, aims at the future - the realm of imagination. In the past, only writers were interested in the vision of the future. At present, politicians and planners discuss it and decide about it. The image of the future is very powerful - it forms the existing. It would not be a paradox to say that in our age the present depends not only on the past, from which it is derived, but on the future too; on the future which is being planned and at which the present aims. When the future enters the everyday life of contemporary people, its visions become important elements of their social activity.

There are important consequences for education which result from these opinions about the various roles of imagination. We should be very particular about the necessity of creating and developing imagination, about the methods of joining this natural human feature with art, technology, science, and social activity. A very distinct line should be drawn to separate the imagination which creates delusions and leads into the world of wizardry, superstition, phantoms, illusion from that imagination which enables us to 'see' the unseen and which shows the perspectives of possible activity.

In fact, man is that strange creature who is going beyond the visible and imagining the world which will probably become his environment in the future. Imagination is connected with the mystery of revolt and progress - those basic elements of the human fate.

It is art which should shape such imagination; art - the great teacher of imagination.

There is another factor in contemporary social problems - it is that expression. Civilization, though a man-made world, has various bad inheritances and limitations and which form the sphere of people's restrictions and slavery. The prospect of overcoming alienation, as presented by Marx, is realized slowly and with difficulties. It is art that makes freedom and genuine expression of experiences and desires, possible. Art enables us to live in another reality, where some laws hold good too, but they are very close to people and make order easy.

For modern man, activity in the field of art is as important and necessary as that in the field of work, science, technology, and social life. Similarly, the desire to express emotions and to harmonize them can be satisfied by art very well. We are more active and more uneasy than our ancestors, our needs are more intense than theirs, and these facts influence the increasing interest in art in our world. At present the meaning of 'art' also covers its therapeutic function as explained by psychoanalysis.

But expression is not directed at an empty space; it looks for an answer. Art is a strange realm where people meet each other through their experiences, though they do it neither bodily nor socially. Art creates human community in a special way: it becomes an atmosphere in which we participate and which is a part of our existence, as well as a part of the existence of many strangers with whom we join in this participation. Films especially, along with paintings and music which do not depend on the understanding of a language, form a vast sphere of this community in the modern world. And even literature, when it overcomes language difficulties, becomes the ground on which people from various countries and even from various continents can meet. Thus, art, crossing the borders of countries and being above any conflicts, binds strangers with invisible ties and creates actual human communities wherever those particular and various individuals can find each other.

Art meets the needs for expression and community in various ways. Sometimes a man identifies himself with a work of art, sometimes he perceives it as his contradiction or his fulfilment or his power. That is why experiencing art always loosens the established patterns shaping people's opinions about themselves. It also explains why art is the source of emotions breaking through the shell of numbness produced by circumstances, bad experiences, and the severe struggle for survival. Moreover, expression in art is neither a simple registration of what a man knows and thinks about himself nor a direct story about him. Being actually still the same, man finds himself richer and modified by this expression - and this is one of the paradoxes of art.

Community, created by art only to a certain extent, also confirms well-known experiences and emotions. Most frequently art reveals the unexpected and unknown aspects of these experiences; it presents possibilities, a part of which can be used to create new dimensions of life. A man becomes more mature as he becomes able to participate in more and more complicated, difficult, and advanced forms of community as created by art. The great works of art from the past and those being created now are the levels of a hierarchy of human opulence which can be achieved equally by various individuals.

Creativity is the third problem in the contemporary discussion of the social role of art. Art becomes a great 'creative experience' - perhaps the most important experience as far as future generations are concerned. In order to understand it we must rid ourselves of the traditional thinking about the act of creation being an unusual activity leading to the production of great works and objects of everlasting value. Thus, we should not consider creativity as the activity of a genius. This way of understanding creativity is of no use as a description of the processes being observed in the present and those which are supposed to increase in the future.

What are these processes based on? They arise from the increasing correlation between the complicated objective demands of civilization and the subjective abilities, talents, and desires of people. In these conditions, man's activity becomes very important for his mental and emotional life and at the same time it becomes more independent than ever. A man is no longer an elementary force completely merged in production. Extricating himself from this slavery, man gains the opportunity of controlling his own activity and forming it in a reasonable way. The more complicated his activity becomes, the richer its possible variants are. Only simple activities are conventional and repeatable. Thanks to complex activities man regains freedom. It is a difficult kind of freedom, because it demands both precise knowledge and brave imagination; only such a union allows us to describe the possible variations, to undertake reasonable attempts, to look for new solutions.

In such circumstances the modern meaning of creative activity is being formed. Its most important aspect is the subjective involvement of the acting person, his consciousness of doing something unique, his conviction that reality, though still mysterious, starts to obey his imagination and will. Those complex subjective experiences are connected with activity which becomes objective and which, in its objective form, becomes a specific union between a man and his world.

The creative attitude, though dependent to some extent on his circumstances, is also a kind of his 'squaring up' to those conditions; the expression of his 'full liberty' in life. Creative activity is a type of activity which is neither completely dependent upon personal experience nor upon outside patterns. This activity, being neither the repetition by the acting person, nor repetition by others, is an activity which goes into the known and which conquers it. It is an uneasy and brave activity connecting wisdom and cleverness with the vigilant observation of the unknown and with a conscious risk-taking. For this activity the world turns out to be abounding with facts and - even more - with possibilities; decisions are based both on the visions of what we could create and on rational knowledge. That is why this activity appeals to people and makes their life important and interesting.

It is just in the field of people's attitude towards art that a new model of life is being created. It excludes adaptation, stereotypes, and the domination of utilitarian motivations. This new idea of life starts to be realized in other forms of human activity too. It may be noticed in work, as well as in people's social life.

Within this activity the union of moral and aesthetic education can be realized.

It is so because art gives the poetic vision of the world which allows us to understand and experience, to overstep the limits of our reality.

Prometheus has been the European symbol of the human desire to be liberated from the power of gods and nature, and to achieve safety and all necessary advantages; while Orpheus has been the symbol of the poetic understanding of the world and of union with its creative forces. Artists used to dedicate to Orpheus their triumphs and defeats, their love, poetry, and music. Orpheus' song was neither a request nor information. It was simply existence itself. This singing - as the wind or the breath of gods - joined Orpheus with the world.

The world in such a poetic vision becomes both a picture and our emotion, it is close to us and easy to understand, but at the same time it is mysterious and shocking; it is definite and vivid, but also incommensurable.

Perhaps we are right when we follow Giambattista Vico's opinion that poetry was more 'natural' and primitive than the objective prose used for utilitarian communication. Perhaps poetry is closer to human nature than everyday, informative languages. Perhaps man is primarily a poet.

Such words seem strange in a civilization of goods and trade. But they do not shock those who create this culture. Physicists, who form the vanguard of science and who discover the most mysterious aspects of nature, are very sensitive to the poetic vision of the world.

Poetry joins not only those who study the structure of the universe, it also joins those who rebuild social life. Revolution is often accompanied by great poetry. Perhaps the Soviet revolution could be the best example of this union. Erenburg wrote: 'there was neither time nor paper for prose ..... . But this period was very favourable to poetry ... , poems were recited in streets, in halls of railway stations, in cold engine rooms; it was not The Day of Poetry, it was The Age of Poetry'. In this period all kinds of poetry triumphed: manifestos, appeals, satires. Great lyric poetry also achieved triumphs unknown before; and although attacked by impatient people, it was loyal to the human need to be liberated from the rigid reality.

In this way the poetic 'negation' of practical reality and of its limitations is, in fact, an attempt to reveal the new dimensions of human existence and the dichotomies of thought and vision; will and inspiration; techniques and contemplation; domination and community; thing and emotion; activity and creativity.

Footnotes

1 'The True Worlds' - The Free Press, New York, 1980 p 26-33.

2 'Strategies de L'Utopie - Colloque organise par Pierre Furter and Gerard Raulet' - ed Galilee, Paris, 1979.

3 Seuil, Paris, 1976.

4 Sunday Telegraph interview, 8.4.1980.

5 Picht G.'Die Verantorung des Geistes', Stuttgart, 1969, p 154.

CREATIVITY AS A PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Janusz Kuczyński

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MAN AS THE UNIQUE CREATOR OF SENSE

Progress and development, the terms of the analysis presented here, will be defined with more precision partly in the light of a discussion of Christian conceptions of their sense. Yet my primary task will be an attempt at a Marxist, positive interpretation of sense as such, of how it is "read" and endowed; in a word, of how it comes to be created. In the course of the consideration a special distinction will have to be made between the meaning of the concept of development and the meaning of the concept of progress.

BEING AS THE BASIS AND THE OBJECTIVISATION OF SENSE

Does Being, conceived as the whole of the objective reality, as the sum of what was and is, have any sense? My basic assumption in this respect is that the objective laws of reality (and above all the laws of objective dialectics) constitute the ontic basis as well as the ontic possibility for sense to exist. Being acquires sense for man when he becomes aware of its structure, its potentialities for development and its wholeness.

Secondly, I assume that Being has sense "in itself" inasmuch as it contains the objectivised relations of our predecessors. Within the framework of reference adopted for this part of the analysis, significance means discharging utilitarian functions. Thus, for example, the tools of production (instruments) are not merely the bearers of significance. They are, moreover, endowed with sense because they present to us the past generations through human labour which is frozen within them. In this way they refer to history, and by the same token to the process of development and thus to the whole.

This is all the more conspicuous with symbolic presentation. Thus, for example, the Royal Castle in Warsaw is primarily a symbol which, to use Paul Ricoeur's words, "gives ample food for thought". It is full of historical meaning of a symbolically presented and represented sense of Poland's history.

The sense as presented by a symbol is clearly different ontologically speaking from the sense of actual history in so far as symbol differs from the process of history (even though the former difference is necessarily less distinct because their intelligibility can be identical). The sense of history even comes to be "substituted" by a symbolic sense, when for example it stimulates the imagination or the intellect with a power that cannot be equalled by the generalisation of the reality inherent in the historical sense. (The power of inspiration is found to be greater in principle with a certain class of symbols. For example with religious or artistic symbols; the paradox of the power exerted by culture lies within the fact that such symbols seem to exert a much stronger impact than does their symbolic generalisations or their possible archetypes). And although the social and productive existence of our predecessors can easily be substituted by quite a variety of things and activities, nothing can substitute their physical and humanistic existence. Yet, the sum of their existence comes to be intuitively revealed in symbolic meaning, while the sense of the history of all past generations can be theoretically reconstructed by the intellect. This is precisely how historians, politicians and practitioners (who turn existence into a link with the past and the future in the first place) either make a cultural resurrection, and even a historical redemption, or are held responsible for the doom and condemnation from those who have ceased to be.

THE MULTILEVEL NATURE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

Obviously, the multilevel nature of human existence (as altogether the subject and object of love, and a self-aware unit of matter and society; both as the supreme axiological value and as a producer) can by no means be viewed in terms of a single form of existence lest man be turned either into an abstract and absolutised being or into a utilitarian function if not a mere instrument. An abstract humanism seems to result from the former while a sheer anti-humanism proves to be the consequence of the latter extreme.

The multifarious nature of human existence turns out to belong with one of the fundamental premises underlying the endeavour to create and interpret sense. In the subsequent "cycle" it discharges the function of interpreting and bringing out sense. It happens not at all infrequently that the significance of an inherited object comes to completely substitute the objectified labour of our predecessors and, by the same token, their social existence as producers. (Thus they are given, whilst at the point of departure, a validated consciousness that their work; their endeavour; their activity including their political activity, will survive). On the other hand, the symbol of an inherited object can only "substitute" its cultural existence. Or even, to be more precise, the symbol can only refer to the object whilst triggering off at the same time the mechanisms of projection and identification.[1] Thus it seems to reproduce and perpetuate a significantly different type of generational bond than is the case with labour or social activity.

THE IMPACT OF THE SENSE OF THE SYMBOL: ITS POWER AND WEAKNESS

In contradistinction to the pragmatic significance of the object, the symbol is indebted for its sense-content to having introduced man into the realm of irreplaceable values and relations which it can then only "counterbalance" or "reveal" ideally, intuitively or conceptually. Hence both the weakness and the strength of symbols and the senses or emotions they contain or release. The weakness lies in the ideal "existence" to which they inevitably refer. The power comes from seeing that they offer a possibility of a much broader concretisation of themselves, of their own sense and that of their "designates" in comparison with the capacity for "concretisation" of a living human being.[2]

Taking this line of thinking it becomes apparent that the impact of the sense of the symbol can at times be proportionally greater than the power and the actual physical existence of the older "sense-carrier". Thus conceived, the sense of the symbol takes on the dimension of a substitute for the existence of man who preceded it. On the one hand, the sense of the "designate" becomes, ontically speaking, the "super-structure" of the object or process, their bias towards us, whilst never ceasing to be "rooted" in their proper individual structure. On the other hand, however, sense, due to its nature as a relationship seems to be "rooted" in us, the subjects. Sense must be regarded as a bridge which spans the gap between us and the generations of our predecessors.

SUBJECT - OBJECT : THE RELATIONS OF SENSE

Let us consider the following set of additional terms; the subject of sense, the relation of sense and the object of sense, which enlarge our conceptual frame of reference and will possibly prove helpful in probing deeper into the complicated, multilevel point at issue here. The object of sense (i.e. being and history in this case) proves to be:

1. the carrier or the "soil" of sense in view of its specific ontic structure
2. an accretion of sense whenever it is the sum total and the consequence of social relations.

Both these elements seem to occur together as a rule. Almost any object can be found to be a bearer of sense when it comes to be embraced by society through cognitive, productive or cultural activity. It is, then, the socialisation of Being through these domains of endeavour which makes an object of sense. This is due to the relations of sense which manifested or manifest themselves between itself and the subject of sense, i.e. between man and the community.

Through our formal-ontological considerations we have been able to demonstrate that the objects of sense - Being and including history - can acquire sense but as the bearer and accretion of sense. Most of the spheres of Being and history, the latter to a considerably variable degree, inevitably prove to be the carrier of sense as soon as the process of history gets started and its various currents assert themselves. They become an actual bearer and accretion of sense when the cognitive counterpart of Being and history, i.e. the subject of sense, enters into relations with these objects, interpreting and positing a new sense in the process of production and creation. By creating a new sense it seems to enrich and enlarge the "sum total" of the sense of human Universe.

GOD AS THE CREATOR OF SENSE AND AS THE MANIFESTATION OF ITS FULLNESS: THE THEORETICAL LIMITATION AND ACTUAL EXALTATION OF MAN

It is high time that the factors limiting the manifestation and the existence of sense were accounted for. Their nature is primarily axiological and historical. They are essentially axiological because any definition of the sense of Being and the sense of history by content is as a rule closely linked with a chosen and accepted Weltanschauung whereas formal-ontological and semantic consideration can potentially be kept neutral in this regard. Genetically speaking, this is, in turn, determined by the place in history and in the class structure of the individual and collective subject together with the ideological and intellectual choice he had made. The matter seems to be quite simple within the framework of the classical Christianity of Christ, Augustine, and even Teilhard de Chardin. There God is the manifestation of sense in its fullness while at the same time being the giver of all sense. God may be said to be the subject of sense and simultaneously, in relation to man, the object of supreme sense, the acme and the inexhaustible source of the sense of Being; of history and of all individual existence.

Taking this specific standpoint into account we must admit that the matter proves to be somewhat different and that the thesis about the neutral character of semantic and formal-logical analyses in relation to Weltanschauungen must be rectified. If Saint Thomas' principle of the negative norm of theology be applied to faith and theology alike, the neutrality referred to will, of necessity, be rejected to the point of questioning the relational value of sense. The whole issue reveals itself in full simplicity: God being the incarnation and the source of all sense, it inevitably follows that sense precedes human activity and proves to be absolutely objective. God therefore marks out the boundaries of all sense considering he is the boundary of all human activity, a boundary inaccessible even through theology.

Thus God seems to mark out a limited ontological horizon and, by the same token, a clearly defined horizon of sense - from the point Alpha to that of Omega. It is of no importance in this case that the idea clearly points to a "spatial" and temporal end of all human endeavour. The important point is that human activity thus proves to be demarcated a priori. The human being ceases to function as a creator while his role is limited to that of a mere executor of plans devised by God, the creator.[3]

This limitation may, naturally, have no negative influence whatsoever upon the practical activity of Christians. Moreover, the idea of God as the source and the horizon of all sense may reveal endless possibilities to man. Within this framework, adopted though it is a priori, there may be no limits to progress. Nevertheless any variety of the Christian religion and any religion where God is so unlike man circumscribes the ontological and temporal horizon. Obviously enough, those varieties of Christianity which try to overcome the pitfall of the "opium of the masses" - like the truly evangelical, Telhardian Christianity and the communist Christianity - seem to be exempt from this negative practical consequence.[4]

Yet "pure" Christianity, untouched as it is by the negative class, social and psychological functions, seems to bring out an incompatibility of theory. It becomes the means by which the ambivalence of ontological apriorism asserts itself with full force. One of the consequences of the ambivalent conception which places man within a rigid framework that he cannot transcend is the idea of the immutability of human nature. The adjective "ambivalent" is applied here in earnest, since clearly there is a manifest and positive aspect through its function as the naturalistic premise of humanism. Spinoza's "God, that is nature" together with his "geometricism" serve as good examples in this context.

There is, to word it differently, the opposition of consistent historicism and aprioristic ontologism. Historicism is, in my opinion, closely linked not only with science and evolutionism, but also with the conception of a consistently conceived autonomy, ontological independence of the world and the "complete theological independence of man".

To what extent ontologism limits the possibilities of anthropology and axiology is an issue in itself. The present work is focused only upon the problem of sense: any determination of sense done a priori must determine quite a number of solutions.

The essential argument against the Christian idea of sense is the fact that it is not man but God that is considered to be the creator of sense. This gave rise to a conception of history which extended it on to social history. The most man can do (and we must admit that it is practically a decisive factor) is to "fulfil" this sense with his activity and in this way contribute to the creation of history through his own endeavour.

NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN MARXISM AND CHRISTIANITY

Let me emphasise it with full force: the contribution of the Christians to the creation of the sense of Being and history has recently increased considerably. Thus there arose a new theoretical situation to which modern Marxism simply had to pay full attention. The cooperation with the Catholics and members of other churches in constructing a new social order counts as the victory shared by both parties to the philosophical debate. Thus the dialogue becomes practically much easier and more widespread. On the other hand, however, it gains in intellectual sophistication and hence in difficulty.

With the basic social values shared by both sides, the dialogue between Marxists and Christians is bound to differ radically from that of political opponents or class adversaries. As I see it, it ought to centre around the presentation and development of the two separate philosophical stands, which would make critique mainly the means of enriching one's own ideas and of co-creating other cultural values in the spirit of humanistic coexistence. This is why my main concern here lies with an attempt at constructing a Marxist conception of sense.

CREATIVITY AS THE PRACTICE OF SENSE

I have digressed to such an extend in order to bring out the anthropo- and socio-centric nature of the Marxist conception of sense; within which the individual and the society are the only subject of sense and the only creator of sense. To put it in more precise terms: the individual is the only creator of sense - every single man as a personality can to some extent "read" the sense and give meaning (significance) to, for example, objects which he had encountered for the first time. He also has the power to change or modify the meaning he has inherited. The activity of endowing something with sense is considered here as creativity par excellence; this being precisely why it can only be the work of an individual. My assumption is that creativity effects changes in the sense of Being, history, culture, science, be it even to a most inconsiderable degree. Naturally, it can be the creative work of a single individual or a collective individual, like, for example, a political party or a scientific community. I apply the term "individuality" to any positive differentiation which enriches the society or the community with new values; in this case including the value of sense.

Thus the sense of Being depends, genetically speaking, entirely on man, the unique creator of sense. Having encountered a being existing on a "pre-sense" level, he begins to endow it with sense through the acts of creative practice and cognition. In this manner he changes Being and endows it with sense. Is the sense, then, of a purely ideal character:

both ideational and emotional? This is precisely my conviction on the subject - the relations of sense also differ from relations of practice by their ideal nature. Yet the ideal ontic status of sense is endowed with distinctive features. First of all sense can manifest itself only on a certain foundation which is peculiar to it. Secondly, sense is by no means an ideal ornament of some kind like, for example, the value of beauty and sometimes even the value of good. Bound in objects, the bearers of sense, with laws as objective correlates, it must itself reveal some regularities. By its very nature it is a regularity, though of an ideal kind. Thirdly, sense seems to be much more closely linked with activity than any other traditional, classical values (except perhaps the truth which, retaining its moral aspect, is primarily a cognitive value). The link functions in a two-fold manner: first, it marks out certain proper perspectives and chances. Secondly, it may have a powerful inspirational value: it is only when we realise the sense of a task that we are ready to undertake it or engage in it with full force.

The latter appears to bear a direct influence upon our attitude towards history. If history is seen to have sense, our activity, must also have it and can be efficacious. Thus, its ideal-relational nature notwithstanding, sense proves to be endowed with a "practice of sense" and may turn out to be a fruitful direction of philosophical enquiry. Creativity is permeated with the idea and with a projectional attitude; it posits and realises the patterns of a new sense. It can also be defined as the first validation of theory in practice, as a particularly intense linking of both. The new sense, born in the mind through a profound comprehension of the existing sense or through a discovery of some new aspects of the structure of the bearer of sense, is then designed as a modification or a new vision or a new sensing of Being, processes, things, etc. After that it changes from an ideal to a material state in the act of creation, giving birth to a new mode or even a new object of sense.

The sense-creating relation is preceded here by interpreting the previous sense or enquiring about the premises upon which the new sense can be constructed. Thus, the subject always manifests itself as a creator whenever it is an individuality. Everyone, we may venture to say after Ingarden and Benjamin, is a creator. For our purpose it suffices to emphasise the anthropogenic nature of sense.

Two particularly significant results seem to proceed from the objectivization, the "crystallization" of sense. These are: the possibility of transferring sense and its power to establish an exceptionally important bond between generations. Moreover, through the process of endowing sense, Being comes to be humanized. Thus both the object and the subject of sense are mutually enriched thanks to the practice of sense. This particular process of objectivization roots out, by and large, alienation, by seeing that by positing or interpreting the relations of sense man holds all things in sway, at least intellectually. We do not become "shepherds of Being", as Heidegger saw it; nor are we subjected to a "dialectics" of simultaneous revealing and obscuring, as Ricoeur conceived it. Nothing of the kind takes place, for we seem to illuminate and penetrate Being revealing its inner light - the light of past generations as well as bringing out from murky depths its rational nature.

The responsibility of man is here thus burdened but at the same time his possibilities seem to have reached their maximum degree. Man acquires the dimension of first the demiurge of sense and afterwards the demiurge of the whole domain of reality. He wrests Being from its "pre-sense" state, constantly enlarging its spheres of sensefulness. It is only thanks to man, thanks to practice and cognition, that Being becomes transparent, open to the intellectual and material influence exerted upon it by human beings.

On the other hand, however, it is only "thanks" to man that Being can become "obscure"; senseless, socially speaking. Once we have the power to posit sense, we have likewise acquired the power to annihilate it; to strengthen but also to weaken it. One can be "blind" and not notice sense where it has been crystallized. But this is not merely the matter of our intellectual ability to "perceive" sense but primarily the question of axiology; of the "point of vantage" and, therefore, also of the historical and class position.

It behoves us now to tackle these axiological problems and enquire into what the sense of Being as created by man really consists in.

THE SENSE OF BEING: AN ATTEMPT AT CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMATIZATION

Philosophy, which seeks to derive its power from a close alliance with special sciences and which ought to change its form with every significant discovery in natural science, is simply bound to rest its vision of the sense of Being and the whole Universe upon the development of science as well as upon the progress made in scientific and productive practice. It is clear then, that the sense of Being cannot be anything that is discovered once for all but rather that it must be something which is dialectically developed through evolutionary, quantitative growth; through scientific revolutions; through the drama of human cognition, and primarily through man's practical attitude towards Universe. The epochs of hierarchical feudal structure; of the violent diversity of the Renaissance; of the, so to speak, linear progress and reason of the Enlightenment; of the boundless, uncontained optimism of the "crystal palace"; of our contemporary vehement enlargement of the Universe - all contribute examples of the link that obtains between man's social situation, his knowledge and his vision of the sense of the reality which surrounds him. The correlations of subjects and objects of sense as well as the changes in the intensity of sense-relations can be easily found there. A history of man, written from this point of view, would certainly reveal accretion in the sense of the world, even though it would be far from linear and expose its faces all the more dramatically.

Codetermined by science, by historical practice and their philosophical generalizations, the sense of Being, the world and the Universe proves to be an intellectual and emotional correlate of man's attitude towards reality and, clearly, of the state of reality itself.[5] In other words it is a correlate of the development of man and the development of reality. In view of all this, the individualising historical, class and personal factors are fully comprehensible. An enquiry into the matter which would view the history of mankind in terms of the change and the development of sense, could, apart from being of great interest, enrich the network of categories and concepts. Unfortunately, there is neither time nor place for such an undertaking. It seems to transcend the possibilities of a single individual considering that it requires a really profound and comprehensive erudition on the part of its author.

Let us be aware of yet another limitation. The definition of Being in terms of the world, in terms of the totality of what exists (which at the same time makes Being coterminous with the Universe) advanced by Parmenides has been found to be sufficient only whenever the issue concerns the most general properties of all reality. And this is precisely the point here.

The question of sense seems to radically transcend the domain of semantics, ontology or, for that matter, epistemology. It includes them all, embracing at the same time the whole of axiology, anthropology, the history of philosophy and even the philosophy of creativity. It thus seems to throw open the possibility of integrating philosophy not from the analytic-neopositivistic stand but from the vantage point of materialistic creationism.

The problem of sense comprehends the problem of essence, truth, value, man, history and creation. Its solution - so difficult as it appears to be - ought to respond to the informational and emotional needs, it ought to work for the reconciliation of consciousness with the world.

The need to posit sense proves to be both fundamental as well as eschatological; the ultimate need of human existence.

Aware of all these limitations, as well as of the tentative character of the proposal advanced, I offer three essential sets of categories as a consideration of the sense of Being.

A. Individuation and Wholeness - The Diversity and Unity of the World

Both common sense observation and modern science seem to teach us that we are constantly surrounded, or even permeated, by numberless individual beings who are ultimately internally subdivided into elementary units whilst at the same time entering into various relations with other individual beings. These relations differ as to the degree of complexity, intensity and permanence. These individual beings seem to compose a kind of a wholeness; first of all at least the wholeness of an object of observation and philosophical reflection of the most general kind but likewise the objective (ontic) wholeness so emphasized in modern cosmologies and cosmological theories of the Universe.

The objective state of reality proves to be its ontic structure which is the bearer and a material correlate as well as the stimulator and a codeterminant of the sense of Being interpreted and co-created by man; which is the unity and the diversity. These two categories are considered in terms of values whereas their material carriers and correlates (a numberless amount of individuations, their structural-dialectic combinations together with their total sum as a whole) are conceived as mere terms of description.

Through sense-creating relations the objective features of Being seem to undergo a transformation into values or, to be more precise, into carriers of values, i.e. elements or contents or embodiments of sense. Particular beings become individual elements of diversity and, on the highest level of development, individualities. The whole forms the basis upon which to construct the plane of unity through sense-creating activity and then the practice of production. And, all the more so, political and ontological practice builds up a real civilizational unity. Yet this whole turns out to be the primary abstract object of general thought, not so much of cognition. Thus, the way towards cognition seems to lead constantly from abstraction to the concrete truth: laying in this manner the intellectual foundations for the concreteness of reality.

The whole of the human world, for example, can form the basis of its civilizational unity, the whole of a country and society - the basis of a political unity, and so on.

Clearly, the process can be regarded as neither simple nor mechanical. Quite the contrary: the actual constitution of sense proves to be an exceptionally complex, dramatically dialectical process. If the assertion is true that the fundamental dialectic and "energetic" law of man is his struggle against and unity with the world around him,[6] that is the struggle to differentiate himself from his natural and social environment while at the same time desiring to achieve a reconciliation with them, it is quite understandable that we attempt to become one of the most distinct and distinguished elements of both the world and society, to stand in opposition to them and even to master them and at the same time we try hard to be reconciled and even to be identified with them.

This very "double-track" tendency appears to be quite complicated in its alternations, changes in intensity, and choice of tasks, etc. There is a great margin for individual differences here. Some individuals will find the sense of the world in its unity, struggling for a reconciliation with it conceived as a form of their intellectual mastery over the whole. Others will spend all their energy in emphasizing their separateness as the condition of the sense of their existence.

Nietzsche's nihilism was, amongst other reasons, the consequence of his conviction that the unity of the world had been destroyed, that the world has become an ocean of transitory individuations: that people have lost the power to create "totalities" and even great creators like Wagner were only capable of "cherishing details".

I believe that the Christian conception of the sense of Being and existence is also amenable to this interpretation. Individuation actually proves to be evil, since it means separation (this is the conception within Genesis as well as that of Plato and Plotinus), while the ultimate sense of our existence consists in our returning to the unity which we have ourselves left. It has been expressed most powerfully by mystics like Boehme, Angelus Silesius and saints like Francis, Theresa, Saint John of the Cross, and others. Naturally, the evil of individuation resides in the sphere of consciousness (the symbolism of the tree of all knowledge) and not in the creation which must be good by its very origin: at the point of departure God creates diversity in order to embrace it again, much enriched, at the final point. Essentially the same idea was expressed by Hegel and in modern times by Teilhard de Chardin. The reconciliation has the dimension through which the individual is enveloped by unity, the wholeness, the community.

These most general foundations - individuation and wholeness - seem to suggest an, as it were, spontaneous, interpretation and comprehension of the sense of existence. How frequently do we hear the confession: my life had meaning because I served the great cause of my motherland, revolution, science, etc? It is clearly visible here that the sense of life is then understood in terms of one's place within the whole; of realising a goal which transcends the particularism of individual existence. To have sense, therefore, means to fulfil wholeness in some harmonious or useful manner. Sense here seems to be the best, concentrated trace of human existence.

This sense of immortality can be easily found at the very dawn of European thought. We can hear Plato saying the same thing in his story of Socrates meeting Diotima. Let me translate the story from the Symposium into the terms advanced here. Human existence is in the immortality of the species or when man sows ideas, which means in the immortality of culture. The first solution was the hope and the reality of the primitive community while the latter meant the opening up of that immense sphere of Olympian individuality which sought its fulfilment in the community of the spirit or the idea.

Thus, in this case sense also refers to the wholeness which alone gives meaning to its elements. Without the wholeness all the elements would function as a formless swarm of diverse, senseless particles. In this way we encounter once again Hegel's significant adage: "Truth is the wholeness".

B. Regularities - Laws

I have already stressed more than once that the proper structure of the world, or, to be more precise, the very fact of reality being governed by regularities which seem to set it in order, underlies the possibility of discovering the foundations of the sense of the world. The individuations and wholeness just discussed can likewise be considered in terms of the dialectical law of the universal inter-relatedness of things and events. I was loath to adduce them as they seem to be too general at least for the purposes of the present work. What ought to be at least considered is the problem of how this dialectical regularity operates depending upon the relations obtaining among the diverse elements; on their distance from one another, on their intensity and on the multidirectional nature of their activity.

Since unity and the struggle of the opposites seemed to be of much greater significance, I attempted to take advantage of this fact in my considerations above. Quite fundamentally it determines the notion of sense together with its subsequent element as advanced here. We have already seen it in the foregoing: in the simultaneous and incompatible desire on the part of man to be reconciled and to struggle with the world. This regularity, while constantly dynamizing man's attitude towards the world, breeds the necessity of a constant sense--creating endeavour within a dialectical world and with dialectical thought. For sense is by no means something that is conquered and constituted once for all. Its very ontic foundations impose the endless activity of building up, developing and preserving.

CHRISTIAN AND MARXIST VISIONS OF SENSE: OPPOSITION AND COOPERATION

I would like to present this problem in contrast to that of the Christian conception of sense which is of a metaphysical, absolutist nature as the result of the ontological substantiation assumed. Conceived as the manifestation of the fulness of sense as well as the essence of all possible senses, God determines one sense which is, a priori, given to all creation. This sense is, in essence, revealed to man thus delimiting the framework and the perspectives of all Being. The duty of the individual lies in opening himself up to this sense, and in accepting it as the supreme gift which bears an unyielding certainty.

This used to result, and it often does even now, in a passive attitude towards the absolutism of sense. Theoretically speaking this passivity cannot be overcome in its ontological aspect. A classically religious, decisively-theocentric culture that would be able to transcend this basic structure proves to be quite inconceivable. One must admit, however, that this passive attitude has been considerably reduced and even suspended by the radical Catholic and Protestant thought on the level of epistemology and especially as far as realization of the idea is concerned.

It is thus at the level of epistemology simply because there are ways of knowing God's plans other than those of revelation, although never so perfect. Even the most traditional variety of Christian thought admits the fact and Saint Thomas Aquinas fashioned a classic example in this regard. The level of what I chose to call realization seems to be of much greater significance. Although sense is given to man a priori, human will and man's endeavour is found to be indispensable for its acceptance and above all for its fulfilment. Once again, then, we must admit that the epistemology can practically "suspend" the passivity which turns out to be a logical consequence of the Christian ontology and theology of sense.

The paradoxical nature of my considerations seem to stem from the antinomy which underlies the religious attitude and its culture. Christianity is bound to derive the origin and the nature of man from God with the source of sense residing outside of man. On the other hand, however, it must emphasise that the truly Christian life together, that salvation (without taking into account the attitude of, for example, Calvin, which is different in this regard) depends also on human beings endeavouring to realize the sense. Man is obliged to fulfil God's plans and by the same token to concretize the sense of Being and history in relation to his own individual existence. Yet even though man has a priori received the supreme gift of the absolute sense as well as of the absolute certainty, he is quite capable of frittering it away. Christian life seems to be exposed to a great degree to be annihilated by senselessness. This is expressed both in the parable of talents in the Gospel as well as in the whole evangelical line of thinking: there is a specific, practical pathos within Christianity.

I believe that the extraordinary, historical flexibility of religion, its ability to adapt itself to various differing conditions, is rooted in the ontological and anthropological antinomy of Christianity. Another paradox - and one logically speaking quite apparent - consists precisely in the adaptive comprehensiveness which stems from the antinomous nature of Christianity.

In view of this the encounter between Marxism and Christianity asserts its theoretical opposition, perhaps the most radical which can happen, while at the same time throwing open a large and fertile field of cooperation. We shall shortly resume this matter in a more systematic manner.

The dialectical theory of sense seems the contradiction to bring into sharp focus. Man must not only work out the sense of his existence as far as its realization is concerned; he must, moreover, struggle unceasingly to secure the existence of this sense. Thus, within the anthropocentric and sociocentric frame of reference, individual as well as collective man (conceived as the unique creator of sense) maintains the existence of sense also through his incessant endeavour. Let us come back for a moment to the relationist ontology of sense. The sense-relation, to use a metaphor, is viewed as the arch of a bridge with one span supported by a definite structure of Being and the other one finding support in a constant endeavour on the part of the subject of sense. Though it develops dialectically, the bearer of sense anchored in Being proves to be objective as well as relatively stable. Whilst the subjective carrier, the creator of the sense-relation, turns out to be individualized to a maximum degree and being at the same time dynamic. What is more, the practice of endowing, interpreting and fulfilling sense can be said to be of a dramatic character and is accomplished in the very process of struggling and finding a reconciliation with the world.

The sense-relation is, then, constantly posited and frequently suspended and even blotted out. This is not only attendant on changing subjective states or the mood the subject finds himself in, but primarily from the drama of the sense being rooted and erected between the two incessantly developing realities, man and the world: realities which are not always developing in parralel.

THE SUBJECT OF SENSE - THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL

This seems to explain the apparent subjectivity of sense, which is interpreted in various philosophies in terms of a total and inescapable subjectivity. It also explains the position of positivistic agnosticism on the one hand and, on the other hand, the various kinds of nihilism, lack of faith, powerlessness and literary confessions upon freedom (for example that of Sartre and, especially, Camus). A scientific, or to be more modest, a testifiable philosophy of sense finally appears to be impossible to conceive. I seek to explore this objectively difficult theoretical situation in an attempt to fashion a tentative proposal couched in relationistic terms and transcending both religious absolutism as well as all kinds of nihilism or subjectivism.

I would like once again to resume the problem of the unity and diversity of Being and of man. We refer to unity considering that we are, as Nietzsche wrote, "also nature, quand même" and our bodies function on the same principles that are proper to living nature. Diversity, seeing that we are what Pascal referred to as the "thinking reed", because we are free while being determined. This is the premise on nature, even in the literal sense of the word, underlying the structural resemblance which occurs between the object and the subject of sense and so, at the same time, gives rise to the fundamental possibility of building up a sense relation.

Yet the drama of making sense proves to be limited in still another way, in a way which reduces the chances for intersubjective communication. Community and objectivity, together with the eternal value of dialectical laws, constitute a common frame of reference for continuing what came to be established in the past and bridging the gap between the generations, cultures and views upon the world (at least inasmuch as common issues and the role of common goals are concerned). It is likewise determined by a common existential condition as well as by the need of searching for and constructing sense.

Gramsci's conception of the collective man (alongside of his idea of the party as a collective philosopher) offers the political, intellectual and practical premise. Accruing consciousness - together with the tendency towards unifying civilization primarily by workers' movements but also with the cooperation of, for example, Christian ecumenism - seem to fulfil the unity step by step.

Nevertheless, the common elements make for purely formal similarities, the similarities bred by a part of the situation shared in common. This seems to suffice for a thesis about the transcendental subject of sense[7] which makes the communication (not identity) between generations, cultures and even classes, formally possible. Communication is possible quite naturally between philosophies too. Here resides the innermost foundation of an intersubjective, scientific theory of sense, whose arguments may prove to be decisive for all in the future when the differences of social and historical positions and the Weltanschauung adopted, which now seem to disrupt the formal community, will be annihilated.

The point at issue here concerns the construction, so painstaking as it has proved to be so far, of a possibility of communication, of proper understanding, of valid enquiry and debate. This is our response to Rev. Prof. Bartnik's expression of a "preference at all costs for constructive proposals; of searching for 'harder points' and, if possible, of defining elements".[8]

Transcendentalism advanced here is thus of a formal character and when filled with the diversity of changing and accruing contents it becomes historicity itself. It must be historically conceived seeing that the transcendentality of humanity changes and develops with the development of humanity itself - the collective subject.

PREMISES OF THE SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY OF SENSE

I refer once again to the issue of the scientific philosophy of sense and this attempt at a philosophy of sense is guided by the desire to couch the problems in scientific terms which are acceptable to followers of divergent views of the world. Hence the search for the objective, existential basis of sense.

Anyway, the sense-creating activity of man simply must proceed from an analysis of objective reality; from the recognition of the basis inherent in it upon which to construct understanding and the processes of humanization. Being "inspires", "imposes" or "determines", as it were a definite sense. Therefore, within the diversity of cultures (epochal and class distortions notwithstanding) there exist and function certain common interpretations and positions of sense, although differently named or incompatibly absolutized. Thus we perceive the wholeness of reality despite the diversity and multitude of forms of individuations; despite contrary tendencies and the struggle of opposites. All this imposes, or determines, the desire and the vision of unifying and of unity. Wholeness, interpreted, rationalized and humanized as the unity forms the foundations of comprehensibility, understanding and rationality. This began with Plato's and Plonitus' conceptions of unity and of the monotheism of philosophical religions aware, so to speak, of the unity. The primeval genius of Heraclitus, the historical maturity of Hegel, the dynamic insight and realism of Marx all went to reveal the innermost dialectical tensions within Being together with the contradictions within each and every differentiated or temporarily constructed unity.

Proceeding from the abstract (the most general feature of Being) towards the concrete, is the struggle of opposites within the unity, including man's unity, and struggle with the world. Further towards the concrete, one encounters a whole network of dialectical regularities and then the regularities of physics, chemistry, biology, sociology and anthropology. They all seem to reveal the "multilayer" structure of Being. One must, however, always take into account the differing degree of their intensity depending on the "density" of matter or the social material which constitutes the background and the bearer of these laws.[9]

Man's sense-creating endeavour transforms these rules into the laws of subjective dialectics as well as of special sciences. Rules and laws, when distinguished terminologically, help to reveal the process of transition from the objective reality (ontic structures) to the theory of Being (ontology) conceived of as the result of cognition. The transition is then subsequently to epistemology (as a theory of cognition, and the analysis of the very process of cognition) and, finally, to the construction of sense. In this manner the construction of sense proves to be a crowning of a multiphase and multilayer process of cognition of the world as well as a crowning of the process of rationalizing and humanizing the world.

Thus the creation of sense seems to crown the double-edged process of Being; "opening up" towards man and simultaneously infiltrating through the intellectual and emotional endeavour of the human being. In this way self-knowledge comes to be consumed in the human consciousness: with man's attitude towards the world reaching, likewise, its perfection. For the activity of positing sense also means a transformation of the intentional character of consciousness into an "intentionality" which, while being directed, acts, rationalizes and humanizes the world. (Whereas intentionality "as such" constitutes a mere passive "reflection of reflection" thus evincing diffuse, contemplative forms which have to be overcome through the effort of will and the integrating activity of the self-conscious subject). The unilaterality of intentionality, and its concentration on objects, is thus levelled out through the relational nature of sense. It turns out to be relationally dialectical considering it comes to be shaped by the mutually dependent activity of subject and object as well as through constant tension between the two; through their authentic unity of oppositions.

C. Sense of Being: Complexity and Development - Self-creation and Progress

We have thus reached the next aspect of the problem of positing sense. The regularities of Being, interpreted in terms of laws, which man becomes aware of and which he co-creates in the dialectical relation of sense and practice, are closely linked with the objectively developmental aspects of reality. Even observation and reflection on the highest level of generality can lead to the conclusion: that there is a growing complexity of the material Universe which spontaneously develops all the more complex structures within some of its spheres and in result of gravitational forces, etc. And at the very summit of complexity there appears consciousness and noosphere, that is matter's self-knowledge and subsequently the self-creation of new forms of Being.

Together with development, growing complexity seems to constitute the existential basis of the following element in the contents of the sense of Being, i.e. self-creation and progress.

Complexity turns out to be caused and conditioned by the dialectical laws of the unity and struggle of opposites; of universal relatedness, of physical laws of gravitation, of biological principles of evolution and the laws governing human psyche and human society. It constitutes an entirely objective and dynamically primary foundation for the self-creation of reality as well as for its constantly more complex forms. The recognition of the growing complexity reveals the nature of Being which can be referred to as self-creation through the process of endowing sense whenever we encounter the supreme form of Being: that is the human being.

The significance of this for any consistent form of materialism seems quite obvious and, all the more so, to materialistic creationism. Being, which is eternal, becomes the subject, the "demiurge" of itself and its varied manifestations. Thus, a possibility of a fully "natural" explanation of reality seems to be thrown open - the explanation by itself and through itself. This very possibility must exist already in the point of departure, seeing that everything else is but a consequence. Therefore, the foundations for the basis of the sense of the world reside in itself, with no necessity of reaching out of Being in its search.

Consequently, the idea of development conceived of here is on the same lines of thinking, It is the objective basis of what is referred to by people as progress. Development is propelled spontaneously, through the forces of the innermost impulses occurring in matter and the material of the world. As such it evinces a multidirectional tendency together with a differing degree of intensity; depending on the inner forces and the resistence on the part of environment. Primarily, however, it depends on the complexity of the forms of movement within matter.

In his analysis of development, Bergson uses the image of the explosion of a grenade while Teilhard de Chardin refers to the preceding, compressing, as it were, forces of complexification. Both metaphors express the immanence of the forces of propulsion, though this immanence is conceived of in spiritual or even psychic terms. However, it goes without saying that even their beautiful language full of metaphorical expressions cannot consummate the wealth of the concrete in the initial phase of transformations. It attempts to replace concepts with images, metaphors.

The spontaneous and multidirectional character of development proves to be also a manifestation of the immanence of the world of forces because it reveals a great "surplus" of nature's wealth in her evolutionary interplay of trials and errors; a surplus incomparable to man's endeavour. Contrary to her eulogists, especially those who are anthropologically orientated, nature is entirely irrational considering amongst other things the incomprehensible "waste" of energy and matter used for the creation of various forms of life.

Obviously, then, man, in his cognitive efforts, and all the more so, in his effort to imitate, simplifies nature to a great extent. At least this has been so in principle. However, there exist two, if not more, types of simplification: that of abstraction (which reduces the concreteness of Being to an aspect, law or a whole network of regularities) and that of subordination of the multidirectional developmental tendency, imposing a certain framework upon it: mastery over spontaneity. I propose to apply the term "creation of progress" to the intellectual and practical activity related to development.

Development is immanent whilst progress is created by man who takes advantage of the regularities of development considering it to be the objective foundation for his intellectualization, rationalization and humanization of the world.

It follows, then, that progress may become, and in principle ought to consist in, a turning to advantage of the regularities of development. The network of rivers flowing to the sea comes to be simplified by constructing a system of dams; at the same time as enabling man to use their energy with efficiency. This is how the relation between development and progress can be expressed by means of a simplifying metaphor.

THE PRACTICE OF SENSE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRACTICE

The problem touched upon above allows us to approach yet another aspect of the sense-creating endeavour of the human being. It is both of an abstract, theoretical nature as well as of a practical, concrete nature. The former can, to a very limited extent though, be subjective and free to a considerable degree, that is determined by both the objective conditions and by the bearers of sense. One might even venture to say that completely free sense, i.e. one which would be determined by reality only negatively; one that contradicts reality as a matter of fact; the "sense" of paranoid states of the psyche and of diseased cultures absurd convictions; of decadent and nihilistic social classes, proves to be a negation of objective sense and the historical lines of its development.

The latter, the practical and concrete sense, is linked much closer to the conditions and the bearers of sense (though it does not necessarily bind the subject with the object of sense). It is only when the practical sense comes to be constituted that we can start talking about the rationalization and humanization of reality. Theoretical sense functions only as a preparation or as a generalization of the practical rationalization and humanization. Both aspects seem to be mutually dependent, inextricably intertwined in man's everyday activity. They follow each other depending on the phase of mastering reality and on the current needs of the society and culture.

The philosophy of practice seems once again to assert its superiority over all other kinds of theory. Its ontological and historically objective nature is conditioned not only by links with the sciences but, moreover, by the practice of sense including intellectualization, rationalization and humanization of both practice and reality. Its power to convince and prove stems primarily from the practical position of sense, through realizing its own historical and humanistic rationality and "sense-fulness". The ontological foundations of sense (the practical interpretation of the sense posited heretofore) are revealed in the process of changing the world simultaneously with the activity of positing and enlarging new sense.

The theory of progress can, in the very same manner, be corroborated and universally recognized only through the practice of progress. Once again practice becomes the final test of theory, whenever proper rules of verification have been worked out. It corroborates the profound truth, considering one might thus regard truth as being of a multilayer nature. Should this prove to be the case one could - by analogy to Lenin's conception of essences of the first, second and n-th degree - devise a conception of a multilayer, multidegree nature of the truth of sense.

THE MULTIDEGREE NATURE OF THE TRUTH OF SENSE: FROM CHRISTIANITY TO MARXISM

Several significant consequences seem to result from this idea. Thus, for example, the Christian conception of sense can no longer be considered either groundless or untrue. For it seems to advance an absolutization of one or several theses, each true in separation, true in the Aristolelian sense and adopted here simply because this adoption then offers a common ground for both Christians and Marxists. The primary thesis about the unity and diversity of the world must be considered to be true and valid for both views of the world. Another common idea is what have here been called the objective bearers of sense; which Christians will have to put in different terms: as the consequence of the splitting up of primal unity rather than that sense being the basis for individualization and unity. The fact of this "splitting up" being called creation does not, by and large, change the issue.

The modifications introduced by Christianity in its various forms have never changed the primary motif (which having originated from Plato, had been given impetus by Plotinus' emanation theory).

Let me try to penetrate the problem somewhat deeper. The same truths about the ontological structure of Being adopted by both stands may underlie their views, opposed to each other as they prove to be. However, these basic ontological truths will undergo different absolutizations through different procedures of positing sense. Religious creationism will recognize these ontic structures as the differentiation of primal unity, as the conscious product of the Unity and thus, to resort to an extreme interpretation, as a degradation of sense. Materialist creationism, on the other hand, will perceive in them mere "harbingers", the ontic possibility of sense which must underlie sense as man-created. Moreover, within this frame of reference, only man can create unity.

The problems of sense, therefore, seem to bring to a sharp focus both the similarities and the incompatibilities of the two with a greater precision. It brings a hope for a more concrete and effective discussion without undue logomachy or incomprehension of terms used by the opponent. It also becomes the battleground of the most dramatic, the most unrelenting even, yet purely philosophical struggle of our times. For it may be that the struggle for sense will prove to be the most profound, the most far-reaching and thus, so to speak, ultimate philosophical battle. It is bound to lead either to solutions or to the most essential convictions which in turn ought to be introduced into the course of practice as determined by a well-grounded theory of sense.

FOOTNOTES

1. The conceptions of Edgar Morin can, of course, be referred to this interpretation of "transmitting" sense. It could also be argued that history at its deepest intellectual level is nothing else but inheriting, developing and transmitting the sense of societies.

2. The process of "concretizing" another man in the process of anthropological cognition is different in many ways from Ingarden's conception of concretization of the work of art. The "object" of cognition is here simultaneously the subject which comes to be revealed and concealed from others by his activity.

3. Compare this with my remarks on Tatarkiewicz's interpretation of the famous poem of Michelangelo, in Dialectics and Humanism, 4/1978.

4. Communist Christianity seemed to be an apparent paradox shaped by a kind of cold war between the Vatican, the church authorities - and socialism, that is until Pope John XXIII. Yet the category proves to be quite valid in the light of the

texts upon the first Christians as interpreted by Kautsky's view of Marxism. What is more, certain movements and attitudes in the contemporary world seem to corroborate the assertion. Compare the views of Fidel Castro and J. M. Valverde, "Marxism - Communism - Christianity", Dialectics and Humanism, 2/1977.

5. By "Being" I understand (unless clearly stated otherwise in a different context) the most general definition of reality or the material of all individual beings. The world I understand as above, with the difference that it also takes various assumptions (" he world of man" is something clearly different from the being of man). Universe is used here not as a term of cosmology but of philosophy, identical with the concept of Being and yet considered always as observation's most distant perspective.

6. This problem was discussed in my Homo Creator, Warszawa, 1979 /2nd ed./.

7. Suffice to a certain extent, that is. The meaning of the transcendental subject of sense is not taken from Husserl but is regarded as the epistemological correlate of the notion of humanity. Thus the subject always undergoes development and is enlarged by the course of history and by the unification of cultures without losing identity. That which is enlarged is the possibility to communicate.

8. Cf. Dialectics and Humanism, 1/1979, pp. 36-37.

9. For a discussion of these notions and conceptions see "Homo Creator".

THE CONCRETISATION OF SOCIALISM:
INDIVIDUALITY - CREATIVITY - COMMUNITY

I. SOCIALISM, WITH REGARD TO CREATIVITY AND THE COMMUNITY OF MANKIND

The transformations of socialism, including the most recent ones, both as a movement and as a type of society, have codefined modern history. Today they will probably become, to an increasing degree, decisive for the fate of human civilisation as a whole. The idea of scientific socialism as a theory was always concretised in the reality of proletarian unity; the Communist International; the October Revolution; Soviet society, the people's democracies in Europe and later in other continents, as well as in the unity of the working class movement on a global scale. Alongside those great historical concretisations we are always dealing with thousands of others realised during the course of everyday life, in the most varied of conditions. The process of concretisation is something permanent and necessary; only an idea can conquer the masses and become a material force. This conquering of the masses signifies also a concretisation of just that idea in the activity of thousands of millions of people.

Let us attempt to define here a new stage in the concretisation of socialism; a stage which in my estimation is becoming ever more clearly both the growing tendency of our period and the need of our history. In my opinion this concretisation is one of the correlates of a socialism which is mature, confident of its reasons and developed. Such a socialism, despite difficulties which at times are so great as to bring doubt to lesser hearts, strives today along various paths, to conquer and, even more, to save the entire world.

We are concerned here with the highest stake - the existence of human civilisation which can readily "extinguish" itself whether by nuclear war, an ecological or energy crisis; or by their highly probable combination, mutual determination and inspiration. These threats are well known today and no one in the working class movement is unaware of them. If then, despite this, we are the adherents of a philosophy of historical optimism, then this is so because those threats do not dominate and because they do not exclude other roads of development. An extraordinary development of the sciences and rules of technical civilisation; despite all odds. Einstein and Russell, when founding the Pugwash movement in the early 1950's, made a famous appeal to humanity in which they stated that mankind depends on man alone, upon whether he will utilise the powers of science and technology to create a heaven on Earth, or destroy the world.

Finally, we are the adherents of a philosophy of historical optimism because in accordance with the deepest humanitarian tendency of Marxism-Leninism we have at our disposal scientific premises for a belief in man, his social common sense, and his good nature. The present class deformations of man, and even social deformations and at times degenerations, cannot blur the fundamental image of the human being as a pro-social, constructive, community-minded being, open towards its fellow man and the world.

Historical optimism is thus based not only on a scientific analysis of class forces; historical tendencies; regularities in the transformations of social structures; the laws of world development as a whole, but also upon the conviction with regard to the effectiveness of a philosophical-moral appeal to all humanitarian forces, even upon the self-preservations of those who wish to avoid destruction in the name of instinct.

Today one can avoid destruction only by decisively and wisely facing the future; by directing and stimulating development. It is here also that we place our problem. After all, the shape of socialism becomes to an increasing degree the shape of the future civilisation, it co-models it and makes it possible.

Socialism - while not resigning from any of its achievements and fundamental principles and remaining the philosophy of proletarian and working class unity, a revolutionary force striving towards fundamental changes in social structures - will to an ever larger degree become simultaneously the philosophy and movement of creation as well as the philosophy and movement of the human community.

It already is, and always was, in its most authentic and profound versions (and to an ever greater degree will be) the basis of the only possible human community, which was prepared by all previous revolutions and which is being constructed by contemporary creativity.

In certain geographical and social spheres one can also say that the creativity of the masses is a contemporary form of revolution. This is a revolution of, above all, a constructive and unifying character. It is thus a conclusion drawn from the achievements of all previous revolutions and the realisation of their furthest plans. Creation is hence the crowning point of revolution, both in the historical and in the anthropological-ontological meaning which we shall present later on. At this time, one can say most succinctly that we are concerned with the fact that not only does the world change but that a new world and new existence is being created. Social and historical collective man is the demiurge of this new world.

This is also the reason why contemporary socialism turns to creativity as the most effective method of constructing a new world, according to its laws and its mission. It also turns to creativity because the latter is the most certain way of uniting mankind. Starting from, as it were, the historical proletarian "earth", the basis of history and its fundamental contents, contemporary socialism heads for the future "heaven" of a united and rescued mankind; it makes concrete its aims by broadening them, reaching for the entire world, uniting all people of good will, challenging the old class forces which remain and also overcoming them also with argument.

II. THE ONTOLOGICAL-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FROM AN INDIVIDUALISTIC AND AHISTORICAL CONCEPT TO A COMMUNAL CONCEPT OF CREATIVITY

Such is the general background of the problem. Obviously, we are not able to undertake at this point all of its aspects and we shall limit ourselves only to the one aspect mentioned in the sub-title namely that of individuality - creativity - community.

Contemporary scientific literature which is mainly concerned with the psychology and sociology of creativity (as well as its methodology and heuristics) is current, above all, in the Soviet Union and the United States. One of the outstanding experts in this field, the Soviet psychologist, Y. A. Ponomariev,[1] attempts a general evaluation of pertinent literature and draws attention to the fact that American research, although characterised by common-sense and of a utilitarian nature, is devoid of deeper scientific-theoretical foundations. As an example of this, probably the best known American methods of creativity - brainstorming and synectics - have emerged outside scientific circles. One can also add that their theoretical background is weak although no-one questions their practical usefulness. However Ponomariev by-passes the entire broad trend of philosophical research undertaken by American scholars such as Whitehead, Wieman and Hartshorne. This in turn, however, further calls for a separate discussion because of the specific character of these philosophies.

As far as I know, all this research is characterised by an individualistic attitude. Ponomariev did not notice this fact and what is more he himself seems to succumb to the attitude despite all the Marxist options available. The individualistic attitude is also, in my opinion, visible in the small body of Polish literature on the subject, which unfortunately limits itself to only presenting American and Soviet research.

The individualistic attitude reveals itself, above all, in a concentration of interest upon the psychological process of creativity and an analysis of the so-called creative personality, whilst by-passing almost entirely (or at least clearly not noticing) the historical, social and philosophical co-determinants of creativity. Hence, this research must lead to a deformed and partial image of such a composite phenomena as creativity.

Limiting ourselves, of necessity, to the formulation or even to only the naming of problems, we wish to point out here that the phenomenon of creation should be seen in an ontological and historical perspective. It is obvious that there must be the question of how creativity is at all possible; thus what are its ontical premises and what is its ontical status? Ponomariev characterises creativity as a universal mechanism of development, as coactivity, as a mutual influencing ("vsaimodieystvye") which leads to development. The creativity of man is one of the concrete forms of this mechanism. As a result he writes that creativity is a trait of an animate and inanimate nature and that it obviously occurred before the emergence of man. "Creativity is the necessary condition for the development of matter, the shaping of its new forms, the appearance of which is accompanied by a change in the very forms of creativity. The creativity of man is only one of these forms".[2]

This attitude is rather widespread in Soviet and Marxist literature[3], but is, in my opinion, sterile and erroneous. It is erroneous since it consists of a sui generis anthropomorphisation of animate nature and the universe and it blurs the breakthrough character of man's activity, especially the highest form of activity which is precisely that of creativity. Creativity in a well-grounded understanding, albeit one that is still general, presupposes a question about the subject: who or what can be the subject of creativity in the universe? It is obvious that despite his own will the Soviet scholar cleared here a path for a common denominator within ontology for materialism, even that of Marxism, and religion.

It is also a sterile attitude since it annihilates the fundamental distinctness of the laws and mechanisms of development, the development of nature on the one hand and man's activity on the other. We are here concerned obviously not only with terminological differentiations, although they also should not be disregarded. It is significant that Ponomariev confuses ontic premises of creativity with creativity itself. How is creativity possible and in what kind of a world can it occur? - this primary question can only have one initial answer: in a world ruled by definite given laws and regularities; this answer applies both to the universe and to society. The latter will be an especially important problem for us in our further analysis. Creativity is thus first the discovery of the laws of the Universe and their fulfillment as achieved in a special way; that is with full consciousness.[4] In society, on the other hand, especially in artistic culture, creativity also consists in transcending, abolishing and breaking existing laws and the establishment of new ones. This is a qualitatively separate type of creativity.

The objective, that is cosmic and biological, premises of creativity, consists in regularities; but they themselves are not the subject of creativity nor its symptom. Creativity as one of the highest forms of consciousness and the highest type of activity appears only in the right meaning at a given stage of man's development, In the first place we dealt with the mechanisms of reaction, etc. Although one cannot establish a metaphysical dividing line between the emergence of human behaviour and creativity; the discoveries of fire and the wheel were one of the greatest creative acts in the history of mankind although they were probably modelled by a stimulus-reaction type of behaviour. In this field the assessment of W. Tatarkiewicz in his "A History of Six Concepts" is instructive. The history of the concept of creativity, included in that work, is simultaneously proof of egalitarisation: the question remains as to whether proof of the concept only or also of the phenomenon. I believe that this is a reflection of a very characteristic development and one which is of particular significance for the justification of the position to be later defended.

The egalitarisation of the concept and phenomenon is for us precisely a sympton of an historical tendency which constitutes one of the premises for the philosophy of historical optimism. Lenin saw this when writing: "In the course of the widening and the deepening of human creativity there must also occur an increase in the size of that mass of people who are the conscious creators of history"[5]. The individual, when thought of as the classical Greek then the Renaissance and romantic subject of creativity, is here historically "supplemented" by the appearance of a collective subject. This collective subject is the most important form of creativity; i.e. the creation of history itself, of which nature is only the crowning part. The masses create the basis for the existence of all cultural possibilities; the revolution achieved by them is a profoundly creative opening up of the field for new and higher forms of creativity.

This is also the reason why individualistic attitudes towards the phenomenon of creativity must be partial, deprived as they are of an historical and ontological perspective. The frameworks in which creativity reveals itself are always existentially and historically determined. At this point we are interested, above all, in the concretisation of the definition: a historical process and community as a factor co-determining creation.

I have already written that at present we are at a stage in the historical process in which the phenomenon of creativity becomes not only increasingly wider; it also constitutes the most important opportunity for the salvation and further development of mankind.

III. DEFINITION OF THE PROGRAMME: CREATIVITY AS HISTORIOSOPHY, IDEOLOGY AND METHOD

Earlier remarks make it possible to assume that in a society creativity has both an objective and subjective aspect. It is objective because it is a growing historical tendency, the subject of which are, to an ever growing extent, the masses and above all their representative - the self-aware collective man, i.e. the working class movement and its political party, the trade union movement, and various forms of self-government. As an objective fact creativity is a component of the historical process, making that process also, to a certain degree, a self-steering subject. In my conviction it is nonsense to talk about the creativity of the universe or animate Nature. Instead one can increasingly clearly talk about the creativity of history. Obviously the significant roles are played by social classes; the dynamics of productive forces[6] and the relations of production as well as ultimately, within the framework of the general objectivity of history, the entire extremely complex and increasingly active superstructure.

Creativity, however, becomes precisely such a subjective factor of history. It becomes a programme, a method of solving contradictions and even an ideology. This we shall stress particularly strongly. I propose to treat creativity precisely as an attitude, an ideology and even as an historiosophy of socialism[7]. It is alongside the struggle between classes, the struggle of ideas, and the working class movement on a world wide scale. We wish to place creativity as one of that struggle's leading elements and in close connection with it. Because of its philosophical heritage (recently recalled vividly by Howard Parsons in his "The Concept of Creativity in Marx") and because of its humanistic essence and programme premises, socialism becomes to an increasing degree the movement of creativity and a creative movement. In releasing large amounts of political initiative, productive energy, the wide cultural imagination and technical inventiveness of the masses, the socialist society perceives more and more clearly a factor of self-dynamics in creativity[8]. This will also apply to socialism as an international working class movement. We shall illustrate the inner socialist and the international perspective by presenting a few of the contradictions connected most closely, in my opinion, with our problem.

Socialist societies are still not free from the previously universal contradiction between personal interests and inclinations and social interests. In earlier formations this contradiction appeared sharpest in class and group antagonisms, which in their mutual relationship increased that abstract and general contradiction ("mellowed" in its general form by many well-known social mechanisms).

Essentially this contradiction, in comparison with previous formations, succeeded in a conquest, as a partially uprooted and partially exploited dynamic energy of activity. It is today the object of attempts to absolutise and so be used in a spectacular political way by the so-called defenders of human rights. From the point of view which we are trying to develop here, it should become even more clear what a great misunderstanding this is.

Through the above mentioned political experience and thus also through such social mediations, we see the growing role of creativity mainly as being a typical phenomenon of the emerging socialist societies as well as an aspect of the dialectical inner development of the present stage of history: as a growing trait of contemporary civilisation.

Here we find a profound regularity, which was foreseen, although expressed in an absolutised or even mystified form by Bergson, Whitehead, Wieman, Hartshorne and Teilhard de Chardin. Creative tendencies become ever clearer and thus ever more significant. If one sees them in the mass of the universe, in organic structures or even in inanimate matter then one expresses, like Bergson, the idealistic attitude or indirectly succumbs to it in a Marxist pancreationism, which sees creativity everywhere, as a universal mechanism or development.

The concept of the noosphere according to Teilhard de Chardin seems to be much closer to the truth of the times, although it remains clearly idealistic. It describes, in a specific language and context, the fact of the growing role of consciousness in the course of the development of the historical process. One can even say that it constitutes a translation into the language of great religious historiosophy both the facts of historical development and their generalisations in Marxist literature. It holds a theory of a transition from the kingdom of necessity to, and let us at this point modify the classical interpretation, the republic of freedom; the growth of the role of the subjective factor.

We stress here the qualitatively distinct and today visibly emerging new stage in the development of creativity as an objective tendency of history. The subjective sphere of creativity grows from individual cases in the past (the elitism of the concept and phenomenon reserved for the Demiurge only), similar to those of divine activity, through to the privilege of geniuses and to the creativity of intellectuals and the people (Lenin). At the same time its objective grows as if it were an inner social, self-steering activity of the collective subject which is becoming to a greater extent the civilisation of mankind, despite all internal divisions.

It is in this meaning that socialism becomes the leading force of the historical process, an exponent and harbinger as well as the creator of the future, which is already, after all, partially present in our times in the form of its basic traits, including, quite precisely, creative attitudes.

This objective historical tendency enables us to formulate the thesis that creative attitudes are not only the result of ideological premises, a sui generis social engineering, but also a regularity of a developing history; it is in this meaning that while simplifying matters we say that creativity is also historiosophy. To put it more exactly, Marxist historiosophy must presuppose (and does so, although mainly in the language of popular sociology) the growth of the role of the subjective factor, and precisely within it creativity as a regularity and a law for constructing future civilisation and its subsequent immanent development.

This must lead to making precise, and further developing, the classical thesis of historical materialism with regard to the dependence of consciousness upon being. To an ever larger degree this dependence will become two-sided; with consciousness playing a growing and leading role. I believe that one of the most significant and universal errors made by Marxists, although in a certain sense hidden and unconscious, lies in the fact that they mistake the general, and obviously correct, thesis on the primacy of matter in the cosmological plan (Engels) - and the classical thesis of historical materialism on the fundamental dependence of the consciousness upon being - with some form of paneconomism and pansociologism; both of which were so strongly criticised by Engels in his correspondence.

Consciousness, in our estimation and in our historiosophic conception becomes to an increasing degree the moving and causal force of history precisely in the form of creativity. Of course, this is no Hegelian "spirit" but a consciousness always concretised in the minds and attitudes of people:

simply a consciousness of individual subjects and the collective object.

Upon this objective historiosophic basis (which we have presented only in an outline) one can place the next thesis which is that creativity also becomes ever more clearly the ideology of socialism. This distinguishes mature socialism both from its earlier stages of necessity aimed at a destruction of the old order, and from contemporary "leftism" and its pseudorevolutionary phraseology.

Creativity as ideology; this means that socialism in its developed form uses among its leading slogans, the conception of man the creator and creativity as an attitude towards the world, which becomes man's subject (material world) or his partner (social world). A humanised world becomes a partner of the man-creator, who is the true demiurge of reality[9].

Here creativity as an ideology opposes many traditional orientations: Hegelianism and its pseudo-Marxist successors; hermeneutics (limited by its religious passivism and with its cult of a reality), as well as certain variants of even the most modern of Christian thought.

IV. GOD: THE CLOSED ONTOLOGICAL HORIZON

On this level the question of Christianity is very complex. These problems are rather well known although they perhaps demand a new consideration from our point of view. It is clear that Teilhard de Chardin is undoubtedly close to a specifically humanistic creationism. To a certain degree Maritain, in the middle period of his work, and certainly Mounier paved the way towards this attitude. Let us, however, recall some of the newest evidence. Ricoeur in his religious hermeneutics wrote at the conclusion of one of his most significant essays, "Religion, Atheism, Faith", that the "purifying" action of Nietzsche's and Freud's atheism destroyed traditional religion and the image of a punishing or a consoling God. In this way Nietzsche and Freud cleared the road towards authentic faith, which is tragic and rooted in the fate of Job.

"The search for a religious meaning to atheism has led us from resignation to consent, and from consent to a way of inhabiting the Earth which is put into order by poetry and thought. This means that existence is no longer the 'love of destiny' (the amor fati of Nietzsche), but the love of creation which includes something of the movement of atheism towards faith. The love of creation is a form of consolation, which does not depend upon any inner rewards and simultaneously is distant from all revenge. Love finds its rewards in itself, it is its own consolation"[10].

One has to admit that this is an important text, although it is unfortunately overly abbreviated and ambiguous. Perhaps most profound and unnoticed even by Ricoeur is that the striving away from the positive exploitation of Nietzschean nihilism, was despite its name was so much, and in a programme-like way, linked with creativity. Here the love of creation is connected with activity and self-satisfaction of the subject, its full freedom (Nietzsche) and with a maximal approval of existence found precisely in attempting to develop it, as if opening it up (the motive of Evangelical progressivism, which is simultaneously radically anti-Nietzschean and aimed against the famous "problem of truth", since it includes an approval of existence). Ricoeur thus wishes to "abolish" in the Hegelian, dialectical meaning of the word, the nihilism born out of the decline of the traditional metaphysics of being and to return to the love of being as if on a higher plane, cleansed of primitive traits. This is obviously a tragic belief, based on the comprehension of the decline of old, transcendent forms of consolation, etc.

Let us admit that in traditional presentations too, including the Catholic one in Poland, we find accents of a contemporary interpretation of the Evangelical principle of subjecting the Earth to man. This occurs in the innovatory attitudes shown by Cardinal Wyszyński towards "the theology of terrestrial realities", by Father Chenu as well as in the theology of human work in the recent and astounding study of C. Bartnik, professor of the Catholic

University at Lublin.

Thus there is a region of problems where Marxism and Catholicism can engage in a constructive dialogue. I have written many times about the great and universal importance that such a meeting could have.

One has to mention at least one basic, and in my opinion as a rule unnoticed, contradiction between those two ideologies. Besides all the well-known limitations (the opposition of idealism - materialism is not the most important nor culturally the most interesting although, of course, it cannot be omitted), there exists, I believe, a significant limitation to Catholicism. Because of its religious character all, even the most progressive, Christianity is condemned to accept a closed horizon to the given world. This was expressed excellently, although between the lines and with approval, by Professor Tatarkiewicz in his essay "Creating and Discovering"[11], in which he quoted the following poem by Michelangelo:

> The best of artists hath no thought to show
> Which the rough stone in its superfluous shell
> Doth not include: to break the marble spell
> Is all the hand that serves the brain can do.

Tatarkiewicz interprets these words in the following way: according to Michelangelo, "the nature of art inheres not in inventing or creating forms but in discovering them.... This perfect shape which is discoverable by the artist's mind... constitutes an expression of God and His wisdom". The analysis of Zamoyski's sculptures and views is, in my opinion, only a development of the principle and the philosophy which very distinctly stress that there is both a divine predetermination and a borderline; even in the creative activity of an artist.

Although the horizon is closed at this point it is so wide that a discussion within its scope could be extremely fruitful and significant.

Finally - creativity as a method. I simply think that creativity is increasingly becoming the most effective, most durable, and surest way of resolving conflicts, of - so to speak - overstepping them. It is also the surest method of speeding up social development in its scientific and technical aspects, a method of initiating new forms of technological action and behaviour. All this is obvious and well-known.

I believe, however, that what requires a separate consideration is the application of this method in social action; for example in the field of organizing mass behaviour. Important - though controversial - remarks in this respect can be found in W. M. Minor's article "Creativity within Institutions"[12]. This, however, calls for a separate discussion.

V. Intelligence and Creativity, Adaptation and Evolution

Many problems arise with respect to concretization. We shall take up the most important ones and those directly connected with the main subject. For a long time authors dealing with the psychology of creativity have discussed the relationship between intelligence and creative abilities. In American studies this was, at times, linked with an analysis of the opposition of adaptation and originality. It was pointed out, among other things, that "children achieving better results in special creativity tests ... reveal less realistic ways of perception, offer more fantastic and strange interpretations. The Rorschach test indicates that they are more sensitive and independent".[13] According to other studies, which were also reported by Pietrasiński, students achieving scientific successes and creative abilities do not display the traits of a social leader. Rather they are introverts, and this "leads to some isolation from the environment, the effect of which is a young man developing his intellectual abilities rather than social skills". The person examined, "while in college, gradually arrives at the conclusion that a pursuit of good grades hinders him from satisfying his own interests, and therefore the correlation between his school grades and research accomplishments is insignificant, and at times even negative"[14]. Summing up this part of his book, Pietrasiński writes, among other things, that the most universal qualities of creative personality include "the individual's independence and autonomy, which break the barriers of conformism" (p. 79) and that "school grades (we do not mean here those of art schools) do not correlate with creativity" (p.80).

A psychological substantiation of this standpoint is achieved by opposing intelligence to creativity. Pietrasiński writes, inter alia; "while originality is an important - though not the only - feature of creative works, intelligence tests demand the opposite; that identical answers be given by all those equal to the task. There is no room for originality, for seeing things in a new light, for posing problems independently. There is only the discovery of schemes and unequivocal answers... Hence intelligence tests practically measure a smaller scope of mental skills than would result from a broad definition of intelligence" (pp. 81-82).

Some studies, however, lead to a duality in comprehending the word "intelligence". Some authors cling to a broad concept of intelligence: as "a general mental ability to resolve various problems". The narrow concepts, connected with tests, "are limited to an examination of "recreative" rather than truly creative thinking. These tasks are simply puzzles with one correct solution, the chief requirement being convergent thinking" (p. 81). Others regard the achievements of creative thinking as the highest indications of intelligence.

Yet others clearly distinguish intelligence from creative abilities (p. 84). For example Getzels and Jackson, define intelligence not in accordance with the generally accepted meaning, but operationally as a proficiency measured by typical intelligence tests.

Pietrasiński concludes that it is necessary to distinguish and make use of the "narrow manner of understanding intelligence" as prepared by the development of psychology, since it is "a convenient term for denoting the quality of mind that contributes to the rapid mastering of the general achievement of knowledge and to the efficient use of this knowledge in various situations requiring recreative thinking ... This will enable us for example to speak of some critics and creative workers as being intelligent in equal measure, but not equally endowed with creative dispositions, which are by no means restricted to the sphere of intellect" (p. 84).

Immediately after making this apt distinction, however, the author cites, without reservations, studies "the results of which point to two different orientations of personality. Exceptionally intelligent young people more often seek success and support in conventional, generally accepted forms of activity and evaluation. Their coequals, distinguishing themselves by creative abilities, can free themselves from the pressure of common customs and stereotypes. What seems to attract them is the risk and uncertainty connected with the unknown. Meanwhile, their "solely" intelligent colleagues rather avoid this risk and seek safe certainty in that which is known, correct, and thus ... accepted".

J. W. Getzels and P. W. Jackson conclude their remarks by expressing regret that "the American educational system does not favour this creative orientation and so far has aimed at transforming students' "divergent" personalities into "convergent" ones" (p. 85).

Similar research results are quoted by A. Strzałecki. According to MacKinnon, "independent students regarded themselves to be original, emotional, artistic, and heedless of conventions, while submissive students characterized themselves as being polite, affable, and nice and more stable. Independent students treasured creativity because of its autonomous value, were more integrated internally and more tolerant toward uncertainty, whereas submissive students took a more practical attitude and were oriented to the environment. These results were next confirmed by Barron in another sample, namely, a group of prominent high-ranking officers of the U.S. Air Force. Similar results were obtained by Van Zelst and Kerr. ... the more productive scholars, as compared with the less productive, characterized themselves in these tests as being more original, having a better imagination, being less content, less conventional, more curious about the surrounding world, more enthusiastic, impulsive, self-confident.

They were better commanders, cared less about their troubles, were less inhibited, less formal, more interested in research work, more subjective, and attached lesser weight to possession"[15].

According to studies by M. Nowakowska, which are also quoted by Strzałecki, outstanding scholars are characterized by self-confidence, mental comfort, egocentricity, and anticonformism, "like to work alone and act in keeping with their own ideas ... They break traditions and customs ... like to be leaders, aptly evaluate their possibilities, and criticize others". Their characteristic tendency toward "narrowing social contacts is the outcome of a lack of time rather than an aversion toward people" (p. 126).

Similarly, Cattel writes that "All creative workers are more "introverted and bolder than average people". Excessive interest in the external world and too frequent social contacts cause - according to Cattel - "a loss of our strength". He even holds that the main cause of creative inability, of "the hidden source of inefficiency" is the socially approved cult of the extrovert, upon whom society exerts pressure and to which he attempts to adapt himself (p. 127).

VI. Polish Assimilation of American Studies on Creativity - a Critique.

This psychological and sociological material does not yet warrant general evaluation - as is quite often done by the quoted and other authors - of the American educational system, and notably of the standard and results of scientific research in the domain of creative personality. This material, however, doubtless shows some of the essential tendencies in American society and their reflection in the very manner of formulating problems. We shall not venture to appraise this society here. What we are interested in is the striving which is explicitly expressed in research conclusions - the striving toward a universalization of the validity of this research. The Polish authors reporting this research have also succumbed to this tendency to a great extent.

We want to meet this tacit challenge consciously. Next to the indisputable stigma of that social structure, psychological studies in this respect must express - though frequently in a distorted form - universal problems, questions, and difficulties connected with the fundamental relationship between individual and society. In each case, mediation of this relationship by the social structure is obviously of tremendous historical significance; but it does not lessen the importance of a number of questions with universal contents and in historically changing form.

In this way, we purposely make our task more difficult. In such conditions, an attempt at analysis is incomparably more complex. But, on the other hand, its possible results should be much more essential. Besides, I think that a very widespread error in Marxist research, or research represented as such, is the concentration exclusively or almost exclusively upon the class and historical aspects of social phenomena, without taking into account their universal element. True, this element should be looked at from the viewpoint of class deformations or distinctions; but it is also true that it ought to be perceived as a universal element.

5

The reported studies reflect a fundamental contradiction between the individual's interests and inclinations and the social interest. It is a fact that this contradiction, in its capitalist version, became particularly acute, absolutized, and almost obliterated the prospect for a solution - since no solutions are possible where there are antinomies, as some results clearly suggest. For a concretization of this contradiction is the antinomy of originality and adaptation; of creativity and intelligence.

It is an obvious historical truth that school and college were and still are instruments of class rule, which - according to the ruling class - expresses the general social interest, allegedly represented by these classes. A narrower understanding of intelligence as the capacity for adaptation and - let us add - even social identification can really be a subtle tool of ideological and psychological argument.

At the same time, however, an excessively "revolutionary" absolutization of this aspect will prevent us from noticing that a certain extent of social adaptation is always indispensable, even in a classically, and not pathologically, revolutionary condition and situation. Otherwise, we simply deny our social humanity. Therefore, one should not negate in a narrow "class" and "revolutionary" manner the benefits resulting from a capacity for adaptation. One must not absolutize them negatively and metaphysically. One should see them in a dialectical tangle of omnifarious and multilevel, multidirectional relationships between the individual and society.

Thus the antinomy of adaptation (conceived, moreover, in its acute versions as conformism) and originality and the development of personality can be an impressive, but highly simplified approach to this complex subject. I wrote as early as 1964, referring to concrete Polish ideological discussions, that the then antinomy of conformism-anarchy only posed false problems and put forward extremes which lived solely on their contradiction. It did not refer to the real difficulties of the developing society[16]. This conviction of mine was further strengthened by the Polish experience of 1980-1981. Naturally, the above quoted American, Soviet, and Polish authors are right insofar as they assault the absolutization of adaptation, which turns into conformism or even "an escape from freedom".

As it appears, the problem lies in how to develop, and not only how to preserve, the ability of adaptation (including, of course, narrowly conceived intelligence, as one of the indispensable instruments of thinking and acting); how to develop it (ensuring at the same time an increase of creative abilities, including intelligence sensu largo) as the ability to resolve problems, and thus to pose right problems.

Due to the lack of competence, I cannot take up the question of sociological appraisals of the repressiveness of school and college with respect to original and creative aspirations. This is a separate and complex research problem. However, on the basis of the material quoted, general knowledge and in the light of the axiology adopted here, one can say that the ability to release creative attitudes is doubtless becoming one of the fundamental measures of social development.

These attitudes ought to be understood properly and broadly. There is no doubt, for example, that one of the basic reasons behind the impressive scientific-technical development of the United States is the ability of its society to release economic and technical enterprise, industrial invention, etc. However, this is but one type of creativity, chiefly of a pragmatic-technical and instrumental character. Considering the tremendous complexity of society and its self-control mechanisms (including class or even group mechanisms) and the pressure of the dominant ideology and culture of the ruling class, this type of creativity is by no means of a revolutionary character, which appears to be a feature of every type of creativity. On the contrary, this clearly conservative creativity well serves general conservative tendencies; it is for example fitted into the smoothly functioning mechanism of reification and alienation.

It is probably for this reason that such a creativity, which at times takes on very impressive and effective forms, is also very superficial both socially and anthropologically. At this point, it seems expedient to recall Ponomariev's opinion that the American psychology of creativity is destitute of a philosophical and scientific-theoretical base. These facts explain each other very well. It is socially superficial because it fails to abolish on a social scale the phenomena of alienation, the despair of the life of "the lonely crowd", and the anti-originality of mass culture. In this respect, all accusations - beginning with those of Alexis de Tocqueville and ending with those of contemporary liberal and even conservative, and not only leftist, critics of capitalist mass culture - remain fully valid.

For alienation destroys the most important form and sphere of creativity, i.e. the social-historical and anthropological creativity of the masses. The latter is decisive proof of the humanistic quality of the social structure and its truly creative character. In this everyday sphere and the life of "ordinary" people the most important anthropological problems, including the mutual relation between personality, individuality, creativity and community, find their solution. The Polish experience of 1980-1981 strengthens and deepens this conviction.

VII. CONTINUOUS NEGATION IN "FRENCH CONTESTATION": MARXISM AGAINST THE REJECTION OF TRADITION

Before we begin a discussion on those problems let us broaden the scope of analysed material by referring to French social and scientific experiments. In 1970 a book appeared whose authors touched upon a number of especially significant matters[17]. By basing themselves to a large degree also upon American research and experiments, the authors, with true fervour, attacked traditional schooling, administration and business as factors hampering creativity. This charge is made dramatically; beginning with the initial statement: "More than ever facts confirm the following alternative: modernize and adjust or perish"[18].

The authors believe that one can and should shape creative talents, educate scholars and, even more, that "talents, genius and lucky change can become an everyday thing". First of all one has to overcome old habits, the educational system, traditions, etc. The authors write, "Although a real contradiction between the freedom of creative thought and faithfulness to inherited traditions does not actually exist, in reality it often seems that this faithfulness to tradition casts a shadow on the future. There is nothing strange in this. After all, we live in a world where for centuries the main concern was for preserving and handing down. The world was stable; stability demanded the support of people accepting a given state of affairs, i.e. conformists. Conformism was sustained by education". This state of things exists today: "School teaching is deeply enrooted in the past. School furnishes us with knowledge about the past; it teaches the literature and history of past eras, languages of the past; even subjects known as modern at present refer only to the past. The future is never mentioned".

Unfortunately, the authors are not precise in these diagnoses. They mention social structure: "In every country there comes into being a certain equilibrium, in which citizens accept a given hierarchy of gains and value. They call it 'social equality'. And even if the poorest protest against the principle of the hierarchy, they nevertheless acknowledge the facts. However, in another country the hierarchy of gains and values accepted as law, can be entirely different. Then which is correct?" The naiveté of such reasoning is obvious. Today one cannot ignore Marxism or even other socialist theories. Without them one falls victim to such glaring mistakes and oversights.

Despite the "innovational revolutionariness", as one might call the authors' programme and style, it must lead to a sui generis paradoxical subjection to tradition. The principle of this subjection could be formulated thus: if one condemns everything, then one does not really overcome anything. This is the reason why when writing, "the entire morality of predecessors proves to be a paralysing structure, but its total change will last for many generations", the authors admit essentially to a certain powerlessness. This is, and at the same time not only, of course, a simplification and an ahumanistic attitude. True revolutionariness also presupposes respect for tradition, while a real, profound and universal creativity is not possible without a solid support of past achievements. Otherwise, it remains a dream or, at best, a very superficial or purely instrumental pragmatism.

One of the most eloquent illustrations of the attitude taken by the French authors is more proof of that superficiality. In their opinion language is one of the greatest obstacles on the path towards progress. This exceptional argument runs as follows: "Words of a language are like cages in which reality become imprisoned, like channels in which thought flows incessantly, like models of activity hiding the world. One cannot build a future with words of the past, at best the past only...

One of the reasons for the achievements of the American nation in the course of the past two centuries was probably the lack of a past or rather the fact that no one lovingly dwelled on it. The American ideal man has not yet had time to take shape. The Americans were also aided by the language which they inherited, a language of exceptional flexibility the vocabulary of which is twice as large as that of French (it includes both Latin and Saxon roots) and the grammar of which, independent and empirical, like the spirit of the nation itself, allows all arbitrariness...

If the French will not break away from their grammarians, then they will not enter the 21st century. They will remain people of the 17th or 18th centuries, the traditions of which they immortalized; leaving the privilege of inhabiting an exceptional world, being born before our eyes, to their neighbours. Each year it is necessary to create a large number of new words; perhaps they may seem barbaric but they will be the key to the future. If we have no talents for the creation of neologisms, then let us not reject words which others, more advanced, generously propose to us"[19].

I believe, however, that despite everything it would be worthwhile to become acquainted with such an attitude not only because of its extremity (this is at any rate that type of originality which is relatively easily attained on the principle of simple negation, as Hegel would have put it), but also because of its exceptionally clear superficial pragmatism, especially glaring in French culture. In such a pragmatism, as in every absolutisation, there exists a "rational kernel"; the real value of absolutised statements can be, however, utilised only when they are placed within a proper social and theoretical perspective.

There is no alternative for authentic dialectical thought: for the past or the future, for language or activity; just as there is no alternative for originality or adjustment. Such alternatives appear only when social absolutisations occur (for example, of a class nature) or theoretical absolutisations of particular parts of a vital or even enlivening counter-position: a non-antagonistic contradiction which should not be transformed into a metaphysical, rigid metaphysics. For Marxian creationism, and anthropocentric and sociocentric creationism developed upon its basis, the future is always a sui generis foundation; one of the most significant reference points. Marxism turns decidedly against all "leftism", of course when the latter also stems from liberal thought, full of good intentions. One can say with justification that it is precisely Marxism as the most revolutionary thought which defends all great humanistic and rationalist tradition. This is also shown in the documents of the French Communist Party; the famous campaigns in defence of Descartes and the achievements of the Enlightenment Period, etc.

Authentic creativity, including the universal creativity of the masses, is possible precisely only upon the basis of such an embeddedness in the past. If one really wants to move the Earth, and even more so the Heavens, then one must have extremely wide-reaching bases of knowledge and unshakeable support. It is only in such an historical enrooting that one can notice both the opportunities, the dimension of the creativity of the masses and their generalisation in Marxist creationism.

VIII. THE DIALECTIC OF CREATIVITY AS MEDIATION OF INDIVIDUALITY AND COMMUNITY.

The contradiction: tradition-future can, at this point, be treated as a diachronic version of the contradiction: individual-society. Left "to themselves" (and especially when absolutised in class terms or in mistaken generalisations) they become non-dialectical, metaphysical contradictions, like electrical poles which touch directly. Here we notice the clearly decisive role of affiliation, so excellently revealed by Hegel. In our case creativity is such an affiliation.

It is not the metaphysical or seemingly dialectical triad of "naked" contradictions but (at least) a triad of borrowed contradiction which here constitutes the mechanism of correct development; an energy factor of transformations. At its starting point the mechanism is concretely that of the individual - creativity - society. Following all appropriate social transformations, the mechanism holds the key formula: individuality - creativity - community.

These concepts are, for us, not so much a description as a programme and also the formulation of an axiological attitude. To put it more succinctly: the individual is an elementary concept, general in an abstract way, embracing all possible concrete beings, from the atom to man. It is as if the linguistic reflection of an ordinary enumeration, an everyday interpretation. Personality, a term so fashionable recently in Marxist anthropology, is for us the name for each human subject, equipped with self-knowledge. Each adult interiorises culture, becomes a personality. This is why for us the term is not as yet a distinguishing value, but the description of man's social status. Only individuality, understood here as social existence, culturally and, as a rule positively, differentiated and differentiating from the environment, is for us both value and programme. To put it more broadly: individuality is personality developed beyond the environmental average; with a deep and all-round self-knowledge and equipped with a high intelligence and wisdom; i.e. understanding and far-seeing and above all exteriorising and developing his rich inner-world through original and creative forms of expression, which are behaviours and acts, enriching through his activity a group, class and nation.

Already it is easy to notice that the content of those terms depends to a large extent upon cooperation with the "opposition", i.e. society and its concretisations. The opposing member can be differentiated only on the principle of abstraction. Actually, society constitutes the milieu in which it develops and a part of which forms personality and individuality.

We, on the other hand, are most interested in the activity which is the intermediary and binds individuality and society. In the case of personality and all acts which remain on the average level of social behaviour, we are dealing with labour, understood as reproduction and production, as everyday social behaviours, which produce utility and exchange values. Creativity, i.e. the highest type of work and social activity is for us the factor which distinguishes individuality. For the present it should suffice to say that creativity is understood here as a bringing to life of original social behaviours, which serve the development of products and institutions: social behaviours which endow the material and cultural milieu with new meaning.

Of course, we are not satisfied with Ponomariev's description which recognises creativity to be a mutual influence which leads to development[20]. In the same way, we do not find Bronowski's indirect statement sufficient, when he wrote that "Man becomes creative as an artist or as a scientist when he finds a new unity in the variety of Nature. He accomplishes this through the discovery of similarities between things... and as a result endows them with meaning and simultaneously a wealth of understanding. The creative mind is a mind which seeks unexpected similarities"[21].

For the same reason one cannot accept the description made by Arnold and Guilford who "see creativity as solving problems, since every situation in which a problem is being solved calls for creative thinking on the part of the individual"[22].

These statements, and many like them, can be charged with not locating the phenomenon of creativity within an appropriate theoretical and social background. This phenomenon must be, in my opinion, defined not only by distinguishing it from work and activity as a whole but also by referring to the subject, object and result of creativity. Of course, I do not undertake an attempt to construct such a new definition of creativity, which would transcend all previous descriptions:

one can find in the literature of the subject many more profound definitions than the three cited above. I am only concerned with bringing to the surface such moments which reveal the mediatory character of creativity, which develops and enriches both the individual and the collective subject (since the community is to a significant degree the co-object of the individual creativity of an artist, scholar, etc.). Creativity at this point appears mainly as a means of a mutual development of the individual and the community; their active mediation by that highest form of human activity. I mention here both clearly and programmatically the community and not a formal social group. Above all the authentic community, based on true brotherly feelings of social love between its members, is interested in the intentions of each component individual subject to develop the next man. The latter is treated as a co-subject and co-creator of certain common values which is precisely the achievement and existence of the community.

In such conditions everyone is interested in the development of other people both from the point of view of the deep feelings of solidarity as well as a wisely understood common gain. Such are the social premises of a truly humanistic and wise social organisation. The Hegelian and especially Sartrean dialectics of rule and enslavement, its symptoms and products in the form of struggle, hostility and envy can there finally disappear. Realism forces us to say that their rivalry will still exist; although why should such a phenomenon not be linked with solidarity, especially since such links already form a part of reality?

It is precisely in this field that the socialist society creates, incomparable with any previous political system, possibilities for the development of a community. To put it more precisely, it is the first formation which enables the emergence of an authentic community. In our conditions this means also an open community, ready to accept all those who wish to enter into it, or at least to co-accept and acknowledge the values of other communities and in which one will recognise the realisation of the same principles, values and ideals only expressed in different forms.

FOOTNOTES

1. Paikhologhia tvorchestva, Moskva, 1977.

2. Ibid., pp. 9 ff and 16.

3. See H. L. Parsons, "The Concept of Creativity in Marx", Dialectics and Humanism", 1/1978; it also appears in the evolutionism of Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin, where we are dealing with an apparent and thought-provoking paradox of a concurrence between such a type of Marxism and pure idealism.

4. This will also be discussed later on - I am here concerned with fulfilment in technical and scientific realisations where the same laws rule as in the unknown universe but in a different way, since man is aware of them and can thus be to a certain degree free of them.

5. Lenin, Polnoye sobraniye sochinieniy. II, Moskva. 1958, pp. 539-540.

6. Let us recall the banal truth of historical materialism which is important here since the leading element is man himself and thus, let us add, also his creative capabilities, his consciousness and will, wisdom and historical good or evil.

7. As one of the leading elements of socialist historiosophy as well as of axiology, which anyway follows from the former.

8. Cf. e.g. the papers by K. M. Dolgov and E. S. Semenov in Voprosy Filosofii (Nos. 4/1977 and 10/1977 respectively); which illustrate opinion (particularly strongly expressed) on the possible and growing role of creativity.

9. I wrote on this subject in more detail in "Youth and Creativity", Dialectics and Humanism, 3/1977.

10. P. Ricoeur, "Religion, athéisme, foi", in"Le conflit des interprétations", Paris, 1969.

11. See the present volume, p. 11

12. "Dialectics and Humanism", no. 3/77.

13. Z. Pietrasiński "Creative Thinking" (in Polish) 1969.

14. Z. Pietrasiński, op. cit. pp. 76-77.

15. Strazałecki "Selected Questions in the Psychology of Creativity" (in Polish), Warszawa 1968, p. 121.

16. cf. J. Kuczyński "The Order of the Coming World" (in Polish) Warsaw 1964.

17. A. Kaufman, M. Fustier and A. Brevet"L'Inventique: Nouvelles méthodes de créativité", Paris 1970.

18. Ibid., "Introduction".

19. Ibid. pp. 7 - 13

20. Ponomariev, op. cit., p.18.

21. J. Bronowski, "The Creative Process", in "Creativity," Amsterdam-London, 1970, p. 12.

22. I am following here E. Landau, "Psychologie der Kreativität", p.15.

SOCIAL CREATIVITY UNDER SOCIALISM

We believe that the cornerstone of philosophy: "I create, therefore I exist", will become a comprehensive practical theory, embracing all mankind, capable of application regardless of time and space, which will mean a true coming of knowledge into the world...

Henryk Kamienski

With the broadening and deepening of human creation, the number of people who are the creators of history must also grow.

V. I. Lenin

Il y a un autre monde, mais il est dans celui-ci.

Paul Eluard

Qu'est que l'homme? Dans sa noblesse intellectuelle, c'est un être qui invente.

Gaston Bachelard

1. Creativity as Imparting a New Meaning

Without rejecting the former definitions of creativity, I propose - chiefly for the purpose of analysis of the theme of this paper - that creative activity be also defined as imparting a new meaning. I previously introduced a definition of meaning as an axiological-cognitive relationship between the subject and the object which reflects the ideal equivalent of the essence of the object[1]. Consequently, I define creativity as establishing a new relationship between man and the object. Meaning; its richness, adequacy, etc. is conditioned, on the one hand, by the subject's abilities, knowledge, etc. and, on the other hand, by the character of the object and the extent of its being cognized and evaluated. Creativity is the outcome, the summit of man's possibilities and his axiological-cognitive activity. While establishing a new relationship, creativity at the same time alters the subject and the object, which keenly distinguishes it from the repetitive, as a rule non-individualized character of labour, production, and reproduction.

Another important discriminant of creativity as compared with labour is the specific character, based on partnership and "dialogue", of the relationship between the subject and the object of creativity. The creator treats his products as being marked by his own individuality, as constituting its materialized extension and as a social particle. The creator's works constitute particles of his own world, are identified with him personally and are unique. Whereas the products of labour are merely repeatable creations; that is goods which are replaceable. Thus the results of creativity are "humanized", individualized and constitute indications, effects of conciliation, or at least of attempts at conciliation, between man and the world. While the products of labour are signs of struggle, attempts at mastering reality, modelled on the previously existing ones[2]. Labour is exclusively, or first of all, an instrument, while creativity is also a goal, since the maximum degree of humanity is preserved within it.

The above additional distinction of creativity from labour (more strictly speaking, the distinction of creativity as the form of effort which is supreme but qualitatively different from labour) is instrumental in defining creativity as the process of imparting a meaning. What is important is not that a new object arises (for every product is new), but that the result of creativity qualitatively changes the relationship between man and his world whilst also changing the creator and his world. The creator establishes a new meaning for the new or old object, since he shows or defines in a new manner the essence of this object and the relationship toward this essence. It is said, and quite rightly so, that following a great discovery or work of art, just as after a technical or political revolution, the world is no longer the same. Creativity alters precisely the relationships between man and the world, endowing the latter with a new meaning.

The definition of meaning as a relational equivalent of essence is only of a formal-ontological character, which shows the ontic status of meaning as a relationship; as an equivalent of meaning. Now what is needed is a formal-axiological definition of meaning as a general value, as a road of conciliation. I shall relate this to the world, history, and ego as "theory", and to ego's "praxis", i.e. life.

Meaning - its individual meaningful subjects being its differentiated concretizations - is a value, since it is a tie between man and the world. As such a tie, it serves in transcending the individual's loneliness and an opening up of the world for him. Thus meaning shows not so much the usefulness or importance, or instrumentality of objects (as labour does, which can only expose the importance of things and repeat their meaning), but rather their purpose, their partnership with man[3]. It turns out that, thanks to meaning, there exists between man and the object a tie of specific kinship and of partial homogeneity which is evident when the object is, for example, society, the family, the other man, but also visible when it is a work of art or science.

Thus meaning brings a promise of man's conciliation with the world, of his finding himself in this world and in his own products. Realizing the fundamental "energetic" law of the human being (presented in "Homo creator" as man's struggle and uniting with the world) reveals the possibility of uniting, paralleled by the preservation and even strengthening of the subject's individuality and the object's separateness. Thus it carries a dialectic of mutual individualization and conciliation: community rather than the Hegelian and Satrean dialectic of domination and enslavement. The meaning of the world, if accomplished, would thus signify man's fulfilment.

In establishing a synchronic tie, meaning consequently opens up the road toward a diachronic tie between the generations and stages of the world (the meaning of history). Thus it promises continuity and immortality in the sense of human eternity. It establishes, next to the unity of man and the world, the possibility for a unity of time; it offers a chance for continuation and development. The development and influences of hermeneutics, recently most noticeable in Gadamer and Ricoeur, can be explained, inter alia, by absolutization in Lenin's understanding of the word, i.e. as a constitutive, historical tie, a primary and active tie, a personalized tie (cf. eg. Ricoeur's "Symbole donne à penser").

A third unity - next to unity with the world and the unity of time - which meaning offers is that of value: the reconciliation with oneself (the meaning of life). A man who perceives and creates the meaning of the world and the meaning of history, must also perceive the meaning of his own life, if he realises his existence in accordance with its essence, which is a part and an opponent of the world and history. Such a life is internally integrated and self-conscious; it is a life reconciled with itself and, at the same time, open to the world and history, being reconciled with them as well[4].

In practice, the world, history, and one's own existence are experienced as values - partially, of course, and with varying degrees of intensity. The above model constitutes the optimum, while everyday life makes us realize the fragmentariness of the three great meanings-values and of their concretizations in millions of other meanings-values.

We can now further substantiate the thesis that creativity is imparting a new meaning; by changing the object, the attitude toward it, and the subject, creativity establishes a network of relations (man is also the whole of these relations, but not only so - as for example L. Seve and many others believe). Labour merely ("merely"!) reproduces the former meaning or even only the significance; leaving the meaning of the world, history, and life at the same levels of values and cognition. Creativity modifies these values and enriches them. The proposed definition enables the drawing of a clear distinction between creativity and reproductive labour. It also brings creativity closer to the processes of cognition and comprehension as thought of by Dilthey and in contemporary hermeneutics.

This latter point, in particular, indicates that I have in mind not only objective, but also subjective creativity, which is the imparting of meanings that are exclusively new with respect to the experiences of the subject to date. From the viewpoint of social anthropology, this creativity - as we shall see - possesses the greatest importance[5].

I must also introduce here a distinction between individual and group creativity. This distinction, of course, intersects rather than parallels the distinction of subjective and objective creativity. I introduce here only one - and, I think, the only possible - distinctive trait from the subject's viewpoint. Individual creativity is, in principle, the work of an individual or a specific collectivity of authors having definite rights to this work (for example through copyright, patent rights, etc.) which is in contrast to creativity the subject of which is that of a group, class, nation, federation, etc. Below I shall concern myself only with group creativity the object of which are socio-political problems[6].

I shall attempt to prove that the notion of creativity as imparting a new meaning is particularly fruitful in the socio-political domain - though so far to a greater extent in projections rather than in description. It is, as a rule, in subjective group creativity by which people impart a meaning to their social movement and, through this movement, to their social institutions, their activities, their society, their country. At times, there are more hopes here than accomplishments, but from the perspective of the anthropological, including the educative and self-educative, effects of creativity, this is equally important.

Through the movement of social creativity, people impart a meaning to their world. Their world - because co-created by them.

The 1980 - 1981 Evolution in Poland:
Self-Creation of Individuality and Community

One of the most striking features of the evolution of socialism in Poland, began in August 1980 although it was actually rooted in the entire post-war tradition, especially in the tragic but hopeful events of 1944, 1956 and 1970. The feature is that of a constant extension of society's role as the subject of socialism, paralleled by a strengthening of the revolutionary elite and uniting it with the grass-root movement of the masses, treated to a growing extent not as an instrument (for which the revolution has been effected), but as a co-subject of the evolution of socialism. Although the above-mentioned years were tragic, they nevertheless constituted stages of an internal, though painful, evolution of socialism. The anti-communist enunciations about the emergence of a "new class", about the struggle of the masses against the new bureaucracy, etc. are only an absolutization (as defined by Lenin in his Philosophical Notebooks) of one of the elements of the much more complex and profound process of the gradual birth of a new formation. Its new political, administrative, intellectual, artistic elite, was subjected to mechanisms of self-alienation which were not only psychological, but to a greater extent material and political, as in the need for prestige, the scarcity of goods, the shadow of the past class struggle and foreign infiltration, etc. But the elite in its basic social genesis, actual function and ideology, remained - even while ruling - in the service of its class and was homogeneous with it. Pathological cases, though recently very numerous, were but peripheral to this social group. Its main ideological programme, goal, and raison d'être was, and is "subjectivization" of society, thus the abolition of differences and thus the transformation of the entire society into a socialist "elite". It is psychologically understandable that the main goal, which under present conditions called for altruism, was to many elite members nothing more than a theory, a slogan, whilst the practice was determined by one's own morality.

However, the slogans continuously preached, realized on a broad scale and - as it turned out - effectively in the system of national eduction both in school and in honest and constructive propaganda, brought about a basic increase in society's self-knowledge. These were some of the bases which had permitted the already famous peaceful, political settlement of conflicts. For such solutions are based on a fundamental conformity with the class interests and, of course, the national and international interests of an overwhelming number of Poles. This, too, offers great hopes for an evolutionary and ever more intensive development of socialism.

An ideological expression of the absolutized opposition of the elite and the masses was the opposition of the aprioristic and empirical shape of unity - which was imposed from the top and built from the bottom. This can be briefly defined as a concretization of the opposition: authentic Marxism versus various forms of Hegelianism (including Stalinism)[7].

We can now better understand social creativity and its growth together with successive stages of the development of the new formation. The problems involved here are more essential than is generally believed in political discussions. They are also the problems of the ontology of social being[8].

I would put forward here the thesis that the normative essence of society is socialism as an idea. Thus socialism is perceived and cocreated by the meaning of society. The actual essence of historical societies was a self-producing community of people. The organising and driving mechanism of historical societies was the antinomy of the individual and the group, generated, in turn, by tensions in productive forces and production relations. The mechanism found its historical expression in the struggle of classes and ideologies, etc. The best minds, perceiving the social structure and the potentialities inherent in it, dreamt - in various forms - of transforming the antinomy of the individual and society into the dialectic of individuality and community. This dialectic is the true essence of society, i.e. reflects its best possibilities. In this sense, I reiterate that socialism as an idea is the normative essence of society, which by its very nature is striving precisely to generate individuality and community.

Individual and Collective Homo Creator

The highest forms of individuality and community are the individual and collective homo creator - man who creates the human world. The above-proposed definition of creativity as imparting a new meaning permits one to take a specific view of the 1980-1981 evolution in Poland. These events can be situated in the perspective of materialist and social creationism, that is, also in philosophical categories and not only in political analyses.

The fundamental, initial feature of the recent events in Poland is a deepening of the process of "subjectivization" of society. I say a "deepening" because it is a constant historical process which has been going on - with ups and downs, and set backs, etc. - since the beginning of history and which has been radically and programmatically accelerated and consciously realized by socialism[9]. Thus, what is most essential, and historically leading, in the renewal movement is also actually a continuation; it is the development of socialism in Poland. "Subjectivization" in this case means an extension of the collective subject and making authentic the previously formal or incomplete subjectivity of whole social groups or parts thereof. The 1944 revolution was effected by the minority - but doubtless in the interest of the majority. Since that time, however, the revolutionary elite, despite all the impediments and previous crises, has almost ceaselessly been growing in number; recruited as a rule from amongst leading workers and peasants. But functional estrangement, which distorted the normal principles of division of labour, delegation of authority, and social representation, along with other factors, led to the demoralization in various ways of so many activities (though certainly of a decided minority of them). But, worse than that, it led to the treatment of the remaining part of society as the object of power rather than its fundamental collective subject.

Calling this state of affairs into question and, more important, the mechanisms which had given rise to it, opened up for socialism in Poland the chances for entering a higher stage - the stage of "subjectivization" of society. In this "subjectivization" the domain of self-government and the properly functioning state began to exercise authority directly and not solely or mainly through its representatives. However, the process is not devoid of difficulties or serious threats and has already posed many problems. It is simply a much more complicated and certainly now more risky kind of self-government for society. But after it has been fitted into the fundamental structures of socialism, it will certainly bring about a tremendous acceleration of this formation's development and will lead to an outdistancing of all the other to-date forms of organization of collective life.

Subjectivity is a necessary and frequently initial condition of a sense of the meaning of one's own life and the possibilities of imparting a meaning to the world which surrounds us. This is where the field opens up for social creativity when understood as imparting a new meaning. People want to shape reality according to their ideas, subjecting the existing state of affairs to criticism and in which they discern many absurdities, half-meanings, and missed opportunities. In this situation, their effort acquiries the traits of social creativity. They wish to create a social world which conforms with their own ideas. These are not ideas devised by them; but then they create not ideas but social reality, endowing existence with a new meaning as compared with the existing one. More concretely speaking: they aim to create a Republic of meaning in all areas of life.

The subject-object relation changes radically here. The subject is becoming the actual and versatile subject, freeing itself from various historical forms of the object's domination: alienation, reification, tyranny felt as an alien institution, from the spontaneity of social processes. The subject is facing the world not as an alien and hostile force, but as a set of possibilities, as a challenge, as a hope. The process of the subject's self-consolidation begins or grows in intensity until there is the attainment of the highest form of activity which was formerly reserved for gods namely creativity. Parallel with the increase of subjectivity and democracy, there grows the egalitarization of the notion and phenomenon of creativity, as emphasized by Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his excellent "A History of Six Concepts"[10].

The process of man's lifelong education, self-education, and self-improvement becomes a real one. The mechanisms of "socialist" mass culture are overcome, which is - in the Marxian understanding - a form of disguising the relations of unclarity and a non-rule or an incomplete rule by the people. The Polish evolution also offers a chance for a truly humanistic, really socialist cultural revolution. The basic content of this is the culture-creating activity of the masses, which constitute individuality and community; the various forms of the individual and collective homo creator.

Let's express this precisely in the language of the theory of culture, transcending it at the same time. First - an important recollection:

A large and venerable anthology of quotations could be compiled on the active, creative role of the reader of literary works. The first on the list would probably be a line from a poem by Terentianus Maurus (at the end of the third century). The line reads "De litteris, syllabis et metris", and is usually only fragmentarily quoted. The whole of the line reads as follows: "Pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli". Or, in other words, "Depending on reception by the reader, books follow different fates". Montaigne's reflections would also be surely represented: "Un suffisant lecteur descouvre souvent es escrits d'autruy des perfections autres que celles que l'auteur y a mises et apperçeues, et y preste des sens et des visages plus riches". And also Schlegel's famous statement: "Kritisieren heisst einen Autor besser verstehen als er sich selbst verstanden hat".[11]

In our times, the emphasis has shifted from the author to the reader of a work, this through an analysis of the various forms of relations between them:

"Therefore more and more often a literary work is figuratively termed a "meeting" (R. Ingarden), "dialogue" (M. Bakhtin), "convergence" (H. R. Jauss) or an "interaction" (W. Iser) between text and reader. One might risk the generalization that in the period of positivism the main aim of literary studies was an explanation of the origin of literary works and therefore the author was the main "hero". If later the emphasis shifted to the structure, that is, the work itself, then for the present we have entered the phase of interest in the function of a literary work and its reader"[12].

Markiewicz next takes up the question of concretization as conceived of by Ingarden and the Czech structuralists, the widely known interdisciplinary Soviet studies and the latest work by Polish literary critics. In these we find more and more elements which could be described as a preparation for a creationist, cultural revolution: under appropriate, authentically socialist conditions, the problem of popularization is overcome, which technically can be achieved easily even in some enclaves of capitalist society[13]. The relationship changes between the mass subject and the object (work) of literary, film, theatrical and scientific culture. The collective subject of reception becomes the subject of a real, peaceful, most profound revolution, a radical change of the relation toward the object (work). The subject co-creates it not only through concretization, but also by making more and more attempts at realizing the values contained in those works[14]. A typical example is offered by the movement of universal, programmed, and joint inventiveness, a literary expression of which are for example the books of the Soviet theorist, Henrik Altshuller. In our country, we have recently witnessed an intensification of the heuristic movement, under the guidance of Docent A. Góralski, who has edited four collections of works on creativity, works which have been mainly written by young researchers.

Of great significance from this point of view is the Polish way of receiving important Western works. In respect of the question with which we are concerned, let us take note of the line of evaluation and reception of Ettore Gelpi's books. These books were competently edited by one of the greatest Polish scholars, Prof. Bogdan Suchodolski, who wrote of the Italian theorist of lifelong education:

"He always discusses workers, not the working classes; presents the problems of everyday work, not the problems of economy"[15].

He next quoted Gelpi: "... the struggle for the advancement of knowledge is, more than ever, a daily political struggle against power groups, administrative bureaucracies, factors of production and military groups, who generally seek to turn research, science and education from their social goals". Suchodolski commented "Within the scope of this vision education acquires the status of an especially significant and integrated defensive action, all of whose links, though apparently dissimilar, make up a future fulfilling revolutionary chain"[16].

Even long before the events of August, 1980, Suchodolski quoted and thus commented on Gelpi's key statements.

""To develop man", writes Gelpi, "and not only the producer, is more than a humanistic principle; it is also a strategy for action against discrimination, inequality and the violence of man towards man".

"It is precisely upon these principles that Gelpi's programme of educating workers is based. It attempts to bind into a coherent whole vocational training; trade union education; workers' education, and adult education. In particular, he stresses that the matter concerns the organization of work, and not solely of the process of vocational education. He voices the dire necessity to incessantly wage a systematic struggle for scientific and technological progress to play a democratizing role in human life, lest it get allied with those who wish to build an authoritarian society. In his conviction, it ought to serve the cause of extending people's participation in management and in culture"[17].

In conclusion, the greatest Polish theorist of education points to a radical change in the strategy and techniques of lifelong education:

"This idea of lifelong education transcends traditional conceptions of organizing education, which universally banish all educational efforts to specialized institutions staffed with highly specialized teachers. His concern is with education in the broad sense of the term; education which refuses to have anything to do with schooling. "The contribution of artists, scientists and technicians to the education of adults means the opening up of new places and new means of communication which are unfamiliar to educators (laboratories, workshops, songs, dance, figurative arts, etc.). The first meetings between educators, teachers and "non-teachers" can be difficult, contradictory, and perhaps even dramatic, but such meetings are the necessary condition for the integration of vocational and general education into new forms""[18].

The reception for Gelpi's book like this is characteristic of the climate in which essential changes were growing in Poland[19]. From a purely theoretical point of view, however, one could say that the propositions made by the Italian theorist constitute an intermediate link between new types of reception for creative work (as quoted above following H. Markiewicz) and the practice of cultural co-creation by the individual and collective homo creator. The process of lifelong education in socialist conditions can be simultaneously co-creation of not only culture, but also man's social, historical world in the profound Marxian meaning, and complemented with positive evaluation[20].

The tremendous intellectual absorptiveness, openness to all values, wherever produced; an attitude of tolerance toward dissimilarities and even opposites; attempts at integration of various values into a specific social, practical metaposition, in which practice turns out to be more mature than theory, a really creative practice - these are other characteristics of the new, post-August stage of the development of socialism in Poland.

An especially striking, external and social trait of this development of socialism is that to an increasing extent it is being shaped by the younger generation. An overwhelming majority of the leaders of the new forms of social movement (notably "Solidarność", but also of the so-called branch trade unions) are young people[21]. What is important here, however, is not youth in biological sense, but above all youth in cultural terms: openness, energy, the will to act, dedication to ideals and romantism, special inclinations and abilities to create. The cultural terms founded on the above properties, as well as in traits systematized in scientific literature are as follows:

1. Creative persons are characterized by the so-called strong ego.
2. Creative persons are characterized by a higher intelligence.
3. Creative persons are characterized by tolerance with respect to contradictory experiences.
4. Creative persons are characterized by a level of mental disturbance higher than that which is average among the population.

5. Creative persons are characterized by a specific form of socialization and by independence[22].

I wish to add here a very important thesis: all the above-mentioned features occur with particular intensity in a period or attitude which I want to call "the phase of youthfulness", and thus, above all, during biological youth, but also during cultural and intellectual youth, At times, we say not only of women, but also of men, that "they have retained a youthful figure, energy and freshness, etc.". And the traits characterizing the state of consciousness and will are obviously more important than external features![23].

An explanation of this fact is provided not only by biological and mental vitality, but also by a certain antinomy of socialization. The latter gives the individual a great deal, but also takes away a lot. At least, this has been so to date. If, in conditions of socialism (in which the socialization processes are particularly strong and valuable, and thus hardly questionable), there are no mechanisms counterpoising or creatively complementing socialization, this will sooner or later lead to specific mental-ideological conformism and the next crisis. Youth, however, will always claim its rights, since this is inherent in the very mechanism of the dialectical relation of individuality and community, and even of the individual and society.

Even the second feature - in my opinion - occurs more conspicuously on a social scale during the phase of youthfulness, since in that period it is not suppressed by adaptation, conformism, etc. In other words: in the phase of youthfulness, we utilize our intelligence more frequently and skillfully, more spectacularly and creatively, since it is constant or develops as we grow older.

The occurrence of the above properties in the specific Polish social structure and situation may explain why the processes of the Polish evolution, including the crisis, protest, and hope of 1980-1981, have been proceeding in the manner they actually have. In the light of the above categories and theoretical assumptions, this is simply obvious.

In conclusion, I shall illustrate the above theses with my own experience. In 1975, a young Marxists' movement came into being under the patronage of "Dialectics and Humanism", and associating together young scientific workers, who were chiefly philosophers from a majority of Polish higher schools. At a national conference in 1976, I presented to my young colleagues and friends a paper entitled "Youth and Creativity". I wrote in it, amongst other things:

"The energy of antagonisms will, to an ever greater degree and on a world scale, be supplemented and substituted by the energy of the uniting of contradictions, an energy of social harmony and understanding of common threats and common aims.

Creative processes, especially in societies realizing socialism, are becoming ever more the mark and expression of a new situation. After all, we observe in our society the more and more universal transition from struggle to creation; from the combatting of opponents to the convincing and uniting of ever wider social circles"[24].

"Creativity as an attitude, taken towards one's own life and towards others, towards one's work above all, makes it possible for a human being to gain the opportunity of everyday contact with the Being which it co-creates. Man becomes something more than a contemplator or a "shepherd of Being" (Heidegger). He has the chance of absorbing and transcending that effort of contact with authentic reality, which is also included in those attitudes, above all thanks to the fact that following the path of discoveries he co-creates that existence since he co-creates the human world.

Thus, man becomes a partner of Being since he becomes the co-creator of objective reality"[25].

"The ideology of creativity is also a sign of the times. Cardinal Wojtyła deplored recently... that "they will oppose the Sign", the sign of which he is today's apostle. We respect this great tradition and, paradoxically perhaps, only we are able to indicate its true historical merits. We believe that in the interest of the superior values of our national and all-human culture it is right that philosophical opponents should be able to do justice to each other's views. This is why we have frequently proposed a dialogue and perhaps on a social scale we have gained something politically very important: a practical cooperation of all Poles regardless of metaphysical views and attitudes towards transcendence"[26].

"Do I mean a great debate between the ideology of creativity and the tradition of the love for one's neighbour? Perhaps"[27].

"Humanistic praxis can be the work of a free man, co-creating him in a process of exteriorization, objectivization and re-interiorization. A real possibility arises of fulfilling an old utopia; the thought of a conciliation between the subject and object, if those contradictions became the symptom of a new dialectics of unity. Only then does there emerge a true world of man. This is true also in the moral sense of the interpenetration of ideas and things which leads to a true humanization of that which is created by man as an individuality and by man as a group member and not by some anonymous and alien powers"[28].

Let's conclude with two more sentences. Many of the members of the young Marxists' movement have become - in their scientific and social circles, or even on a national scale - prominent activists or even leaders of the movement of socialist renewal in Poland. Many of them present themselves ever more conspicuously as dynamic personalities with rapidly growing creative possibilities; both in socio-political life and in the domain of philosophy.

Footnotes

1. Cf. the previous sections, which I render here more concrete with respect to the present Polish realities.

2. Still more strongly, but this time only metaphorically: the relationship between the producer and the product can be placed in the generalized formula of alienation and monologue in the Hegelian dialectics of "the master - the slave". While the relationship between the creator and the work can be placed in the formula of dialogue, and the dialectics of conciliation.

2. To Frege's classical distinction between "Sinn" amd "Bedeutung", I ascribe here, of course, another meaning, very different from the frequent identification of these words in English. Cf. my article The Meaning Sense of the Word - the Meaning Sense of Being, "Dialectics and Humanism" no. 1/1980.

4. Thus I develop here the communal-anthropocentric conception of creativity, which is radically different from the individualist and the naturalistic (A. Koestler, "The Act of Creation", 1978), which also speaks of the creativity of chimpanzees, and is also radically different from the materialist-naturalist theories of Ponomarioff ("Psikhologia tvorchestva", Moskva 1977). The two well-known Marxist researchers, while contributing many valuable theses, even describe as creativity those processes occurring in nature. Cf. H. Parsons, "The Concept of Creativity

in Marx", Dailectics and Humanism", no. 1/1978.

5. An especially clear-cut distinction between subjective and objective creativity can be found in E. Landau, "Psychologie der Kreativität", Munich 1971, which is centred upon the subjective aspect of creation.

6. The notion of collective social creativity, introduced here, has vast and variegated foundations in Lenin's thesis as adopted in the motto, "the revolutionary creativity of the masses". See "Voprosy Filozofii", no. 10/1977, pp. 10-17. Entirely different perspectives are outlined in the work of F. Perroux, "Industrie et creation collective", Paris 1964; different, too, from that of W. Kingston in his book "Innovation", which includes a chapter entitled "Creativity in Business", and still yet different from well-known American works.

7. I wrote about this extensively in the first chapter of "Homo Creator", Warszawa 1976, 2nd ed. 1978.

8. Also in the meaning indicated by the title of G. Lukàcs's book.

9. This phenomenon is at times called an increase of the role of the subjective factor in history, especially in socialism (e.g. in Soviet literature), while Teilhard de Chardin termed it a growth of noosphere.

10. Wł. Tatarkiewicz, "Creativity: History of the Concept", "Dialectics and Humanism", no. 3/1977 which is one of the chapters of "A History of Six Concepts".

Egalitarization is connected, in my opinion, with the process of "scientifization" or even the industrialization of creativity; although industrialization frequently depersonalizes creation, making it a mere tool. The historical growth of these processes has been presented concisely by M. Fustier:

"...le brain-storming était déjà contenu dans Bacon qui parle de "violenter" à l'expérience. L'analogie est décrite chez Descartes, Claude Bernard, Couffignal, Helmholtz, Poincare, Einstein, témoignent de leur côté du caractère intuit et spontané de leurs découvertes...Mais le mérite des chercheurs anglo-saxons est d'avoir proposé, non pas tellement des explications, mais des méthodes pratiques pour maîtriser ces phénomènes. Au premier rang de ces chercheurs, nous trouvons Osborn ("le brain-storming", 1935) et Gordon ("la synectique", 1961) ainsi que de Bono, un Anglais celui-là (la pensée latérale", 1970), dont les approches sont reprises ou décrites dans les exercices qui suivent.

"De l'Amérique, la créativité fit un retour discret sur le vieux continent où elle retrouva tous ceux qui avaient rêvé d'elle sans parvenir à la cerner exactement, ni à la faire entrer dans les moeurs. Les années soixante furent marquées en France par un certain nombre de tentatives pratiques comme celle de "Synapse" (Aznar, Rapaille), celle de la "Créatique" (Desmarets, Druel), celle de "l'inventique" (Kaufmann, Fustier, Drevet), celle de "Créargie" (Sol) venant se mêler aux approches plus théoriques d'Abraham Moles (la praxéologie) et de Bize, Goguelin, Carpentier ("le penser efficace"). M. Fustier, "Pratique de la créativité", Paris 1976, p. 23.

The most extensive presentation of these problems in Marxist literature can be found in the collective work "Sozialismus und wissenschaftliches", Schöpfertum, Berlin 1976.

11. H. Markiewicz, "Reception and the Recipient in Literary Studies. Perspectives and Difficulties", "Dialectics and Humanism", no. 2/1980, p. 25.

12. Ibidem, p. 26.

13. Though, as known, the USSR boasts the most developed and effective system of real popularization of belles lettres and scientific literature.

14. H. Osborn (in "Creativity in Art and in Life", "Dialectics and Humanism", no. 3/1980) writes, among other things, that Marx showed a social perspective in which all people could become creators. Osborn attempts to demonstrate wherein the creativity of all people should consist in art and in life.

The role of creativity's social determinants is also put forward by authors who formally do not mention Marx e.g. J. P. Guilford, "The Nature of Human Intelligence", 1967.

15. B. Suchodolski, "Ettore Gelpi on Lifelong Education", "Dialectics and Humanism", no. 1/1980, p. 156.

16. Ibidem, p. 157.

17. Ibidem, p. 158.

18. Ibidem, p. 159.

19. It is also significant that Western, and especially American, books on creativity, though well known to specialists, have no influence in Poland. Even such an interesting and pertinent book as R. May, "The Courage to Create", 1975, is unknown to Polish society. However, its title's thesis has been outdistanced by practice in Poland.

20. This line of perception, strongly emphasized by Suchodolski, is significant for other reasons as well. Of special interest were works representing a democratic, though original, tendency and possessing a practical-creative character, such as the above-mentioned, as well as those works linking the problems of creativity with a clearly defined Christian or Marxist theoretical context, and thus situating creativity in a broad social and Weltanschanung perspective. This was the case e.g. with the papers of: T. Langan, "Hope, Creativity, Appropriation"; De George, "Creativity and Authority"; and H. Parsons, "The Dialectics of Creativity: Dominance-with-Dependence", from the colloquium "Man and Creativity", organized

in Warsaw in 1978 by the International Society for Metaphysics and "Dialectics and Humanism" (see Dialectics and Humanism", nos. 1 and 3/1979). On the other hand, the papers presented at a large international conference on "Creativity and Social Life", also organized by "Dialectics and Humanism" in 1978, papers which contained anti-socialist allusions or were apology of liberalism, such as D. Kerbs' "Creativity of the Common People" ("Dialectics and Humanism", no. 4/1979) or W. Minor's "Creativity within Institutions" ("Dialectics and Humanism", no. 3/1977), were important as regards content and theoretically profound, but situated in a typically American context. These papers did not evoke any scientific, not to mention, social, response.

21. I feel morally obliged to explain that I am a member of the latter Union. That is, I have belonged for 25 years to the Polish Teachers' Union, which boasts splendid traditions in the struggle for Polish schools and in struggles during the period of the Nazi occupation. However, as early as September 1980, when "Solidarność" did not yet exist, I welcomed, in a meeting at Warsaw University, the proposal to found a new Union, declaring at the same time the readiness to take up a constructive, friendly rivalry with it.

22. Jerzy Trzebiński, "Osobowościowe warunki twórczości" ("Personal Conditions of Creativity"), in "Osobowość a społeczne

zachowanie sie ludzi" ("Personality and the Social Behaviour of People"), Warszawa 1976, pp. 105-111. The above enumeration is chiefly founded on well-known American literature.

23. Youth is the potential fullness of being, the total of possibilities, and thus the most intensive existence. It is revolutionary and creative by its very nature. Thus it has not only socio-anthropological, but also ontological premises. This understanding is unlike that of Bergson, Berdyaev, Whitehead - or Hartshorne, who wrote (in "Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method", Illinois 1970): "To be is to create". A more profound view was voiced, in the 19th century, by Kamieński, who said: "I create, therefore I am".

24. J. Kuczyński, "Youth and Creativity", "Dialectics and Humanism", no. 3/1977, p. 147.

25. Ibidem, p. 148.

26. Ibidem, p. 150.

27. Ibidem, p. 150.

28. Ibidem, p. 153.

SUMMARY of "Homo Creator"

The aim of Homo Creator is to present the results of research conducted, among others, during a yearly stay at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy in 1973 and during numerous visits to Western countries. It is also a result of the study of Marxist and non-Marxist literature concerning the philosophical premises of creativity from the perspective of philosophical anthropology.

The research tasks consisted of explaining the historical and theoretical premises of what the author calls "the philosophy of materialistic creationism"(Part I) and in an attempt at formulating his own philosophical attitude within Marxist thought. To put it more precisely, the author aimed at trying to develop some of the trends of the philosophy of praxis in relation to human subjectivity. On the basis of results gained, theses were formulated pertaining to his understanding of a contemporary Marxist variant of philosophical anthropology. These were contained in the second part of the book which is entitled "An Outline of the Dialectics of Man". Here the author treats anthropology not as a trend of thought but as a field of philosophy, similar to ontology or epistemology.

The first part of the book consists of six chapters. The first chapter "Two Unities. Creationism: Hegel on the Objects of Negation", concerns the relation of contemporary Marxism-

Leninism to the Hegelian tradition. The author formulated the thesis that alongside the well-known traditional evaluation of Hegel, given above all by Marx and Lenin, there has existed for the past few score of years a certain mystified, absolutized type of reception of Hegelian philosophy. This type of reception consists basically in furtively taking over Hegel's thought, especially his aprioricism and "deductional" way of philosophizing; which means an attempt at "forcing" reality into a priori accepted schemes of development. This unavoidably has given rise to dogmatism in ideology and philosophy, to neglecting or weakening the meaning of research on reality, according to the famous Hegelian saying, "So much the worse for the facts" (i.e. those facts which were not in accordance with his theory of reality, "Wirklichkeit"). Unity found in the philosophy of the "Berlin sage" is a unity of an a priori idea which overpowers reality. This is why development had to end with Hegel. That is also why this system's ahumanistic, or in certain interpretations simply anti-humanistic; intellectual climate (which reveals itself in a total subjection of the human individual to the all-dominating whole, "the cunning of Reason", etc.), is even more dangerous than idealism. On the basis of an analysis of Hegel's texts as well as their contemporary interpretations and the above-mentioned conclusions, the author rejects the thesis of the topicality of Hegelianism (e.g. W. R. Beyer's), which is also propagated in some Marxist circles.

He opposes traditional Hegelianism, or that which appears in a "Marxist" cloak, to the conception of constructing a true unity in the process of creating a humanistic community; through the creative effort of each conscious and responsible participant of the process of historical empiria and, above all, of the international communist movement based on classical and currently developed principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The second chapter, "The Philosophy of Praxis and Creationism", presents in detail and develops the above mentioned fundamental ideological-philosophical theses on the basis of historical material pertaining to the polemic of Marx and Lenin with Hegel. The main topic of the chapter is the understanding of praxis and its varieties: the praxis typical for capitalist society, analysed in "Theses on Feuerbach" and in "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", is opposed to praxis freed from alienation, and which, thanks to this, can be creative and is being developed ever more universally in the course of realising a socialist society. The egalitarianization of the concept and phenomenon of creativity is a result of the historical process (Lenin's well-known thesis which is accepted by the great majority of theoreticians in Poland and is, from another point of view, also analysed by W. Tatarkiewicz). On that basis and on the basis of attempts at a new interpretation of classical statements in the light of the latest scientific achievements, the author develops the conception of materialistic creationism. This is an attitude which particularly stresses the role of the new type of liberated and humanized praxis and, at the same time, the dialectically linked idea, theory and philosophy. To put it differently, this is an attempt at concretizing and developing well-known sociological theses on the growth of the subjective factor's role in the course of the realization of socialist and communist society.

Chapter Three, "The Dialectics of Culture as a Dialectics of Creation", makes this attitude of materialistic and dialectical creationism more precise. The chapter concerns the development of Hegel's and Lenin's famous thesis that, as quoted and interpreted in "Philosophical Notebooks", "The consciousness of man not only reflects the objective world, but also creates it". The author does this in relation to the dialectics of culture as a particularly intensive intertwining of relations between the subject and the object. Cultural creativity (in a global understanding of culture) is presented here in its various forms; amongst others, in relation to political creativity, whose subject (the doer) is the collective politician and philosopher: the political party. In this way the author tries to prove that due to the creative "intermediary" of Lenin (which reveals itself not only and not so much in the interpretation of Hegel as in the classical and critical "abolishing" of idealistic creationism and dogmatism in revolutionary praxis and theory by the Great October Revolution's leader), a contemporary, creative development of Marxism as a premise, correlate and, at the same time, generalization of the working class movement, has become possible. The above-mentioned thesis concerning the collective politician, which stemmed from the experiences and achievements of A. Gramsci, seems to be in place here.

The last two chapters of the first part, "The Age of Dialectics" and "Dialectical Society", apply the theses of materialistic creationism developed earlier to polemics with the important and, in a specific way, dialectical conception of Van Lier, to be found in his book "The New Age". In the author's opinion, Van Lier's work is worthy of attention because it is an attempt at a dialectical synthesis which, although bourgeois, contains liberal, progressive and even pro-socialist options for something one might call a pro-socialist theory of convergence. In contrast to theoreticians of "post-industrial society" (mainly Americans) who have tried to neutralize and combat the influence of socialism, Van Lier seems to notice that it is necessary to accept many elements of socialist civilization and already at this stage he has accepted directly certain theoretical elements of dialectics. At the same time, the historiosophy of the Belgian scholar is clearly in a programmatic manner oriented towards the future, an already shaping dialectic universal civilization which, in the author's opinion, forms an early but, nevertheless, important attempt at solving today's common problems, for example those problems concerning ecology and energy.

The author tries to go further than Van Lier and applies those instrumental, technological tools of the "dialectic machine", a network of machines, synergy, and so on, to the conceptions and theories of a dialectic society. A truly dialectic civilization is only possible on the basis of (and in close connection with) a dialectic society, i.e. such a society in which the problem of individuality, "as inexhaustible as an atom", and its relations with the community, will be solved. The author bases himself here on a conceptual methodological-theorical apparatus which he had conceived in his previous book "Individuality and the Motherland. The Philosophical Problems of the National Question" (1972, in Polish). In particular, the earlier work had included the differentiation between individuality and person as well as between a community and a social group: the former two concepts were also treated as values, the latter only as instruments of sociology and the theory of man. The earlier book also included the conception of a "manifesto of communist civilization", as a proposal for a collective preparation of synthetic, philosophical premises for the future unity of all nations on earth (a conception which has been elaborated further in the book under review).

The chapter embodies an attempt at an ontological justification of creativity's dialectics, realized in the form of an ontical differentiation between strata of being and through introducing a distinction between dialectical and metaphysical areas and aspects of being. This should be understood in the following manner: metaphysics is not "an ordinary falsehood" but an absolutization of one of the aspects of being. Otherwise, it could not have arisen as a real opponent of dialectics. In the author's opinion, only with the background of the theory of being, understood in this way, does dialectics gain an appropriate meaning as its adequate generalization and also as the "abolition" of metaphysics (metaphysics is understood throughout the book as an anti-dialectical philosophy and methodology).

In this way the author had prepared the basis for the second part of the book which is entitled "An Outline of the Dialectics of Man".

Chapter Seven formulates an answer to the question: How is a Marxist-Leninist philosophical science of man possible? Here we find, among others, the problem of the essence of man and the laws which rule that particular reality which we call man. Special attention is paid to the basic, essential, and "energetic" law which is the unity and struggle of man with the world. The author is here concerned both with biological premises, as found in the theory of relatively isolated systems or arrangements (Ludwig von Bertalanffy) and developed in the philosophical anthropology of Roman Ingarden and in the dialectical production of political, moral and psychic relations of individuality, or even an ordinary individual, with the world.

Chapter Eight, "An Outline of the Ontology of Man", aims at revindicating and developing Marx's "naturalism" (human nature, corporeality) as well as Lenin's revolutionary "idealism" (the creative role of ideals, longings and theories) in a sharp polemic against alleged "Marxist" sociologism and alternative thought. The subject of this polemic are the tendencies towards various mutually opposing "strata" of man: a corporeal, a social and a psychic-ideal. Such tendencies are characteristic of non-dialectical, alternative thought: in which "strata" are either the activity of consciousness or biological or social determinations. In particular, the author has developed a criticism of an absolutization of the "social" stratum in the famous Sixth Thesis "The essence of man as the totality of social relations". This absolutization is to be found not only in the incorrect conceptions of Adam Schaff, but also in the general plan of the scientifically important book by Lucien Seve, "Marxisme et théorie de la personnalité". In the author's opinion, under the influence of this type of interpretation, there took shape a certain kind of "sociologism". This "sociologism" is understood here as an absolutization of the "totality of social relations" in an interpretation of the essence of man and in a neglecting of the biological and corporeal "strata" as well as the psychic-ideal stratum.

Chapter Nine gives an illustration and concretization of the proposed outline of the dialectics of man while referring to a literary and historical example, i.e. to Faust. The author undertook a philosophical reconstruction of the history and legends of Faust on the basis of various interpretations of Goethe's masterpiece and the analysis of the latter's statements as well as his conversations with Hegel. On this basis the author aimed at capturing "the man as history" and "the man as a species". Faust is presented as embodied dialectics, an historical example (great but at the same time historically limited) of dialectical man: "dialectical" as a result of the interiorization of tensions of the history and, in Goethe's conception, also the interiorization and typification of the human individual's universal fate. At the same time, the author poses the problem of the character of the humanism which is found in Faust. (It is done, for example, in a polemic with the excellent but, at this point, rather one-sidedly positive approval by Lukàcs as being that humanism which, after all, recognised the unavoidable biological and historical-existential defeat of every man). The chapter includes proofs that Goethe was basically close to Hegel's thoughts and to his dialectics of the domination of the whole over the individual and even to that which one might call "an historical anthropological instrumentalism"; i.e. to a subjection of the individual to the absolutized "process" or "spirit" of history, contrary to Kant's categorical imperative and the fundamental principles of humanism. Hence, it is possible to charge Faust of ahumanism despite the fact that this work is considered to be a classical example of humanism. On the other hand, the author also adopts a moderate formula within the problem of the type and limits of that humanism and its specificity in comparison to socialist humanism. It is evident, one may say, that Faust has belonged to the tradition of contemporary, most profound and most universal socialist humanism. This problem is discussed in the summarizing part of the chapter entitled "The Borders of the Ambiguity of and Right to Faust".

Chapter Ten, "Homo creator versus homo contemplator: Marxism-Leninism in view of the transformations of Phenomenology", presents a discussion of Husserl and contemporary phenomenologists against the background of the historical dying of metaphysical (including the Christian) theories of human essence. Particular stress is laid upon revealing the disintegration of the phenomenological school and the appearance of new orientations: historicism in the thought of Husserl himself (of course, in his later period of the Crisis of European Sciences...) and dialectical trends as well as a realistic attitude in the philosophy of Roman Ingarden. Basically the author aims at presenting the importance of this outstanding Polish aesthetician's works in the complex process of the disintegration and overcoming of phenomenology and, finally, to reveal the growth of dialectical elements in contemporary philosophical anthropology. These tendencies can and should be utilized in a development of a fully dialectic Marxist philosophical anthropology.

Chapter Eleven, "The Struggle and the Unity of Man with the World", develops and makes more precise the above-mentioned "energetic" law of the human being on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the relations between the subject and the object on an anthropological level. The author presents the historical changeability of those relations, the growing role of the activity of the subject and, at the same time, of the humanized object (in relations with the "humanized world" and, above all, in social relations freed from alienation and those of a "transparent" character). The historical tendency of contemporaneity leads ever more visibly to the development of this activity into its highest species, i.e. creativity. This is why at the end of the chapter philosophical premises for a scientific theory of creativity are discussed.

Chapter Twelve, which bears the same title as the book, is a summary of conclusions, but with some lines of thought being further developed. Here we come upon the statement that from the perspective of biological, social, or psychological sciences, and, above all, from the point of view of our reality itself, we find ourselves today faced with a phenomenon which is called "the revolution of man". Thus also from the anthropological point of view, we live in a period of a break-through. However, the author is not concerned either with the appearance of a "superman" (in his monograph "The Twilight of the Bourgeoisie. Immoralism - Nihilism - Fascism", in Polish, 1967, he had already polemicized with Nietzche's conception) or with "the death of man" (a motto voiced by technocratic structuralism) but with a revolutionary development of man as a being which realizes possibilities once stifled and acquires new capabilities. Here we find an analysis of relations between sciences about man and the philosophy of man within a growing anthropological revolution. This will be possible only on the condition of a strengthening socialist society and a transition to communism. It is only in a communist society that man will develop in a revolutionary way and, in comparison with progress hitherto, as a full being (Marx) and a manysided one. However, this development poses a problem from the point of view of a certain objective antinomy between socialization and universalization. While polemicizing with the metaphorical statement made by Marx in his "Critique of the Gotha Program", the author formulates a thesis about unavoidable specialization, the limitations of which will be overcome by a universally developed Marxist-Leninist philosophy and great art in the communist era.

The final, Thirteenth chapter, "Freedom and Moral Responsibility" is an attempt at employing the book's theoretical results for practical aims: to show a set of norms, prohibitions, commands, etc., and their meaning. The polemics centre around the "absolutism" of responsibility as proposed by Satre. It seems that the two general and undefined interpretations of moral responsibility, founded on the conception of absolute freedom, lead towards self-negation. The author's analysis is nevertheless basically of a positive nature, especially in relation to ontology, epistemology, anthropology and historiosophy.